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 How do domestic audiences respond to belligerent rhetoric by foreign leaders? I argue 
that when leaders of countries that are historically adversarial engage in belligerent rhetoric 
directed at the adversary it has a detrimental effect on the perception of the opposing state. This 
generates transnational audience costs which are costs created by foreign rhetoric and imposed 
on the domestic political leadership. These costs constrain the range of decisionmaking of 
domestic leaders that can hamper future cooperation. Advancing our understanding of the role 
that citizens play in shaping state foreign policy is important to more accurately identifying the 
components that shape the international system.  
 To identify this phenomenon, I have developed a novel method to examine elements of 
survey and discursive data that highlights the intersection between rhetoric, bilateral relations, 
and state-society relations. Specifically, I look at available survey data, media coverage, and 
individual interest over time via search inquiries to identify how interested people are in what 




other changed following the use of hostile rhetoric. Through three empirical chapters I cover a 
diverse range of historical rivalries to demonstrate the range of states and relationships 
transnational audience costs are present in. In the dissertation I look at the China-Japan, India-
Pakistan, and Greece-Turkey relationships and how the effect of rhetoric on domestic audiences 
changed each’s perception of the other over the time period of 2010-2019.     
I conclude by outlining how I will continue to develop both the model and method used 
in this dissertation for use in future research. The preliminary findings presented in this 
dissertation highlight the importance of understanding the mutual constitutivity or inherent 
endogeneity of interactions at the state and international levels. Understanding this dynamic is 
critical to satisfactorily deepening our understanding of the effects of globalization across all 
levels of analysis and all players in the international system. With the diversification of ideas 
across the international system and their permeation of closed societies, global citizens have 







“Telling it like it is” or speaking one’s mind about issues regarding foreign policies with 
our arch-rivals is an ever present but recently louder stump tactic used by politicians and political 
elites across the world. More importantly, it is a successful tactic that comes at a seemingly low 
cost to benefit. Ranging from the hourly tweets of the 45th president of the United States, to the 
feelings of the mayor of Shanghai toward Japan, the outrage of Brazilian policymakers about the 
audacity of Argentinians to challenge the superiority of Pelé over all other soccer players in 
history, to Pakistani claims of a Hindu Nationalist agenda to annihilate Islam on the Indian 
Subcontinent or Greek rhetoric on the nonsensical claims by the Turks regarding sovereignty 
over Cyprus, these narratives are examples of micro-level exchanges bilaterally between pairs of 
states that aggregated, make up part of an increasingly global conversation between humans.  
However, there is often a cost to engaging in this type of rhetoric. This cost has broader 
implications for the international system as a whole and our collective understanding of it. 
Before identifying these costs though, first the interrelational costs between the pair of 
participants needs to be addressed. The intersectionalism of identities that comprise a state often 
times place regimes and/or governments into a position where they must stay true to a narrative 
and use rhetoric about some “other” that, while we outsiders may find completely meaningless, 
is an integral part of their ontological identity (Mitzen, 2006). This is especially true in dyads, 
pairs of states, where one or more regime is either an autocracy or new democracy, and where 
there is an enduring rivalry present (Goertz and Diehl, 1993). With that said, national leaders 




audience costs. Audience costs in this specific sense, being the costs imposed by constituencies 
for deviating from the accepted public narrative.  
Reflecting on the substantial literature about security dilemmas, spiral theory in 
international relations, and threat balancing, it seems logical that this would exacerbate tensions 
within these dyads. Further, given what we know about audience costs, the costs imposed on 
leaders by their real constituency for deviating from the institutionalized narrative of the regime, 
we can imagine that assuming these costs occur, that belligerent rhetoric may generate them 
within the dyad. Most interesting perhaps, is that not only may adherence to a domestic narrative 
have audience costs associated with it, but it may also generate reciprocal audience costs within 
the domestic space of the other’s audience. This observation is the substance of this dissertation. 
The puzzle I have identified, and the question I ask has a very modest goal. Does 
belligerent domestic rhetoric create audience costs for the “other’s” government and/or political 
regime? In this dissertation I explore this question with the specific purpose of probing the 
boundaries of existing theory, as well as contributing my own conclusions, to determine the 
presence of what I call transnational audience costs. They are transnational in that, purposefully 
or not, talking tough about how the rival should be handled may create concerns for the 
constituency within that rival state. This audience is not an official representative of the state nor 
does it interact with other states on their behalf. Therefore, their presence exists outside the 
control of the state they may physically exist within. To illustrate: if tribe A and tribe B are 
neighbors, and tribe A beats a war drum when preparing to attack tribe B, if members of tribe B 
hear tribe A beating the war drum, they will look upon their own leaders to prepare a response, 
whether that be preemptive action, or building defenses to stymie any anticipated attack. The 




members a seat at the bargaining table with the leaders of the tribes, independent of those 
leaders. 
I hypothesize that because of access to more information, regardless of whether it is 
factual or not, belligerent rhetoric does in fact create transnational audience costs within the rival 
state. However, given the multifaceted nature of theoretical assumptions built into this 
framework or model, the agenda for this dissertation is modest insofar as my ambition is to 
establish the plausibility of this phenomenon and identify its presence if possible. Furthermore, 
while I engage in supposition as to the source of greater information, it is not the focus of my 
hypothesis. What I focus on is whether or not the phenomenon is occurring. Does the real 
selectorate in state B react when the leader of state A engages in threatening rhetoric directed at 
state B? I assert that to the extent that I am able to fully identify and define it in this dissertation, 
it serves a simple purpose as a pilot for a broader body of work, therefore as a plausibility probe 
that will be followed by an even more robust and testable model in future iterations based 
leaping the following existing hurdles. 1) this is a largely new approach to understanding the 
two-level game, bargaining, and the relationship between bargaining and intersubjectivity that 
may not seem intuitive at first glance. 2) greater funding is needed to conduct the necessary field 
work and collect a moderately large sample of survey data to refine and reinforce the method of 
analysis I use in this dissertation. And 3) the framework I propose in this dissertation needs the 
refinement that only multiple iterations of peer review can provide.  
That said, the broad agenda of this dissertation is ambitious insofar as building a 
foundation for a new body of work to build upon. It is important in its timeliness because our 
access to information and global interconnectivity as a result of technological innovations has 




a much greater role in interactions, transactions, and perception of ourselves, each other, and the 
system than we have previously realized1. In light of this, we must evaluate social behavior with 
an understanding that acknowledges from its starting point that audiences behave with greater 
awareness of how the world works than scholarship has typically done up to this point. And if 
not actual awareness, then at least a subconscious sensitivity of social structure. Past work has 
almost exclusively viewed audiences as a tool or a mechanism used by agents, whether it be 
political regimes or elite interests, overlooking the agency that audiences/selectorates themselves 
have. I demonstrate in the following chapters that proximal or passive indicators such as search 
engine analytics in conjunction with public opinion survey data and the intensity of media 
attention offers an improved approach for understanding the relationship between constituencies 
and rhetoric and how that shapes policy while avoiding many of the pitfalls from regime 
manipulation of the findings in our scientific inquiries. To be concise, I combine existing 
methods for data collection with search engine analytics as a proximal indicator to contribute to a 
less politically vulnerable and more stable barometer of audience beliefs and/or preferences. 
There is a great deal of foundational work to be done within this document for future 
work to build off of. Returning to the narrower research question that is the focal point of the 
dissertation however, I investigate the role that transnational audiences play in shaping the two-
level game. I weigh the plausibility of my hypothesis by examining the presence or lack thereof 
of this phenomenon in three empirical chapters, each consisting of one dyad, or pair of states. 
The one constant component that must exist in each dyad in the framework presently is an 
enduring rivalry. With that single prerequisite aside, my findings are generalizable and reveal 
 
1 I do not mean social media specifically when referring to technological change and access to information. 
Speaking from experience, social media as a source for information is unreliable and vulnerable to interpreting 




that transnational audiences play a significant role in shaping not only a state’s foreign policy, 
but the international system as a whole.  
In identifying how transnational audience costs function within this diverse selection of 
dyads, future research can then extend out to pursue more ambitious goals, such as identifying 
linkages that work around the existing historical rivalry requirement. Refining the model to 
eliminate this prerequisite would enhance generalizability even further. This would expand our 
understanding of how transnational audience costs work beyond what this study is capable of. 
Additionally, these findings justify expending greater resources in terms of time and funding to 
continue improving this methodological approach to achieve an even greater degree of rigor than 
what is used in this pilot study. 
 In addition to the novel contributions of this model, I continue building upon a growing 
body of work that examines how and when leaders are held accountable, whether democratic or 
autocratic, and how leaders utilize their publics to strengthen their domestic political position. 
The scholarship I advance in this dissertation is a focus not on the dynamic between elites or 
policymakers and their domestic audience, but rather, what impact their rhetoric has on the 
adversary’s policymakers and their domestic audiences. My approach to this literature is 
straightforward. Rhetoric is critical to the continued legitimacy of political elites across the 
cultural and institutional spectrum,2 and they will say what is necessary to stay in power, 
regardless of their power to actually deliver. Further, in contrast to one of the ideas presented by 
the original framers of the audience costs literature, there are not always substantial costs to be 
paid for not following through. Because rhetoric has an institutional and cultural context, the 
 
2 This phenomenon takes place in all cultures and is practiced by decisionmakers and political elites across all 




nuance of instrumental or utilitarian rhetoric is trapped into being simultaneously subjective and 
intersubjective. Rhetoric can have a subjective meaning within a state, which is internal 
intersubjectivity, however it may also be lost in translation from the original words spoken from 
elite to audience to what is interpreted by the adversary’s elites and audience. Or, as is usually 
the case, there is another layer of intersubjectivity of the rhetoric between state and society in 
both states in the dyad. 
Some of the language of this phenomenon has been widely discussed within other areas 
of political science such as the study of American Politics, this calculus has overlap with ideas in 
international relations that should be incorporated or linkages be made (Mueller, 1973; Mayhew, 
1974; Bueno de Mesquita et al, 2004, 2011). My theoretical contribution is most relevant to the 
area of the international relations bargaining literature focusing on the role of domestic politics in 
international relations over the last thirty years. I contribute to a continued effort to build 
linkages between Putnam’s 1988 article on two-level games, and continuing through the 90s, 
2000s, and 2010s by scholars including James Fearon, Jessica Weeks, and Jessica Chen Weiss 
on audience costs. As domestic coalitions and politics become more polarized and partisan, 
political elites increasingly deflect popular frustration toward long-term rivals and/or newly 
emerging opponents (Mueller, pp 196 – 204).  
Scholars within this literature argue that states bargain with each other to come to 
agreements of one sort or another. In the case of high stakes deals, when the public is aware, they 
become a player at the table as well. While national foreign policy leaders are the actors 
physically sitting in the chairs at this bargaining table, a multitude of domestic actors are keeping 




identified that democratic national leaders are held accountable to domestic audiences3 during 
the negotiation or bargaining process (Fearon, 1994; Tomz, 2007), and a subsequent wave of 
scholars have expanded the scope of this literature to identify and include authoritarian states 
with certain characteristics (Weeks, 2008; Weiss, 2013). These domestic constituencies, within 
states ranging from the most democratic to even the most tightly controlled authoritarian states, 
possess real costs and consequences for leaders who make unfavorable agreements and/or appear 
weak with/to other states (Weeks, 2014). Extrapolating on Bueno de Mesquita’s selectorate 
theory, even dictators are subject to a selectorate of some form. 
 The existing literature on audience costs has been substantiated frequently enough to be a 
reliable platform for use as a major component in the foundation of this framework. States 
collide, creating friction in the form of a dispute that requires a resolution, either cooperatively or 
aggressively. Regardless, leaders meet, discuss the options, and either come to some form of 
agreement, or in rare cases, engage in conflict whether it be a military action, a trade war, or 
some other form of aggression intended to cause material harm to the other. In the pages that 
follow I examine another aspect and group dynamic that is taking place during this process: the 
words that leaders are saying to their constituencies back home on the other side of the two-level 
game, and how that rhetoric informs the adversary’s audience of the other leader’s true feelings 
and intentions; and thus, the pressure that places on their leaders at the bargaining table.  
How this rhetoric affects the adversary’s domestic audience and their leaders sitting at the 
negotiating table contributes to relations between these two states within both this dyad. 
Although I do not address it in this document, in future research I will examine the influence of 
 
3 A political leader’s home constituency who is receiving, processing, and interpreting the manner the national 
leader at the bargaining table is conducting his or herself in terms of representing their interests, as well as their 




transnational audiences over multilateral organizations and within the international system as a 
whole as well. More generally, and returning to my research question, I take a step back and 
examine the attitudinal environment that has been shaped vis-à-vis domestic political rhetoric 
both prior, and following, the dispute resolution process. As I reveal in the subsequent chapters, 
there are times when belligerence is inherent to the very existence of the state, such as in the case 
of India and Pakistan, and in those cases, the question changes slightly to: why do they keep 
going? 
 The examination that follows in my empirical chapters, I use a method I have developed 
on my own largely using proximal indicators that inform us on how the dynamic of transnational 
audience costs function and vary from dyad to dyad. This method serves as a sufficient tool for 
establishing the plausibility of the presence of transnational audience costs and if they do exist, 
what should be done moving forward. It serves as a useful low financial cost method for 
justifying future funding into research in this area that will require a substantial amount of survey 
data and field work. I look at international news sources, domestic news sources, governmental 
press releases, survey data, search term interest over time, and more where available. This often 
includes drawing upon exemplars of statements by officials and citizens that fall within the scope 
of this study. I call this method a Survey, Media, Search (SMS) Analysis. I use the information 
gleaned from this method to make a case to justify further investment into my model through the 
examination of three dyads in three empirical chapters. I examine the Sino-Japanese dyad, the 
Indo-Pakistani dyad, and the Greco-Turkish dyad.  
 My empirical chapters reveal two very important observations. First, threat perception is 
often fueled by belligerent rhetoric from the leaders of a historical rival. And second, that 




which previous literature has focused on. Belligerent rhetoric has been a pervasive contributor to 
exacerbating preexisting tensions and mistrust by parties in both states across all three dyads. 
Further, it has been words and shared histories, not a material balance of power, or preexisting 
cultural social constructs or “clashes of civilizations” that contributed to this spiral. Belligerent 
rhetoric is especially problematic given how attractive it is instrumentally to drum up general 
support and legitimacy by political leaders with their constituencies. While the audience costs 
literature has its detractors (Snyder and Borghard, 2011; Shultz, 2001), it has been resilient in 
illuminating the peculiarities of how states interact with one another.  
 Up to this point, no study has systematically examined the effect that belligerent rhetoric 
has on the relationship dynamic between the adversary’s state-society dynamic and how that 
dynamic influences foreign relations. Prior to my work, there has been a multitude of peripheral 
studies; however, nothing has exclusively targeted this dynamic. Previous work in various 
literatures has identified five related phenomena: 1) political elites use belligerent rhetoric to 
rally their constituency, especially their base within it (Mueller 1973; Goddard 2015; Goddard 
and Krebs 2015; Krebs; 2015). 2) Belligerent rhetoric is one component of a formula in a state’s 
calculus of its threat perception toward another state (Walt 1987). 3) Rhetoric is institutionalized 
as a component of the narrative a regime is held to by its citizens (Hopf 2012; Mitzen 2006; 
Gries 2004; Goode 2012). 4) Another is the general idea of audience costs. States harness their 
state-society dynamic to signal their resolve on a policy dispute to the other party in the dispute 
(Putnam, 1988; Fearon, 1994; Tomz, 2007; Weeks, 2008; Weiss, 2013). And 5) Enduring 





 Although one can infer my thesis via the combination of these explanations with the 
audience costs literature, nothing has systematically focused on specifically how the dynamic 
that exists between a state and society is affected by external belligerent rhetoric. To rephrase 
that, prior literature has not focused on how what you as a leader say to your constituents shapes 
the type of pressure the other leader’s constituents are going to place on them. Goddard and 
Krebs make the case that leaders are primarily concerned with maintaining legitimacy at home 
and practice legitimation strategies through narratives intended to maintain public support 
(Goddard and Krebs, 2015; Goddard, 2015; Krebs, 2015). In contrast to my argument, their work 
places a much larger emphasis on the domestic side of decision making and how it affects the 
state’s foreign policy and shapes the international system. They focus on narratives used by 
leaders to maintain public support and heavily emphasize the resonance these narratives have 
within mass politics. So, while similar in many ways, Goddard and Krebs are inward looking 
whereas my work focuses on essentially a third dynamic, not inward between state and society, 
not state to state, but other society to other state, to put it crudely. Synthesizing this with another 
theme that builds an intersection to mine is Stephen Walt’s. Albeit less direct than the other 
approaches, Walt’s examination of state threat perception takes rhetorical strategies into 
consideration in terms of how states weigh foreign threat however the calculus he uses to 
examine threat and response to it relies more heavily on material capabilities than my own (Walt, 
1987).  
 On the opposite end of the spectrum, scholars such as Jennifer Mitzen and Ted Hopf 
focus more directly on the state society dynamic. The case of Jennifer Mitzen’s work focuses on 
ontological security as an explanation for why states find themselves in tension with one another. 




agents base their feeling of security on how they believe reality works. And second, that the 
destabilization of a society’s ontological security creates chaos, incentivizing leaders to adhere to 
an existing narrative regardless of whether or not they personally agree with it. This is important 
in the process of narratives being institutionalized. In this is an explanation of rationality in terms 
of explaining leader behavior. In addition to the utility of her ontological security model as a 
means of explaining the rationality of a state’s preference for conflict, it is also useful in 
understanding the legitimation strategies state leaders utilize and direct toward their target 
audience. The two-level game between state and society is also exercising a form of ontological 
security in that a leader garners coalitional support from their domestic audience through 
successful legitimation strategies. This reduces audience uncertainty, and simultaneously, 
audience resonance reduces leadership uncertainty. As Ted Hopf explains in more depth, this 
two-way line of communication is important in understanding institutional configurations 
specific to states and/or nations in that both originate/exist within the same societal construct and 
are thus both aware of and likely share, the same norms and values that determine regime 
legitimacy (Hopf, 2012).  
 Hopf’s thesis focuses even more exclusively on the linkages between state and society. 
His work captures what Taeku Lee similarly calls a two-way flow of political communication 
(Lee, 2002), also in many ways similar to John Zaller’s Receive-Accept-Send (RAS) model of 
communication (Zaller, 1992). Based on this approach, Hopf argues that neither state nor society 
behave within a vacuum. The behaviors of each are contingent upon feedback loops or 
interaction from the other. The state, comprised of individuals socialized within the society of 
analysis, behave contextually to that society. Society, on the other hand, governs a logic of 




consequence for deviations from appropriate behaviors and practices. This translates into 
policymaking that is constrained by society, even within authoritarian states. In sum, the primary 
distinction between the framework I propose here in contrast to the work of the scholars I have 
mentioned is the unit of analysis. We are examining a very similar, if not identical phenomenon, 
the primary distinction between my argument and these is the metatheoretical foundation the 
argument is built upon. My work intends to advance the dialogue in a specific sub-section of the 
impact rhetoric has on perception, focusing more on the mid-level rather than meta, and more 
importantly the relationship between a state and society in reaction to that of the external rather 
than internal. In layman’s terms, from the perspective I am examining, the dialogue between 
elites and their audience would essentially be, “they have insulted and humiliated us, now what 
are you going to do about it?” 
 Key to the remainder of my theoretical proposal is the clarification of key concepts in 
subsequent chapters. First, to generalize and summarize the evolution of the audience costs 
literature, Fearon originally proposed, and Tomz later quantified, the observation that democratic 
leaders have an advantage in the bargaining process with other states due to the accountability 
that domestic elites, as well as their constituency, may hold them to if they talk tough and do not 
follow through. Weeks expands on this, that aside from autocrats with total control over all 
facets of the government, authoritarian regimes are held accountable to domestic audiences as 
well. This has since been expanded on even further, that leaders4 can utilize domestic audiences 
instrumentally in the bargaining process at the international level to signal constraints they face 
in compromising (Fearon; Weeks; Weiss). The state can manipulate the public to be either more 
supportive or more hostile to an issue that leaders are striving to make a deal on with other states. 
 




By rhetoric, I mean instrumentalist discourse used to persuade an audience about the value of 
some action, the legitimacy of their governance, the validity of their candidacy, or a policy they 
are promoting. In simpler terms, rhetoric is a form of socially constructive persuasive speech 
utilized to achieve a specific outcome by the speaker (White, 1984). I will go into significantly 
more depth with these concepts as well as every other key concept of my model in my research 
design for the dissertation in the following chapter. 
 The remainder of this dissertation is divided into five chapters. Chapter 2 presents 
the research design to be used as a framework for evaluating my three empirical chapters. In it I 
clearly define variables and refine the framework to be as informative as possible within the 
exploratory constraints of the current iteration of my model. The biggest takeaway in this 
dissertation is in where in the bargaining dynamic we are identifying audience costs, who is 
causing them, and who the costs would be imposed upon. While a clearly identified dependent 
and independent variable are necessary features of any scholarly work, my objective in this 
dissertation is to identify a critical mechanism associated with the dependent variable rather than 
focusing on the strength of the relationship between the two itself. The two will always be 
important but the strength of this exploratory research is in attempting to pinpoint the location 
and intensity of this type of audience costs are. My model as it is presented is my current 
progress in capturing the sentiment and salience of audiences resting on the assumption of other 
foundational scholarship in this research area. As I will elaborate on in subsequent paragraphs, 
the key idea is that leadership behavior is constrained by audience costs. I will go into more 
depth explaining what audience costs are in subsequent chapters as well. What the costs are and 
the consequences of activating them are not the focus of my research, simply identifying them in 




said, I will briefly summarize the linkage between audience costs and the IV and DV in past 
literature, and then summarize the distinct direction I am exploring for future research.  
The fundamental concept of what audience costs are does not differ in my research from 
the traditional scholarship. Audience costs exist within the bargaining literature. However, what 
we are looking at are similar concepts located in very different parts of the bargaining process. In 
past literature, audience costs are the perceived costs by leaders in state B that leaders in state A 
face as a result of tying their own hands via public statements signaling their resolve to not back 
down from a bargaining position. Put another way, state A and state B are trying to come to an 
agreement. State A has a specific preference they are not willing to compromise on. In order to 
signal to state B that they are unwilling to compromise, they will make statements that they want 
state B to perceive as hand tying statements where by publicly stating what they are willing and 
unwilling to accept, because their domestic constituency has the power to impose costs on them, 
they cannot back down from the statements they have made and thus their future bargaining 
position is constrained due to their intentional, self-inflicted, bargaining strategy. Typically, we 
should expect that the leaders in state A, who are tying their hands in this process are fairly 
confident about the actual costs that may be imposed on them. Regardless though, the costs 
themselves are not important, the act of engaging in this strategy, and the leaders of state B’s 
perception that the audience costs state A have imposed on themselves are credible is what is 
important. In this context, the independent variable is state A signaling what they are willing and 
unwilling to accept through the bargaining process and the dependent variable is state B’s 
response. Does state A’s signaling change their position on the outcomes they are willing to 
agree to? Audience costs are a tool at state A’s disposal to signal their unwillingness to 




In contrast, in my model, I identify a phenomenon that exist on the other side of the 
bargaining process.5 In this exploratory model I propose that rhetoric that leaders in state A 
engage in, for whatever reason, is the independent variable and that it ties the hands of leaders in 
state B in terms of future bargaining engagements with state A. These are still audience costs but 
essentially an inverse of what has previously been explored. The audience costs I am looking at 
are the constraints placed on leaders in state B by rhetoric used by leaders in state A. Again, this 
research is still in the exploratory phase as I continue developing and refining the method for 
examining and testing this. However, the implications are substantial in terms of highlighting 
how speech acts leaders have no control over may constrain the options at their disposal when 
engaging in bilateral relations, as well as more substantive work on audience/selectorate agency 
further down the line. In my model the audience costs exist within state B and constrain the 
bargaining position of state B’s leaders. State A engages in rhetoric for a multitude of possible 
reasons but what is important to my argument is that 1) it constrains the options available to 
leaders in state B when bargaining with state A, and 2) more importantly, these costs, or 
perceived costs, or how constrained the options state B has, are less certain for the leaders in 
state A engaging in the rhetoric. State A may or may not even be aware that the rhetoric they are 
engaged in is constraining their counterparts in how they are able to bargain in the future. The 
key part of this is that there is no way that leaders in state A can know for certain what effect 
their rhetoric is going to have in terms of hand tying for the leaders of state B. They may very 
well be counting on hand tying to occur, but they cannot know for certain to what extent that will 
occur.   
 




The important takeaway is in where the audience costs are located and who, how and 
why they are constraining leaders. The question I ask is: does rhetoric used by leaders in state A 
tie the hands of the leaders of state B insofar as their bargaining options with state A? In this 
model, audience costs are a consequence of state A’s rhetoric rather than a tool for state A to 
signal their resolve, and they may not even be aware it has occurred. Therefore, in my model the 
independent variable is rhetoric in state A and the dependent variable is the creation of an 
audience cost mechanism or constraint on policy options available to state B’s leaders for 
bargaining with state A. The overarching exercise in this stage of the theory development is 
identifying the appropriate data to collect as well as the most effective way to analyze and test it. 
For one thing, empirical case selection must avoid as Tomz phrases it, the problem of how to 
“study audience costs directly while avoiding the problem of selection bias” (Tomz, 2007). For 
another, the phenomenon I am looking at is not domestic politics but rather is transnational so 
requires a more flexible methodology that avoids the pitfalls of attempting to use a method that 
works in democracies that does not work in autocracies. What is required is a novel method that 
can capture, as unskewed by regime management as possible, samples of audience attitudes, and 
the sentiments and the saliency of their views on the issue associated with the constraint/cost. 
The preliminary cases I have utilized in this dissertation highlight some potential avenues for 
refining the overall model moving into more rigorous research down the line.  
Additionally, I more deeply explore rhetoric conceptually, as well as in practice. The 
word rhetoric is frequently used but rarely operationalized. To avoid conceptual stretching or 
ambiguities, I fully operationalize rhetoric and define its role in the bargaining process, 
specifically its role influencing the adversary’s state-society dynamic. I then fully explain my 




the cases I have selected are useful for this exercise, and how they are useful for continuing to 
develop and refine the method for rigorous (but very expensive) research and findings in future 
research. Within this document, the method is highly illustrative but illuminates avenues for 
continued exploration to best capture the dynamics of this model within robust and fully 
developed cases.  As exploratory as the current version of my method is, it does its job well, 
which is to support continuing this line in inquiry moving forward. Lastly, the conclusion of 
chapter 2 offers further clarity of the contents of the subsequent empirical chapters.  
 Chapter 3 examines the Sino-Japanese dyad. In it I examine the history of the two 
countries, how their trajectories changed following their forceful opening by the West, and how 
their relations with one another changed as a result. I then focus the remainder of the chapter on 
how this past led to the contemporary narrative between the two countries and why they are often 
as hostile to one another as a result of this history. Chapter 4 examines the Indo-Pakistani dyad. 
In it I examine the fundamental components of the relationship and powerful historical linkage 
between the two to uncover why the relationship between the two is so complicated. I begin with 
the history between Muslims and Hindus on the subcontinent, examine the partition between 
India and Pakistan, the dissolution of East and West Pakistan into Pakistan and Bangladesh, and 
examine the dispute over Kashmir. My analysis and the method I employ provides context for 
the hostile narrative within the dyad that never seems to wane. In chapter 5 I look at the Greco-
Turkish dyad. I focus on the circumstances of Greek independence from the Ottoman Empire, 
the construction of a Turkish identity tied to a geographical state following World War 1, the 
relationship between the two in the interim between World Wars 1 and 2, post-war relations, the 
dispute over Cyprus, and the continued off and on, mostly on, dislike for one another over time. 




concerned. Further, it illustrates that not all audience costs escalate tensions. This aspect is 
important because if the framework is capable of greater generalizability, the roots for this 
should be present within this dyad. Finally, in chapter 6 I discussion the implications of this 
phenomenon in the context of its theoretical contribution generally speaking, dyadic 
relationships more generally, and international relations systemically. I also lay out my agenda 
for future research moving forward from this document. Finally, I conclude the dissertation in 























Chapter 2: The Externalization of the Two-Level Game 
2.1 Introduction 
 In this chapter I lay out the theoretical foundation for my model and research design for 
how I will execute it throughout the remainder of the dissertation. The question I ask and explore 
is simple. Within a dyad, a pair of states, what effect does domestic belligerent rhetoric by one 
state have on their adversary’s state-society dynamic. I will get into this notion of “domestic 
belligerent rhetoric” and “state-society dynamic” in the concepts section, but I’ll break this 
question down more first. For a simple illustration, State A and State B are at a bargaining table. 
State A consists of its national leadership, A1 and its constituency/audience, A2. State B consists 
of its national leadership, B1 and its constituency/audience, B2. So, to break the question down 
into more manageable pieces, First, what are the consequences of belligerent rhetoric that A1 
uses, assumed in this mode to be intended to rally A2 around their bargaining position, with B on 
the relationship between B1 and B2? Further, what constraints and audience costs does rhetoric in 
state A place on the leadership in State B (B1) in how it will proceed to interact with A? In this 
chapter I develop a model for identifying and measuring this phenomenon.  
This model is cradled within Putnam’s two-level games model and given greater depth 
and nuance using an expanded conceptualization of James Fearon’s audience costs theory. It 
does this by identifying when this phenomenon occurs, the extent or severity of it, and 
demonstrates how this phenomenon can be observed and tested methodically. I expand on this 
systematic historical scrutiny of each dyad with a method I have developed to address many 
shortcomings, gaps, resource strained institutions that fund research, as well as current 
restrictions on freedom of movement. This is my SMS Analysis framework which I will discuss 




My model makes five basic assumptions: 1) that political constituencies, regardless of 
regime type, possess a mechanism for holding policymakers accountable for their decisions. This 
is the foundation of where the audience costs literature comes into play. 2) Both democratic and 
authoritarian leaders consciously utilize the perceived efficacy of audience costs to improve their 
bargaining position in bilateral relations.6. 3) The state and society of the adversary is aware of 
this dynamic to a sufficient degree that it affects their perception of threat from the other. 4) At 
the very least, in states with historical rivalries, there is an unintentional blowback effect in the 
targeted state which is the core of this dissertation, which I define as transnational audience 
costs. And 5) Regardless of whether leaders in the state that initiated the rhetorical brinkmanship 
are aware of these transnational audience costs, their rhetoric forms an institutionalized narrative 
that creates legitimacy costs if they deviate from it. A small caveat to this, to address an excellent 
point regarding audience costs by Snyder and Borghard (2011), though not explored in this 
dissertation, there is some threshold of believability, or a tether to reality might be a better way to 
phrase it, in terms of the credibility of belligerent rhetoric domestically. Further, though the 
institutionalization of legitimized narratives is itself an interesting subject worthy of exploration, 
and that I have investigated myself in the past, it is not the foci of this dissertation. My focus in 
this text is on the ripple effect in state B that rhetoric tailor made by leaders in state A for 
audience consumption in state A has on the audience in state B’s threat perception. 
The remainder of the chapter proceeds as follows. First, I identify the meaning and 
boundaries of the key concepts I use throughout the dissertation. In some cases, the way I define 
these concepts may differ from how a previous author intended them or how the reader may 
understand them. I believe this disconnect happens much more frequently in the sciences than we 
 




appreciate so eliminating or at least mitigating the impact of this misunderstanding as much as 
possible is something I actively engage in my work. I then discuss the theoretical assumptions I 
make in this text, how I understand key theories and models to function, how I synthesize them 
within my model, and what I contribute to the broader collective understanding of them in the 
social sciences. I then proceed to ground this discussing directly and concisely within my model 
to thoroughly explain it and define its parameters and boundaries. Finally, I outline and build my 
research design. I identify the dyads I have selected to examine in my empirical chapters, justify 
their selection, and go into further detail on why the approach I use in this text is the most 
appropriate for this framework in the present. Further, I explain my logic and justification for the 
data and evidence I use in my method for examining the dyads in the empirical chapters. I 
conclude by providing an outline for the structure and content on the empirical chapters that 
comprise the remaining substantive chapters of the dissertation. 
2.2 Concepts 
 This section serves as a reference sheet of sorts that readers may refer back to throughout 
the document to refresh their understanding of how, and why if explained here, I am using a 
concept, what I mean when I use it, why I am using it in that manner and why that concept and 
not another. Again, while this process is often tedious for both the writer and reader, it is 
imperative that both build an intersubjective understanding of the meaning of words in context in 
text. By intersubjective I mean that a concept or idea has shared meaning between participants. 
This is in contrast to objective, which some would argue does not exist, but regardless, implies a 
collective understanding of a concept or idea by all, and subjective which is the way that a single 
entity understands a concept or idea internal to itself. While many of these are commonly used 




stretching inevitably occurs over time. I have already provided a preliminary discussion of most 
of these ideas in a general sense in my introductory chapter, however, in this section I will 
identify them with more nuance and context insofar as how and why they are important 
components in my broader model. Put differently, this section devotes additional space to 
explain how key concepts are relevant to this text. I explain how they work, in relation to the 
other components I use, and interact with all of the moving pieces within the model. 
 First, a word that has been used a lot already, is dyad. A dyad is a pair of states (Russett 
and Oneal, 2001). Anyone familiar with work on the democratic peace theory is likely aware of 
this term, however, it needs to be secularized so to speak. There is no ideological implication to 
the use of the word in this dissertation. Some dyads contain a democracy and autocracy, or any 
combination of the two. It is simply a more concise way to refer to a pair of states or bilateral 
(dyadic) relations. An audience, is a constituency or group in general that is the target of rhetoric 
from elites, decisionmakers, leaders, etc. Audience is used in this work interchangeably with 
electorate, selectorate, constituency and public (Mayhew, 1974; Russett, 1990; Fearon, 1994; 
Aldrich et al, 2006; Tomz, 2007; Weeks, 2008; Bueno de Mesquita et al, 2011; Chen Weiss, 
2013; Bausch, 2014). Further, in regards to selectorate, although most would dismiss the 
nominal selectorate as mostly irrelevant in authoritarian states, the general public that typically 
comprises it still has some means of obtaining accountability from policymakers, even if that 
accountability is collective action to topple the regime (Tarrow, 1988; Beissinger, 2002). In my 
work, perhaps it is a shift in generational understanding, or perhaps genuine autocratic slippage 
is taking place on a global level, but I seldom use the word electorate, preferring selectorate, 
when talking about constituencies. In terms of the word electorate, it is interchangeable with 




domestic bargaining, coalitions, constituencies, and win-sets for policymaking than electorate 
does. I use the term leader, decisionmaker(s) and policymaker(s) synonymously as well.  
 I define rhetoric as being instrumentalist discourse used to persuade an audience about 
the value of some action, the legitimacy of their governance, the validity of their candidacy or a 
policy they are promoting (Goddard and Krebs, 2015). Discourse is talk and text, or words and 
deeds, that take place between two or more actors. Instrumentalism refers to the discourse, talk 
and text, and actions, that decisionmakers engage in being a tool used to obtain a specific 
reaction out of the target audience. The policymakers’ personal views on the idea being used are 
irrelevant, what matters is that whatever pure or symbolic speech utilized by decisionmakers, 
vis-à-vis their audience is used specifically to achieve a desired outcome (Conversi, 1995; Smith, 
1996; Brown, 2004). Both Fearon and Bates address instrumentalism as well in their treatments 
of rationality and ethnic politics insofar as how elites will engage in narratives instrumentally to 
activate specific intersections of identities to push for the support of a policy, a regime, or some 
other idea that is in need of support. While not explicitly related here, some will read this and ask 
“how does one identify when instrumentalism ends and institutionalism begins?” especially in 
the context of ethnic and nationalist politics. Paul Goode’s 2012 analysis on the 
institutionalization of nationalist narratives in post-Soviet spaces provides as concise of a line to 
demarcate the two as one can expect when discerning between when something is instrumentalist 
or has become institutionalized (Goode, 2012). Astroturfing is mass movements or mobilization 
that are constructed to appear grassroots, but are in reality controlled and manipulated by elites in 
general or the regime in power specifically (Howard, 2005; Ratkiewicz, 2011).  
Rationality, rationalism, or to be rational is used here to mean that: “every 




is, it proceeds toward its goals with a minimal use of scarce resources and undertakes only those 
actions for which marginal return exceeds marginal costs (Downs 1957, pp 137). Narrowing this 
down to recognize how culturalism, socialization, identity, etc. factors in, I use Bates’ typology 
which highlights the cultural, institutional, and/or structural context that rationality exists within 
(Bates et al 1998, pp 628). And most importantly, that agents behave rationality based on their 
learning, socialization, and the information that is available to them which may not be available 
to us, which accounts for the observer’s perception that the agent has made suboptimal decisions 
when in reality there is a separate game going on in addition to the game within our unit of 
analysis (Tsebelis 1990, pp. 24-39). I fully acknowledge that I am significantly streamlining 
Bates’ bounded rationalist vs. Tsebelis’ nested games to use them as synonymous with one 
another, but within the context that I use them, they are used straightforward and simply to 
acknowledge that there is not a universal rationalism, neither culturally as in the case of Bates, 
nor temporally as in the case of Tsebelis. Rationalism is the underpinning of bargaining which 
identifies and explains the negotiation and cost-benefit analysis that policymakers weigh when 
determining whether their optimal decision is war, or some negotiated alternative (Fearon 1995, 
pp. 380). Further, and a matter which I will discuss further later, given the stigma against 
rationalism that still glows faintly following the post-paradigmatic clash between rationalism and 
constructivism, it is necessary, especially in IR, to avoid the pitfall of strawmanning rational 
choice theory and the scholarship that utilizes this epistemology based on cleavages constructed 
in IR constructivism’s infancy.  
2.3 Theoretical Assumptions 
 With the basic concepts fully defined and operationalized so to speak I will now touch 




especially important for this dissertation because 1) I cover a broad swath of literature in the 
social sciences, and 2) I do so with my own subjective understanding of them which necessitates 
that I elaborate on and justify my understanding, interpretation, and usage of them throughout 
this dissertation. I will touch on the big ideas, the exemplary pieces that stand out within each 
specific body of work to identify the origin so to speak, and then discuss the mid-level theorizing 
that has taken place within that area of research since, up to the present, to lay out how exactly I 
arrived at the conclusions I have arrived at with each, and what my work adds or contributes to 
each.  
2.3.1 Enduring Rivalries 
 The first major theoretical idea that needs to be addressed is a relatively small, but 
extremely important, literature for this model. Throughout all of the scrutiny I have subjected my 
general hypothesis to, which is that domestic belligerent rhetoric creates audience costs in the 
adversary’s country from their constituents forcing them to take tougher positions in terms of 
bilateral policies, the only limitation thus far preventing it from obtaining total generalizability is 
the necessity for the presence of a preexisting historical rivalry. As such, I will discuss the 
general thesis of the theory, how it applies to this model in general, and how it is relevant to the 
dyads I have selected to examine in my empirical chapters.  
 The foundational works of the enduring rivalries literature are the papers by Goertz and 
Diehl in the 1990s and again, has since been brought into the broader rivalry literature. Generally 
speaking, the enduring rivalries literature has been consolidated within the broader literature on 
rivalries in general, “dropping the modifiers and simply uses the term rivalry” (Findley et al, 
2012). The modifier remains critical to this model however. Further, I use enduring rivalry and 




affects bargaining varies based on type. More recent works such as Findley et al. focus on the 
use of terror tactics in the bargaining process between rivals. Krainin and Ramsay examine 
rivalries that exist based on asymmetries in resources, thus creating rivalries (Krainin and 
Ramsay, 2012). However, in the case of rhetorical threat perception in terms of transnational 
audience costs, a historical narrative, context, and past incidents or confrontations shape and 
inform the other on rhetoric used insofar as its credibility, what sort of triggering effect it may 
have, and other factors discussed in each of the upcoming chapters highly specific to that dyad. 
For example, Chinese have an understandable anger toward certain Japanese practices in 
Shintoism in terms of its ties to the Yasukuni Shrine, however 1) this is independent of the state, 
which does not share a common meaning in Japan, and 2) this is perceived by Japanese not as 
being unapologetic for the atrocities the Japanese military committed in the Second Sino-
Japanese War, the role that Japanese political elites and common people played in those 
atrocities, but rather as the Chinese Communist Party attempting to restore the regional power 
dynamics of the Early Qing Dynasty and the tributary system that existed in East Asia during this 
time.  
 Goertz and Diehl’s work deals specifically with enduring rivalries. They define enduring 
rivalries as “repeated conflict among the same set of states, or what we refer to… as ‘enduring 
rivalries’” (Goertz and Diehl, 1993). Their work highlights repetitive or recurring conflict within 
a dyad that stretches over an extended time period. In their 1993 piece, they casually discuss the 
India-Pakistan rivalry and the Israeli-Arab rivalry. They delve more into the theoretical side and 
engage the broader literature on the topic in their 1995 article (Goertz and Diehl, 1995). Also 
within this literature is greater precision on what is meant by an enduring rivalry which is one 




 What is important in this model though is that, building on what I said, there is a shared, 
intersubjective understanding of dyadic discourse and the rhetorical devices that are interwoven 
within that discourse. Discourse again being, the words and deeds that take place between states. 
Rhetoric in a vacuum does not necessarily carry significant meaning. However, rhetoric that 
exists within a discursive space contained in an enduring rivalry dyad, consistently maintains a 
constant, continuous, stable meaning to the parties involved. In other words, whether the pattern 
will hold this time, historically this rhetoric has indicated that the next move will be x, y, or z. 
While this forecast can never be certain, what matters in this model is that at the societal level, 
the public perceives the rhetoric to be likely enough that transnational audience costs are 
generated and brinkmanship within the relationship increases. Future research should examine 
the applicability of quantitative approaches that construct an algorithm that sheds light on this 
relationship between discourse, rhetoric, and brinkmanship behavior in this type of scenario. I 
say algorithm due to the work flow, decision tree, conditional variables, and the nature of how 
those variables are operationalized would need to take place. Regardless, that is not the objective 
of this text, but it is certainly a topic worth exploring within the broader boundaries of this model 
at a later date.   
2.3.2 The Selectorate 
 The next theoretical assumption I address is that political constituencies possess a 
mechanism for holding their policymakers accountable (Mayhew 1974; Bueno De Mesquita et 
al, 2004; Gallagher and Hanson 2015; Wong 2018). While distinct in makeup, both democratic 
and autocratic leaders must satisfy the preferences of the “winning coalition” within their 
electorate or selectorate base, depending on regime type. These scholars show not only evidence 




mechanisms of accountability that constituencies in both democratic and authoritarian states 
possess. 
 In democracies, the voting participants within society possess the means of peacefully 
deposing leadership that they determine to no longer satisfy the conditions for administrating the 
state (Dahl 1971 pp, 2-10). When policymakers in democracies do not deliver, those who were 
once their coalition oftentimes defect and punish them via voting them out of office (Key 1963 
pp, 9). The legitimacy of this institution/mechanism is evident in the level of consideration that 
policymakers devote to fostering the support of their constituency (Mayhew 1974 pp, 5). Finally, 
contrary to the popular misconception, (someone) a strong case has been made and supported via 
empirical data that the electorate, public, or audience are attentive to the foreign policy decision 
making of their leadership (Russett 1990, Aldrich et al 2006).  
Within my framework, as with other established theoretical concepts that I have utilized, 
I argue that a separate distinction between electorate and selectorate is unnecessary. Rather, an 
electorate is merely one component within the selectorate theory model (Bruce Bueno de 
Mesquita et al. 2011). Depending on the true level of democracy that exists within a state,7 an 
electorate could be either the nominal or real selectorate. In a pure democracy, which is one with 
a Polity score of 10, such as Germany, the electorate may in fact be the real selectorate, whereas 
in an anocracy, which is not a democracy, such as the United States or Russia, the electorate is 
subjected to significant hurdles to mitigate its impact, or obstruct who can participate, 
sufficiently that it is at best, a nominal selectorate. I will not extrapolate on this in greater length 
than necessary, but to address raised eyebrows in my saying this by some members of my 
audience, through increasingly aggressive gerrymandering, partisanship that puts party before 
 




constitution or governmental institutions, a hyper-politicized “supreme” court, and a mechanism 
in the upper house of the US congress (the filibuster), minority parties are able to wholly obstruct 
parties that win elections, even decisively enough to warrant a governing mandate, that the “will 
of the people” (electorate) can be canceled by approximately 2/5ths of that congressional body, 
or an almost absolutely unchecked judicial system.   
That said, further explanation of selectorate theory, especially insofar as my usage, is 
warranted. Selectorate theory places participants in the selection process for leaders into three 
categories, the nominal selectorate, real selectorate, and winning coalition. Regardless of regime 
type, all states possess a selectorate. In a typical democracy, the nominal selectorate is usually 
the average voter. More influential personalities or elites comprise the real selectorate, and those 
who voted for the winning candidate are a member of the winning coalition (Bruce Bueno de 
Mesquita et al. 2011). On a linear spectrum from most democratic to least, what changes is the 
size of the selectorate, and therefore, the winning coalition. Shedding additional light on this 
though, it should be clarified that being a member of the winning coalition requires more than 
just voting for the correct candidate. The winning coalition implies agency that members of the 
nominal selectorate, aka the interchangeables, and likely the real selectorate as well, typically do 
not possess independent of one another, or more often, without an extra “push” from an even 
more powerful circle of elites. Future research should explore an expansion of selectorate theory 
given the increasing sophistication of authoritarian system since the late 1990s - early 2000s. 
In the case of autocracies, absent an electoral mechanism, governments are still built 
upon the foundation of at the very least winning coalitions, and these coalitions are complicit in 
the actions undertaken by policymakers and have, to some varying degree, the means of 




sort is necessary to maintain the favor of the coalition however ideological considerations matter 
as well (Bausch 2014). The important take away for the purposes of this project is that there is 
the presence of a mechanism for people not currently or directly in power to hold those in power 
accountable for every decision and area of discursive space they venture in to. Couched better in 
the vocabulary of this text, audiences are synonymous with selectorates and therefore while size 
may vary, there is always going to be an audience within a state, a coalition of supporters, that 
must be satisfied with the policies of the leader(ship). 
2.3.3 Instrumentalism in Perceived Costs 
 The second assumption is that leaders in both democracies and autocratic regimes use 
both their knowledge A1 and their bargaining adversary’s knowledge B1 that this mechanism 
exists, as an advantage in obtaining the most favorable outcome in negotiations. This is a very 
concise summarization of audience costs theory (Fearon 1994a; Schultz 2001; Tomz 2007; 
Weeks 2008; Chen Weiss 2013; Weeks 2014; Chen Weiss 2014). Audience costs scholars argue 
two main points. 1) That leaders interact with their domestic audience instrumentally to create 
their desired reaction as evidence to other leaders at the bargaining table that their hands are tied 
and they cannot back down from their position. And 2) by intentionally placing themselves in 
this vulnerable position, leaders are signaling their resolve of what the boundaries of acceptable 
terms in the bargaining process are (Fearon 1994a; Fearon 1994b; Fearon 1997). 
Fearon’s original thesis on domestic audience costs made the observation that democratic 
leaders can use their domestic rhetorical tools to their advantage in the bargaining process with 
other states. He argues that, in contrast to the two previous predominant arguments by previous 
scholars, 1) that leaders conduct a balance of power and capabilities calculus with their 




victim of cognitive biases that impair their decisionmaking during negotiations (Jervis 1976, 
Snyder and Diesing 1977, Lebow, 1981, and Jervis, Lebow, and Stein 1985). In sum, leaders 
make decisions based on a calculus of reductionist or single-minded threat perception rather than 
on the slew of complexities that factor into a leader’s strategy. An excellent illustration of the 
complexity and nuance that goes into a decisionmakers calculus is Saddam Hussein’s bluff 
regarding his possession of weapons of mass destruction. Saddam viewed Iraq’s position and 
security in the Middle East in terms of its adversaries as more critical than the overwhelming 
force the United States could throw at it. His decisions were wholly rational and calculated, he 
was simply placed in an impossible situation.8 Based on this logic, foreign policy decisionmakers 
are wholly rational and calculating in their conduct of relations with other states (Fearon, 1994a, 
Fearon 1994b). Decisionmakers engage in a “rational” bargaining process with their 
counterparts. Further, democracies possess an exceptional advantage when bargaining with 
autocratic decisionmakers because: A) the democrat’s constituency has institutional mechanisms 
to punish their leader for obtaining an unsatisfactory agreement; and B) democracies possess the 
institutional transparency within their media, from elites who dissent from the primary 
decisionmakers, and other expressions of dissatisfaction that the domestic audience, or public, 
possesses. This provides decisionmakers an inherent advantage in the bargaining process. 
Furthermore, the key part of Fearon’s argument, is that democratic leaders use this to their 
advantage, and engage in tough talk with their audience regarding the adversary, to signal their 
resolve to their counterparts at the bargaining table (Fearon, 1994a pp, 579-581). 
Fearon’s work has since been built upon to account for the comparable dynamic within 
authoritarian states. Building on the selectorate theory discussed in the previous section, all 
 




regimes have an audience they are accountable to. The primary distinction between democracies 
and autocracies is the size of the audience, and the means for communicating their preferences to 
leaders. Credibility adds an additional complexity in terms of whether the autocrat rallying their 
base to protest and demonstrate against backing down is viewed as legitimate or not by their 
counterparts in the bargaining process. Weeks argues that previous literature on audience costs 
underestimates the degree that they also affect authoritarian regimes. Whether or not audience 
costs exist, and possess instrumental value to the regime depends on three factors, 1) whether or 
not domestic audiences have the means and will to hold leaders accountable, 2) whether they 
view compromise as a negative outcome or not, and 3) and most importantly, whether their 
counterpart believes that their audience costs are credible. Weeks demonstrates empirically that 
democracies hold no exceptional advantage in terms of audience costs when signaling their 
resolve to their counterparts (Weeks, 2008).  
The specific mechanics of how autocratic audience costs work is explored in even further 
depth more recently (Chen Weiss 2013). Authoritarian regimes such as China utilize 
demonstrations and violent outbursts, combined with their domestic calls for calm from the 
outraged masses during an important strategic or unexpected confrontation. The demonstrations, 
which are widely publicized and known about, are allowed to occur in order to demonstrate to 
their adversary “the dog they are desperately trying to hold on its leash” when confrontation and 
need for bargaining occurs. The take away from this analysis is not anything to do with the level 
of support or anger about a particular situation the Chinese people feel about whatever the issue 
may be, the important variable is that the regime allowed the protests to occur and opened the 




There are five key observations that can be identified from this. 1) This is a prime 
example of how governments use audience costs to negotiate in international disputes. The 
Chinese government is pursuing a bargaining strategy that utilizes the nominal selectorate as 
their rhetorical mouthpiece toward their adversary. Rather than becoming confrontational and 
belligerent in the negotiation process, they use the Chinese public to do it for them. 2) This 
process is also beneficial in shoring up domestic legitimacy when the regime can appear to have 
been responsive to the public’s demands by walking away with a better deal than what was 
allegedly on the table.9 3) The information and narrative the average participant in these 
demonstrations is exposed to is constructed or tailored specifically to evoke the response they 
want. In this context, audience costs can be even more effective when used by autocrats than by 
democrats. Their ability to control the information the people have access to makes it easier for 
them to solicit the response they desire.  The Chinese government effectively utilizes public 
outrage to signal its resolve during confrontations. The Chinese government encourages and 
even guides these demonstrations in order to signal their inability to make concessions on an 
issue understood. 4) Even if this strategy is astroturfing rather than grassroots mobilization, it 
does not mean that it is costless for the regime. Legitimacy is on the line at that point. Therefore 
there are still very real consequences for utilizing an audience cost bargaining strategy, and the 
whole point of using this strategy in the bargaining process in the first place is intended to 
communicate to the adversary how seriously the leadership takes the issue.  5) Finally, just 
because this process is inorganic doesn’t mean that the alternative is better. The absence of this 
strategy does not mean that the regime would not get punished for not using this approach and 
instead making a more positive sum deal. While literature previous to mine, which focuses on 
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domestic audience costs outside of “the other” in a manner of speaking, with transnational 
audience costs, by virtue of conjured discursive space generating the traction that it does 
indicates that there are very real and legitimate sentiments on this issue and if the weaker 
position the government was taking in these negotiations became known, it could be disastrous 
for the regime.  
2.3.4 The Cost/Benefit Calculus with Audience Costs 
 Expanding on the previous assumption, and critical to tying all of this literature together 
is the assumption that leaders are typically acting rationally even when it appears they are 
making suboptimal decisions. What makes their decisions rational may be outside the scope of 
the observer’s criteria. Utilizing the logic of bounded rationality and/or nested games, the puzzle 
of why leaders use belligerent rhetoric to shore up domestic support at the expense of the foreign 
policy negotiations they are engaged in makes sense (Bates, 1983; Tsebelis 1990). We should 
assume that decisionmakers are always acting rationally, and rather than isolating and dismissing 
or discounting their behavior, instead investigate the target audience within that discursive space 
and the instrumentality of engaging in that rhetoric by leaders. In terms of the model, the payoff 
for leaders, A1 in utilizing rhetoric to mobilize the selectorate or audience, A2, may be what the 
objective of A1 was in the first place. Further, in spite of or even in contradiction of audience 
costs, on occasion it is more beneficial for leaders, A1 to deviate from the narrative they have 
constructed with their audience, A2.  
Within this area of scholarship are exemplars such as Mueller’s work on the relationship 
between the US president and the public in terms of the rally around the flag effect, Tsebelis’s 
work on nested games which demonstrates the rationality of perceived irrational behavior by 




because leaders are satisfying a different audience at the expense of the actor they are bargaining 
with, and Russett who goes into great detail about the symbiotic relationship between the US 
president and the public in shaping the foreign policy of the United States (Mueller 1973; 
Tsebelis 1990; Russett 1990; Nacos 1990; Aldrich et al 2006).  
A concern that often comes up when bridging literature designed for democratic regimes 
with actions and behaviors of autocratic regimes is that the systems of government and 
institutional configurations within them are fundamentally different. However, while this is most 
certainly true, I utilize these tools here as mechanisms and processes that exist in almost if not all 
states, albeit to varying degrees. The regime type plays a part in how interactions work within the 
model, but the pieces themselves are similar enough to fall under the same umbrella of 
understanding. In the subsequent chapters I identify the presence of solid empirical evidence that 
these same constraints are present with authoritarian leaders in addition to those within 
democratic states. 
2.3.5 Tangible Consequences 
 The fourth assumption is that the audience costs highlighted in the previous points can be 
severe, up to and including the loss of regime legitimacy. Once a political regime becomes 
“locked in” to a narrative they have constructed, it can be disastrous to back pedal or contradict 
that narrative. This is the point where the audience costs the previously mentioned scholars come 
into effect. A wealth of knowledge and research has been done within this area, albeit not in the 
context of the audience costs literature, rather, in terms of narratives, discourse, rhetoric, and 
legitimacy (Hopf 2012, Mitzen 2006, Goddard 2015, Goddard and Krebs 2015, Goode, 2012). 
Scholars of this area include those such as Ted Hopf with his distinct and signature approach to 




mechanics of state and society, and in his particular case, within the Soviet Union. Mitzen 
identifies the idea of “ontological security” which is the perception of security or insecurity of 
state and society in a dyadic or even systemic relationship. Her work adds an entirely new 
dimension to understand constructed narratives in the international system. The narrative of the 
other in a dyad or one’s place in the system isn’t just contingent upon how its place and the 
others places are defined and redefined, but the entire conception and understanding of one’s 
existence with others and within the system as a whole. Goddard and Krebs examine the linkage 
between rhetoric and legitimacy within states. They argue that a state’s grand strategy is a 
product of a regime’s legitimacy and the rhetoric and narrative needed to maintain that 
legitimacy. In sum, why a state moves from position/posture A to position/posture B is dependent 
upon the regime’s legitimacy at the time of A and B is the result of the necessary measures both 
in words and deeds that are required to stabilize its position. Paul Goode’s examination of the 
institutional constraints that nationalist narratives have on future regimes’ “rhetorical toolkit” 
highlights a mechanism of accountability present in states of all regime types, whether 
democratic or not.  
2.3.6 A Spiral of Fear: The Outcome 
 The fifth and final assumption is that the belligerent rhetoric of leaders in state A 
heightens threat perception of the audience within state B. The threat perception of the 
audience/selectorate in state B toward state A constrains the range of policy options available to 
state B’s leaders with the leaders of state A (Schelling 1960; Schelling 1966; Jervis 1976; Cohen 
1979; Walt 1985; Walt 1988; Schelling 1984; Davis 2000; Rousseau and Garcia-Retamero 
2007). Placing threat, and threat perception, into a broader context, threat is a specific type of 




guarantee and response are negative (Davis 2000). Change in threat perception is not the only 
type of response an audience may have, but threats are what we most often associate with 
“belligerent” rhetoric in terms of promises. Finally, regardless of how credible state B’s leaders’ 
view the promise, what matters is the constraining effect it has on them based on how state B’s 
audience interprets the rhetoric. Schelling identifies three primary characteristics of promises: 
1. What is promised must appear to the second party, the one to whom the promise is 
made, as being in his interest. (Incurring an obligation to punish in the event of his 
misbehavior we would call a threat.) 
2. What is promised should be something that one would not ordinarily be expected to 
do or to bring about, absent the promise: promising is vacuous if I always go home on 
time for dinner and there is no reason to suppose that today is different.  
3. What is promised should be something that the second party perceives to be within 
the promisor’s control. My promising that the sun will be eclipsed at noon should not 
affect your expectation that that event will happen nor get me any credit for having 
brought it about (Schelling 1989/Davis, 2000). 
These characteristics sum up what comprises the threat side of the threat perception calculation. 
Summing this up concisely, Rousseau and Garcia-Retamero infer from this that threat is “a 
situation in which one agent or group has either the capability or intention to inflict a negative 
consequence on another agent or group” (Rousseau and Garcia-Retamero 2007). Extrapolating 
on this, threat perception is the perception and subsequent anticipation by the receiver or 
inflictee, of the above-mentioned outcome for noncompliance with the inflictor’s preferences. 
Specifically, within the context of my model, the threat is delivered via A1’s rhetoric to its target 
audience, A2, and is weighed and interpreted by B2 in terms of the threat’s credibility and 
severity. B2’s assessment shapes the pressure that it places upon B1 and the costs it may impose 
for B1’s failure to properly respond, whether that response be saber-rattling in return all the way 
to something more material and severe such as sanctions or military confrontation. In sum, in the 
following three chapters, I examine 3 dyads empirical to highlight different ways this framework 




where history is more or less important, regime type, religion, etc. I also weigh alternative 
explanations in order to explore the scope of possible types of relationships between state A’s 
rhetoric and state B’s response, as a consequence of A’s rhetoric on audience B.   
2.3.7 The Collateral Damage of the Two-Level Game 
 Building on these assumptions, I incorporate my model into Putnam’s two-level game 
(Putnam 1988). The contribution I add, is identifying the effect of belligerent rhetoric on the 
bargaining counterpart’s audience, and how that effect complicates the domestic side of the 
interstate bargaining, narrowing the win-set range between actors. This results in an even broader 
“Transnational Two-Level Game” which I will investigate further in future research. In this case, 
Transnational means that agency outside of the direct control of the state, e.g., the selectorate, 
aka audiences, have a role to play in Putnam’s win-set model, hence, the transnational aspect. 
Framed more clearly in the Putnam’s terminology, my model identifies a third dynamic in the 
two-level games model. There is the statesmen dynamic in state-to-state interactions, the 
domestic dynamic in statesman to domestic constituency dynamic, and there is a third variable, 
transnational audiences. Transnational audiences exist outside the bounds of the traditional state 
model in spite of their simultaneous role in another portion of the game. They do not just 
influence their statesmen in the bargaining process, they also signal independently to the other 
side in the bargaining process what range an acceptable agreement will fall within. Although this 
creates a more complicated dynamic in the bargaining process, when transnational audiences are 
vocal, it provides more information to the statesmen sitting at the state-to-state table.  
So, to tie everything together, a confrontation of some sort occurs between state A and 
state B necessitating negotiations and thus, bargaining, between the two begins. During this 




what their optimal outcome is. The outcome is the “win-set” that they must obtain. Further, it is 
an outcome that is acceptable both to their bargaining counterpart as well as their domestic 
audience. The domestic audience is not simply a party that must be satisfied in the bargaining 
process, but is also a bargaining chip in and of itself. Each side will frame the negotiation to their 
domestic constituencies in a manner that achieves the desired effect for them to signal their 
resolve to not budge from some specific outcome with the counterpart. This on one hand, 
determines what the domestic audience is willing to accept, and on the other, what the minimum 
the negotiators with the other state will accept. The resolve dynamic is based on the knowledge 
of the counterpart that once those domestic commitments have been made, that the state cannot 
back down without sustaining significant costs from their domestic audience.  
 Meanwhile, while all of this is going on, each state is utilizing the negotiation to shore up 
domestic legitimacy. It’s just as possible that the entire initial confrontation was manufactured to 
build up domestic legitimacy as it is that a genuine incident occurred.10 Either way, the incident 
serves as an opportunity for the regime to reify its commitments and promises to its constituency. 
Each side utilizes an instrumental rhetorical device to inflate the perception of its responsiveness 
to the public and advance the state/society’s prestige in the relationship and/or world. As will be 
discussed in the following empirical chapters, this rhetoric is oftentimes not followed up upon or 
enforced by the audience or the real consequences of the tough talk are not widely known, either 
in democratic or autocratic states. For example, US presidential candidates talk tough, but very 
rarely follow up on these campaign promises once in office. Also, something that cannot be 
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emphasized enough, audience costs do not always constrain decisionmakers to respond with 
belligerence. Audiences can pressure leaders to deescalate rather than escalate a crisis. 
This final point cannot be emphasized enough. Throughout my examination of my model 
through a multitude of dyads, I continued to run into a major obstacle which I at first identified 
as an indicator of a null hypothesis or the spuriousness of my model. In many cases, audiences, 
at first glance, were totally indifferent to rhetoric. They did not care. I first saw this in an 
investigation of the British-French dyad. Historically, Britain and France have been rivals at 
many points. France has often been Britain’s bridge of contact with continental Europe. Based on 
that I assumed that Brexit and the rhetoric associated with it would have placed a strain on 
Anglo-French relations. However, that was not the case. While British politicians, political 
pundits, and elites and other circles were pontificating on the disastrous consequences EU 
membership was having on Britain’s economic, political, and global well-being, French 
audiences were unmoved and unphased by any of it. They legitimately did not care. This pushed 
me in a new direction where I slightly restructured my hypothesis that perhaps in addition to an 
enduring rivalry, an autocracy must also be present in the dyad. This was troublesome given that 
India and Pakistan both score highly on democracy in the Polity Index, however it was in my 
examination of the Greece-Turkey dyad that the obvious explanation finally occurred to me.  
Thanks to Turkey’s autocratic slippage due to Erdoğan’s leadership, an endless stream of 
belligerent rhetoric from an autocratic state was being directed at a historical rival. However 
again, just as in the British and French case, there was no outcry from Greeks to escalate based 
on rhetoric. However, what did happen, and what reestablished a greater degree of 
generalizability within my model, was that audience costs DID have an effect, just the opposite 




leaders not only for not taking a tough position in response to belligerent rhetoric, they can also 
punish leaders for taking a tough position when it is not necessary, given the emptiness of the 
threats being made. So, looking back at the British-French dyad, or any other dyad where it 
appears that audience costs are irrelevant, it is not that they do not matter or are not present, it is 
that they are in fact working to deescalate tensions rather than escalate. I will discuss how I will 
be moving forward with investigating this in greater detail in the conclusionary chapter when I 
outline where I go from this dissertation. 
2.4 Model for the Dissertation: 
Transnational Audience Costs and Beyond 
 With the important concepts nested within my framework, and the major theoretical 
contribution I use from others bounded in terms of my application of them, I now proceed to 
present the compiled framework of my transnational audience costs model. Put another way, 
with all of the literature I synthesize, borrow from, and add to appropriately discussed and cited, 
I can proceed throughout this section with an uninterrupted explanation, avoiding the necessity 
of rejustifying each concept and theory I touch upon in the framework and thoroughly cite and 
discuss each as I have done so already in the previous section.  
 In summing up the model, in this dissertation I propose an expansion of our 
understanding of the audience costs literature as part of a broader research agenda that will span 
multiple bodies of work. This initiative will further build on the two-level games literature, the 
selectorate theory literature, the bounded rationality literature, nested games literature, and 
societal constructivism literature. Again, I will discuss all of this in much greater detail in the 
conclusionary chapter. Insofar as this text, it is the foundation for building out. I expand the 




 Audience costs prior to my work refers to a mechanism of state-to-state bargaining where 
the leaders of country A publicly state the boundaries of what they will compromise on in order 
to signal to the leaders of country B that their resolve is so strong on this issue that they have 
placed themselves in a position where for them to compromise after making these public claims, 
they would suffer electoral or selectorate punishment for backing down. Snyder and Borghard 
rightly point out problematic issues with this in terms of how the original proposal did not set a 
satisfactory upper and bottom limit on the spiral. “Could this lead to nuclear war based on 
‘signaling resolve’”?? Snyder and Borghard ask similar questions to this one highlighting the 
need for refinement of the theory. Furthermore, international relations has lacked a solid 
standardization of terminology in terms of identifying, acknowledging, and accounting for the 
role that the public, via electorate, nominal selectorate, real selectorate, winning coalition, win-
set, etc., as indicated by the plethora of terms that only scratches the surface of terms IR scholars 
have used. Expanding audience to serve as a general term for “the people that hold leaders 
accountable” provides a concise terminology for discussing the role of constituencies. I also 
create a typology or categorization for discerning different types of audiences and the associated 
costs. Domestic audiences, foreign audiences, and in this case transnational audiences. 
Transnational in the sense that a constituency is, insofar as one can, applying pressure to a state 
via their own state, whereas domestic audience costs are an audience applying costs to their own 
leadership and foreign audience costs would be more on par with public boycotts of goods from 
another country, e.g. Americans refusing to buy goods manufactured in states that engage in 
Apartheid such as South Africa in the 1980s or Israel more recently.  
 Transnational audience costs are a phenomenon where belligerent rhetoric in state A 




is not consistent with their expectations, and by proxy of this or proximally to this, costs on state 
A for engaging in the rhetoric in the first place. And to emphasize again since this is the most 
underdiscussed aspect of this phenomenon, audience costs do not occur solely from not 
escalating. They can also occur because leaders escalated. And again, transnational audience 
costs are a component of a much larger framework around transnational two-level games. 
Transnational two-level games opens the door for a substantial number of new research areas 
ranging from the constituencies that I discuss in this dissertation, to NGOs, which is incredibly 
important insofar as democratization and other areas of transnational behaviors. 
Transnationalism in terms of NGOs is such a powerfully important field of study that the N in 
NGOs has become increasingly fuzzy as evidenced by US affiliated NGOs tampering with 
Russian and Chinese politics in the 1990s and 2000s, their expulsion from Russia in the 2000s, 
their expulsion from China in the 2010s, and the US expulsion of Russian and Chinese NGOs in 
the US that has picked up momentum beginning in the latter half of the 2010s, due primarily to 
election interference in the case of Russians and surveillance of Chinese nationals in the case of 
the Chinese. There is more to that picture, and while it will be revisited in the conclusion, that is 
largely a topic to be discussed elsewhere.  
2.5 Methodology: Survey, Media, Search Analysis 
2.5.1 SMS Analysis 
 The method I employ in this dissertation is a homemade mixed-method small-N quasi-
statistical inferential approach for collecting data that tests the boundaries and validity of the 
general hypothesis and framework in general of this dissertation. That is quite a mouthful when 
describing the methodological approach used! But I describe it this way to be both forthcoming 




limitations of this method. The main strength is that identifying linkages within the presence of 
everything within these three very different types of data collection provides a powerful 
inferential conclusion and a strong plausibility probe for further investment, both time and 
money, into constructing more robust (expensive) survey models and accurate (ethnographic 
field work) investigations into domestic interests in topics. Given the current circumstances in 
terms of safety for potential interviewees within the states I discuss in my empirical chapters, 
both in terms of surveys and discursive analyses, and the substantial financial resources 
necessary to conduct the ideal version of this project; which likely necessitates work from others 
in addition to myself, this method is best suited for the present task. To put it concisely and 
straightforward, this method and the cases11 I selected are illustrative of my theory to justify 
further exploration and investment so I can continue to more rigorously test my hypothesis down 
the road.  
 The time frame that I examine as part of the actual analysis using the method is from 
January 1st, 2010 to December 31st, 2019. I will go into more specifics in the following 
subsections but I predominantly use Lexus-Nexus for media data, Google for search trend data, 
and PEW for survey data. There is a major caveat to this however. First, a minor note, there are 
some deviations throughout each chapter when more meaningful information is available from 
better sources, however I will acknowledge and justify why those sources are better when those 
instances occur. The major caveat is the chapter immediately following this one, Chapter 3 on 
the China-Japan dyad. That relationship, and China in particular, has been a consistent focal 
point of almost all of my research, in many different types of studies, over the past 10 years of 
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work. Additionally, the method I employ throughout the following two empirical chapters is 
largely stymied by the ingenious but nefarious methods the Chinese government has employed to 
prevent any flow of traffic, either Chinese looking out, or those outside of China looking in, from 
interacting with the Chinese internet. It should in fact, be more appropriately be considered an 
“intra”net due to the credentials needed to use it. I will discuss the nature of this chapter in more 
detail in a preface prior to the chapter. Just as a reassurance, it is the only chapter that has such a 
preface. Given the challenges with this dyad though, while I have employed the same method as 
I did in the chapters following it, it relies much more heavily on a broader historical analysis. 
This will be explained in detail in that preface. 
2.5.2 Survey 
 The primary reason for the method I have designed for this dissertation is, which I have 
already touched upon briefly, that survey data is sparce when trying to find public barometers 
that are not superpower-centric. Many readers may initially be skeptical about this claim but I 
will be the first to thank anyone that finds a reliable source of valid survey data that provides 
barometer data on bilateral relations unrelated to superpowers. An expression I may be guilty of 
using again later in this dissertation is thank conductors of valid international surveys have 
persisted with what could cynically be called an obsession for continuing to paint the world in 
broad strokes of a three-world system. What was once “Team USA”, “Team USSR”, or 
“Unaffiliated” has merely had the USSR category replaced with PRC. Outside of barometers on 
how countries across the world feel about the US in relation to China, survey data is inconsistent. 
If regular temperature checks could be conducted, the other two prongs of the SMS Analysis 




local feelings and record feedback from participants would provide as good as, if not a better 
picture of relations based on media inference and search inquiries.  
 The consistent source of survey data that I will be using is from PEW. There are more 
regionally focused polls available that vary by dyad and region, for example Eurobarometer data 
on European countries, Genron data on Japan, and other local sources in Southern Asia. I use all 
survey data within the 2010 to 2019 range that serves as a barometer in any way, either directly 
or indirectly to indicate public sentiment toward the other during this time range. Another 
expression I may be guilty of saying more than once is a common reference made by 
astrophysicists. The way we know black holes exist is due to the effects they have on space-time 
around them, the proximal indicators, not the blackhole itself as it is so efficient at preventing 
any leakage of information from occurring. Often times, in addition to a lack of interest, funding, 
or whatever the cause may be, some states do not want public sentiment about issues to be 
obtained by third party organizations that may present a narrative different than the one they 
would present. Which is why the other two portions of this method are so important.  
2.5.3 Media 
 First and foremost, there will be some variation in media data throughout the empirical 
chapters. I say that merely to be completely transparent. Ideally there would be complete 
standardization between every chapter but there are two shortcomings with that on opposite ends 
of the same spectrum. On one end, that level of standardization is just much less interesting. On 
the other end, it would present a less clear picture of what is going on because relatively 
speaking, it would be more nonsensical. There are regional and local nuances in terms of how 
information is shared and media utilized that elude large scale data bases like the one that I used. 




substantive addition from them that present a clearer picture of the events that took place in that 
dyad during the 2010s.  
Media data illustrating the narrative of the relationship and the rhetoric utilized is 
collected from Lexis-Nexus using the search engine to identify all texts from January 1st, 2010 to 
December 31st, 2019. I use dyad specific terms that have intersubjective meaning between both 
groups within the pair. For example, for my chapter on the India-Pakistan dyad, I search for the 
term Hindutva which is the world for Hindu Nationalism. Hindu Nationalism is an issue that has 
invoked anxiety among non-Modi12 aligned politicians in India who fear it is the most likely 
cause for conflict on the Indian Subcontinent between India and Pakistan, and for Pakistanis and 
Indian Muslims, Hindutva represents a literal existential threat. I will discuss why in more detail 
in chapter 4. So, in this case, my Lexus-Nexus search would first have a constant term, being the 
countries within the dyad so it includes both the name of the country and a conditional OR for 
the name of the people so the keywords India OR Indian AND Pakistan OR Pakistani OR Pak 
AND Hindutva. There will also always be an AND condition for War and Rhetoric. War is also 
used as a constant to capture additional results that use belligerent rhetoric, and rhetoric is 
included because the type of media that is being searched is that which identifies that rhetoric is 
being used. Results are further narrowed, when possible, to only include exchanges by the BBC, 
NYT, CNN, and the Guardian. In some cases, this is not possible, for example in chapter 3, CNN 
is not an option that is available so it is replaced by articles from the Japanese Economic 
Newswire. Unless otherwise specified, the database is also further narrowed to include 
international relations and international security. International organizations is excluded to avoid 
 




noise from international organizations that may be misrepresenting the domestic and dyadic 
narratives.  
2.5.4 Search Data 
Finally, in terms of search data, search data is data generated from Google trends based 
on “Interest Over Time”. With the exception of the Greece-Turkey chapter, I limit my search 
into areas pertaining to “law and government”. Narrowing the search analytics down to law and 
government is critical because it eliminates search hits for inquires for topics including the word 
“war” that were used in reference to a popular Disney-Marvel movie that came out during that 
time period with that word in the title. In the Greece-Turkey chapter, expanding the search 
beyond “law and government” was necessary because some of the search terms used were 
relevant to bilateral relations but not necessarily intersubjectively understood in the context of 
law and government, for example, “the Aegean Sea”.  
Numbers represent search interest relative to the highest point of the chart for the given 
region and time. A value of 100 is the peak popularity for the term. A value of 50 means it was 
half as popular as at its most popular. A value of 0 means there was not enough data to score this 
term during this time period. Within the spreadsheets, there is also a value of <1 which I scored 
as 0 for being insufficient data. Although in this preliminary examination I am using Google 
Trends due to language and location/access obstacles, the most popular search engine in some 
countries or regions may be different. This is only relevant in the China – Japan chapter, 
however in all three chapters I utilize data from statcounter which aggregates the market share 
size of each relevant search engine in the region. In with the exception of China and Japan, 
Google has over a 90% share of the market in the other 4 countries. That said though, future 




across all of these regions, especially the Indian Subcontinent, to determine any discrepancies 
and what we may infer from these variations, e.g. what class, caste, race, religion, etc who speak 
each language has more or less interest in different terms at different times.  
2.5.5 Selection of Dyads 
 As with any case study or case study-like document, justifying case selection is of course 
necessary so that the reader understands the logic I used and to explain how this is not a 
phenomenon that exists only in these three dyads. While my empirical chapters are not cases in 
the methodological sense, for the purpose of clarity and to be concise I will temporarily refer to 
them as cases. The cases I selected represent a diverse selection to capture a broad swath of case 
types available. They are illustrative of my model and identify the current boundaries of its 
applicability based on existing data. Future investigation will expand on this study in multiple 
ways. For starts, I will say up front that in the subsequent book version of this text, I also hope to 
include, what will by then be actual cases, cases from Africa and South America. This expansion 
will yield a larger sample of cases and information in general for further refining the 
methodology employed in this dissertation, or even reveal how to better couch the existing data 
in more formal and traditional modeling approaches.  
That said, the cases I selected for this study are still diverse and provide an acceptable 
range of cases to illustrate the plausibility of my model and why it warrants further scrutiny in 
future research. The Sino-Japanese dyad was selected due to the very long shared history 
between the two countries, the way they were similarly forcibly opened via Western imperialism, 
the divergence in how they responded to that, the atrocities that one committed against the other, 




be a war of superpowers in this century, China and Japan will almost certainly be a focal point in 
that conflict.  
 The India-Pakistan dyad was selected because, frankly, it is one of the most interesting 
cases to select for this type of study due to the number of paradoxes involved. The peoples in this 
case share a common identity insofar as both belonging to the Indian Subcontinent. They were 
both under British administration when the subcontinent was unified. They both score highly on 
the Polity democracy index but how democratic either country is, has been the source of much 
scholarship within the field of Comparative Politics13. There are more languages spoken and 
more ethnic groups within these two countries than most of the rest of the world combined. This 
is probably the most hostile and potentially violent political and military relationship while 
simultaneously being the most culturally complimentary relationship by Indian and Pakistani 
migrants, with intermarriage between the two in other parts of the world being a not uncommon 
occurrence. And finally, it is a great case in terms of the amount of data available outside of 
survey data, academic interest, and as a way to look at a case with many secondary variables 
such as democratization, new democracies and old democracies, ethnically diverse democracies, 
and nationalism.  
 Finally, the Greece-Turkey dyad was selected for a multitude of reasons. This has been 
the most dynamic, fastest evolving, and least stable case of the three over the past decade. Few 
would dispute that democracy in Turkey has almost if not entirely collapsed in Turkey in the 
span of ten years. However, in spite of that, Turkey possesses many robust democratic 
institutions that, while failing, have proven to be more robust than may have been expected. 
 




Greece and Turkey have come the closest of the three cases to an actual hot war over the decade, 
but, have been the FOIL case among the three. This, in many ways, makes it the most interesting 
for the framework as a whole, and most definitely makes it the most important case in terms of 
expanding its generalizability.  
Perhaps future research will demonstrate that the transnational audience costs Greeks 
imposed on the relationship were the sui generis variable rather than the variable that brings 
generalizability to the model, but absent that unlikely scenario, Greek transnational audience 
costs were the key to the realization that audience costs can constrain leaders to deescalating 
options in response to incidents rather than continuing disputes. As Erdoğan continued to ramp 
up the rhetoric against Greece, the EU, and Cyprus, Greeks, while generally interested in Turkey 
from a cultural standpoint, did not respond in kind, similar to how the French did not respond to 
British anti-Continental rhetoric. None of the indicators I examined suggest that Greek views of 
Turks declined because of rhetoric. There were military confrontations as I mentioned, but those 
were synchronous with military maneuvers after rhetorical antagonism consistently failed to 
elicit a response. That makes this case the most valuable in terms of new contribution to the 
framework. 
2.6 Conclusion and Layout of the Remainder of the Dissertation 
 In this chapter I have laid out the research design of my model, my methodology, and the 
states I examine in my empirical chapters. I elucidated my use of concepts that are often 
understood differently in different disciplines, may not be used, or may be discipline specific 
jargon in need of clarification. I engaged the theoretical areas that I bring together to present my 
model, justify why I used them, how they fit, and what I have added to them. I then presented a 




how these ideas all fit together. Following this I outlined my method, how it works, and why it is 
the most appropriate for this study, and how it may be useful in future studies. Finally, I 
discussed my case selection. Each of these cases tests the flexibility of the model along different 
boundaries as well as revealing how this model better informs our understanding of other mid-
level theories in international relations. The model I have presented here expands on existing 
literature in a direction that represents uncharted waters for establishing linkages between 
domestic politics and the international system, specifically, how domestic audiences act as 
transnational agents in what may be a phenomenon of an increasingly globalized world. This will 
be revisited in the conclusion.  
The remainder of the dissertation is simple and straightforward. Chapters 3-5 are my 
empirical chapters. In chapter 3 I examine the China-Japan dyad. In Chapter 4 I examine the 
India-Pakistan dyad. And in chapter 5 I examine the Greece-Turkey dyad. Finally, in chapter 6, I 
discuss my findings, the implications, summarize the key takeaways, and discuss future plans for 
this research area as well as this text specifically. The future research section of this dissertation 
contains what I think to be a relatively ambitious agenda for moving forward with this research. 
While I do not believe that I have created anything revolutionary or groundbreaking in any 
extraordinary way, the exercise of writing out this document has inspired me in terms of a 













In this first empirical chapter, I examine the relationship between China and Japan and how 
it has evolved from opening up to the West to the present. I utilize the SMS Analysis I laid out in 
chapter 2 to examine the impact of transnational audience costs on bilateral relations. Due to the 
current state of access to data in China, I am unable to identify how Japanese attitudes and 
rhetoric may feedback in to China. Due to this, there is a trade-off in my analysis of the dyad. I 
spend significantly more time discussing the historical context of the case from the perspective 
of China since I cannot examine the 2010 time series among Chinese netizens the way I can 
internet users and public opinion in other countries, and conversely, since I can obtain this 
information in the case of Japan, I spend less time examining the historical context through their 
lens. Regardless, identifying transnational audience costs is the main goal and these three 
empirical chapters present unique circumstances in their own ways while utilizing slightly 
different approaches with the same methodology. In the chapter over India and Pakistan, and 
even more so in the chapter over Greece and Turkey, the use of the SMS Analysis is much 
clearer and more consistent with how I discussed it in the research design given greater access to 
information in both countries within the dyad. The third empirical chapter on Greece and Turkey 
adds another layer of generalizability by highlighting how the presence of transnational audience 
costs are not dependent upon the presence of autocracy. Additionally, audience constraints do 
not always lead to brinkmanship. The most important take away from that final empirical chapter 
is the generalizability of this phenomenon. The current single limitation on the model is the 
presence of an enduring rivalry, which will be the next obstacle to generalizability to eliminate 




Given the limitations present in this chapter, as well as the history of the countries involved, 
I conduct a considerably more in-depth historical analysis of the dyad. Sovereign India and 
Pakistan did not exist until 1947. Modern Greece did not exist until 1823. And in the sense of a 
nation, there was no such thing as a Turk until the 20th century and the construction of their 
nation-state via genocide and ethnic cleansing had not stabilized physical geographical 
boundaries until 1923. China and Japan however, have existed in the international system as 
sovereign entities for as long as this unit of analysis has existed. Certainly longer, but that goes 
beyond the scope of this study. To summarize, there is a substantially larger amount of historical 
context to understand when one asks why China and Japan have the relationship they do, and the 
divergence in how they handled their unsolicited addition to the 19th century international system 
is fundamental to understanding the two countries now, and how they interact with one another.  
In addition to the SMS analysis over the 2010s, I give more attention generally to the 
downward spiral that has occurred between the two countries throughout the 21st century. 
Although there have been recent attempts at reconciliation, in the aggregate the relationship has 
suffered a significant decline following the progress at repairing the relationship following the 
Second Sino-Japanese War, which began in earnest in 1937, and eventually spilled over into 
World War 2 as the Pacific Theater in 1941. In this chapter I examine how anti-Japanese rhetoric 
in China has contributed to an increase in threat perception by Japanese citizens toward China. 
Building on the work by China specialists in IR, in this chapter, all of the negative rhetoric I 
discuss directed toward Japan from China that is publicized is considered to be a product of the 
state (Chen Weiss, 2013, Wallace & Chen Weiss, 2015; Reilly, 2013). These scholars along with 




internal/domestic information that gets through the “Great Firewall” has been instrumentally 
allowed to get through by the Chinese government.  
As of the writing of this chapter, people outside of mainland China, including Chinese from 
Hong Kong, are completely barred access to the use of China’s primarily search engine “Baidu”, 
it’s primary chat and social media platforms, “WeChat” and “Weibo”, and no person without 
identification credentials from the CCP are allowed access. Due to this, not only is getting access 
impossible outside of China, it has become increasingly dangerous for non-Chinese inside of 
China to smuggle this information out into the broader world, and it is unethically dangerous for 
scholars to rely on Chinese colleagues to use as proxies for access to these materials. To 
illustrate this shift, my personal experiences in China in the 2010s were that the use of virtual 
privacy networks (VPNs) which generate or use internet addresses outside of China in order to 
gain access to non-Chinese social media in order to get information out, or more likely, just to 
access one’s YouTube or Facebook page was tolerated within very generous reason. As of 2019, 
directly from the report from the US Embassy in China from 2019: 
The government continued efforts to limit unauthorized virtual private network (VPN) 
service use.  While the government permitted some users, including major international 
companies, to continue to utilize authorized VPNs, many smaller businesses, 
academics, and citizens were prohibited from using these tools. In March a Henan court 
charged Sun Dongyang with the crime of “illegally providing a tool for intruding into a 
computer information system” because he ran a website that promoted VPNs and other 
methods of circumventing the government’s firewall (US Report on Chinese Human 




This is in contrast to six years earlier when bars and coffee shops were permitted to have VPN 
services to provide their patrons! This lengthy illustration serves as a tool to elucidate how the 
metaphorical tap has been completely sealed off in a very short period of time. Due to this, it is 
almost always true that the information that has been permitted to be released was done so only 
because it came through official channels or organs of the government and has found its way out 
of China due to it being consistent with the state’s narrative. This does not mean that the CCP 
wanted the information to be directed toward the audiences of other states, only that they lack the 
mechanisms or filters to prevent their own rhetoric designed for regime legitimation to escape 
their shores.  
 As I demonstrate consistently throughout this chapter, the political rhetoric used by 
Chinese elites has eroded all of the progress made in repairing relations with Japan from the 
declaration of the People’s Republic of China in 1948 until perhaps the first wave of sporadic 
anti-Japanese protests in the 1980s and 90s, and certainly by the anti-Japanese riots in 2005. This 
chapter proceeds with the following objectives. First, I discuss the brief history that has occurred 
since China and Japan’s introduction to the modern state-centric international system in roughly 
the middle of the 19th century.14 This culminates with the actions by Japan and especially it’s 
military during the 1930s and 40s that enabled the construction of a narrative useful for 
externalizing domestic troubles onto Japan’s actions during that timeframe. Second, I discuss the 
reconciliation phase that took place between China and Japan from the 1950s to 70s for sure, and 
still, but less enthusiastically15 in the 80s and 90s. Finally, I demonstrate the plausibility of my 
 
14 Both China and Japan were coerced to open trade relations with the West in the 19th century. The Westphalian 
State System and the structure of bilateral and international relations had been completely foreign to both countries 
prior to being forcefully opened. 
15 Perhaps political tides were changing or Chinese politics went through a phase of pluralization that permitted 




thesis based on the changing narrative of Chinese elites since the beginning of the 21st century 
and how it has soured the perception of Japan’s domestic audience, who have since began 
pressuring the Japanese government to take tougher measures against China. Based on the logic 
of my model, not only is it non-rational for China to intentionally damage trade, tourism, and 
diplomatic ties as well as economic and security benefits with Japan based on what is to be 
discussed, it is unlikely that it was their intention. As I describe further in the chapter, based on 
my model, their objective in using the rhetorical narrative they did was domestic legitimation 
that was neither suited nor tailored to foreign audiences. Those well versed in the history of 
China and Japan up to the June 4th Protests in China may find it useful to move directly to page 
36 from this point. 
3.2.1 The Path to Contemporary Sino-Japanese Relations 
 To briefly summarize the initial “first”16 meeting between Great Britain and the ruling 
Qing Dynasty of the Chinese empire, George Macartney led the mission to establish a permanent 
embassy and official relations with China (Kitson, 2013). The meeting was challenging 
diplomatically given the notion of the Chinese officials’ misconception of the nature of the 
British mission as well as not understanding their actual position in the world in terms of 
material power as well as the innerworkings of the Western state system or the efficacy and 
extent to which Western imperial powers had developed in terms of maintaining remote colonies 
across the world. China had operated for centuries on a system of international relations 
throughout their periphery known as the Cefeng (Tributary) System.17 The Chinese Tributary 
 
16 Western traders had contact with China but they were confined to trade through Guangzhou and no formal 
agreement had ever been made between the British and Chinese states, but nothing to the extent of their meeting 
with George Macartney. 
17 Alternatively, I have found the term gongguo (贡国) used for this system in contrast to the previous author’s term 




System centered around the idea that China was the center of power in Asia and every country in 
their sphere of influence was required to participate in a scheduled meeting where the envoy to 
China would kowtow to the Chinese emperor to acknowledge their status in the region (Hevia, 
1995). Inferring from the events that followed, the British refusal to conform to the practices of 
countries within China’s Cefeng System was not the warning signs of a paradigmatic shift taking 
place that it should have been, but was instead dismissed. 
 Western gun boat diplomacy was also used in the process of opening Japan up to the 
West as well (Wilson, 1957; Kornicki, 1998). The incident of the Phaeton in 180 and intrusion of 
American warships in 1837 compelled the Japanese to take the opposite response to Western 
confrontation than China (Kornicki, p. 246). The opening of Japan to Western trade culminated 
in Matthew Perry’s 1853-54 confrontations and ultimatum to the Japanese to open trade 
relations. The Japanese acquiesced but believed the only way to push Western influence out of 
Asia was by immediately beginning the process of industrialization to be able to fight back 
(Beasely, 1982). 
 In the case of both countries, they were both forced by the barrel of a gun to allow both 
the virtues and vices to enter their countries. Ultimately both China and Japan moving toward 
westernized industrialization following these meetings, however whereas the Qing stayed in 
power and moved at a comfortable pace to learn the power the West had used to expand their 
empires across the globe, the Japanese embraced the tools of the West, spelling an end to the 
taido and kaikido eras and traditional Japanese conceptions of politics and war, and the 
beginning of the Meji Era, Japan’s industrialization and armament, and ascent as a global great 
power (Takano, 2010). In terms of their interaction with the West and integration into the West-




the Russian Navy in the Russo-Japanese War of 1904-1905; (Steinberg, 2008; 
Schimmelpenninck van der Oye, 2005) whereas China became mired in a greater and greater 
struggle to maintain independence. For China, this was their Century of Humiliation. Their 
descent saw them fall from the “Middle Kingdom” of the planet, to a colonized land ripe with 
resources to be exploited at will (Kaufman 2010). The Qing Dynasty sustained defeat after defeat 
starting with the Opium Wars in the mid-19th Century and culminating with the collapse of the 
Chinese Imperial Era and the beginning of the Republic of China in 1912 when Westernization 
began in earnest (Dreyer, 2003; Wilkinson, 2000). 
3.2.2 The Empire of Japan and the Sick Man of Asia 
 While China and Japan were both victimized and exploited by Western states who 
possessed power beyond what they had previously experienced, their perception of the world 
both shifted greatly and impacted the nature of their relationship. Japanese disdain for China 
became more and more apparent throughout the late 19th and into the 20th century, however even 
during the era of the Cefeng System, Japan refused to accept the role of tributary to China 
(Nakajima, 2018; Banno, 1973). Prior to their opening to the West, relations between the two 
countries were relatively obscure (Yo, 2000; Yoda, 1996). However, given the opposing paths 
each took in the face of Western imperialism, Japan soon saw opportunity and the potential for 
empire building in the failing Qing Dynasty China. Japan and China’s first major negotiation 
was concluded in the Sino-Japanese Amity Treaty of 1871 as a treaty between equals who had 
been treated unequally by Western powers (Fairbank et al, 1970; Banno, 1970; Yo, 2000). 
However, relations deteriorated due to mutual contempt and lack of respect for one another. 





3.2.3 The Ryukyu Islands 
 Throughout China’s Century of Humiliation, Japan increasingly became the focus of 
Chinese hatred for imperialism. One point that should be further emphasized though is that while 
Japan did hold China in low regard during this period, their imperial aspirations were not focused 
or devoted exclusively against China and conquering the periphery of the Qing empire, but 
rather, placing as much of Asia under their administrative control as they could to prevent the 
West from gaining an even more solid foothold in the region than they already had. In a lot of 
ways, for good or bad, this resembled the US strategy for enforcing the Monroe Doctrine 
throughout the Americas.18 With that in mind, the first major point of friction between China and 
Japan was over Okinawa and the Ryukyu Islands in the 1870s (Hirano, 2007). The Ryukyus had 
de facto administration over their own territory, however culturally and vernacularly they aligned 
with Japan while also maintaining tributary status with China. Given this paradoxical position 
and the opportunism of Western imperial aspirations in the region, Japan rendered the issue moot 
and began consolidating control over the island chain throughout the 1870s (Hirano, 2007; Pak-
wah Leung, Edwin, 2011; Newman, 1963; Kiyosawa, 1993; Katsuta 2003). 
3.2.4 Korea 
 The next territorial dispute involved the fate of Korea. Initially, the Japanese sought 
merely to establish a concrete definition of Korea’s sovereignty status in 1875. Chinese 
diplomats affirmed Korea’s independence, albeit as a tributary, and ability to establish their own 
 
18 The reader should keep this context in mind going throughout this section of the chapter. Although Japan’s 
intentions were no doubt imperialistic, it can be argued, as in the case of the US in the Western Hemisphere, that 
their actions were defensive rather than opportunistic. That being said, any scholar familiar with the US impact and 
damage that lasts to this day can appreciate that this acknowledgement is not an endorsement of this practice. Both 
US preemptive action in the Americas and Japanese action in Asia were aggressive and led to instability and 
suffering throughout the region, in spite of being under the sphere of influence of a regional actor rather than a 




foreign affairs with Japan and other countries (Wang, 1987; Jansen, 2002). Chinese leaders later 
realized their blunder and claimed that Korea was part of China but by this time the Japan-Korea 
Amity Treaty (Ganghwa Treaty) had already been concluded and normalized relations favorable 
to Japan and excluding China were established (Okamoto, 2004). The result of this was the 
deployment of Chinese troops to maintain its influence over China and Japanese overtures to the 
Korean government to establish closer non-Sinocentric relations between the two countries 
(Okamoto, 2004). This was followed by a coup to push Chinese influence out of the Korean 
peninsula and bring it more under Japan’s control in 1884 to which China responded with 
military action (Kimura, 2007). The military conflict resulted in a British mediated treaty 
between Japan and China to both withdraw forces from the peninsula and recognize Korean 
sovereignty in 1885 (Takahashi, 1995). Between the stalemate, Japan’s recognition of it’s need 
to restructure its military system, and concern being redirected from expansion onto continental 
Asia to defending Japanese territory from Russian incursion, Japan was preoccupied in the years 
leading up to the First Sino-Japanese War of 1894-95. Additionally, the Japanese recognized 
following their military confrontation with China in 1885 China’s regional military superiority, 
especially in terms of its navy, within the China, Japan, Korea triad (Toyama, 1951; Hirayama, 
2004; Sakai, 2007; n.a., Kobun ruisan, 1891). 
3.2.5 The First Sino-Japanese War of 1894-95 
 Ever since the initial China-Japan Amity Treaty in 1871, relations gradually deteriorated 
between the two countries. China focused on maintaining its cultural worldview in a changing 
world and establishing the integrity of its borders spanning from Taiwan in the East to Xinjiang 
in the West. In contrast, Japan sought to synthesize its own culture with Western ideas of 




struggled to maintain the integrity of its borders, Japan sought security though expansion. The 
collision of these opposing perspectives of the circumstances and world that they found 
themselves in following the end of their isolation from the West culminated with a decisive shift 
in the balance of regional power in the Sino-Japanese War of 1894-95. 
 The catalyst for the eruption of conflict that ensued was once again in Korea, this time 
over the Donghak Rebellion in 1894. Both the Chinese and Japanese dispatched troops to protect 
their poles and interests on the peninsula, however following the stamping out of the rebellion, to 
the objection of both China and Korea, Japan refused to withdraw its troops without substantial 
reform of Korea’s political system and the nature of its relationship between China and Japan. 
This led to the establishment of a pro-Japanese government in Korea with the result of military 
conflict between China and Japan in July of 1894 and a formal declaration of war on August 1st 
(Banno, 1973). Prior to the formal declaration, much of Japan’s subsequent success can be 
contributed to its skillful political maneuvering, especially with the British, prior to the 
beginning of formal hostilities with China (Denby, 1906). 
 The conflict established a new precedent within the Japanese government of heavily 
emphasizing military funding and Japan’s commitment to obtaining its objectives in the war led 
to additional unexpected gains. What started as a conflict to push China out of the Korean 
Peninsula resulted in the occupation of additional territory on the Liaodong Peninsula, 
Weihaiwei, where China’s northern blue-water navy was stationed, and Taiwan. On March 26th, 
1895, Japan seized control over the Penghu Islands as well and stipulated that any cessation of 
hostilities was contingent upon China’s ceding control over Taiwan to Japan. The losses China 
endured and Japan obtained in the First Sino-Japanese War were significant and cannot be 




threats of Western intervention was the Qing Dynasty spared total collapse (Banno, 1973; Liu; 
Xu). This brought the war to a close and resulted in the signing of the Treaty of Shimonoseki 
(Kang, 1957).  
The importance of the Treaty of Shimonoseki cannot be overstated and the effects are 
still felt today with issues such as the conflict between China and Japan over resource rights in 
the East China Sea and Taiwan’s unique role in terms of its autonomy/sovereignty. China lost 
any influence it had still retained at that point over the Korean peninsula, the Island of Taiwan, 
islands south and east of the Ryukyus including the Diaoyu/Senkaku Islands, and was forced to 
open many previously unexposed cities in China such as Suzhou and Hangzhou to Japanese trade 
and influence (Osato and Son, 2006). The war and subsequent “unequal” treaty was the first 
major confrontation with Japan that became an important piece of their victimization and anti-
Japanese narrative in contemporary political rhetoric. China’s Century of Humiliation had begun 
with their losses to the British in Opium Wars, losses to other Western countries in the interim, 
but now they were being attacked and losing influence to a country they had lumped into their 
sphere of influence in terms of the Cefeng System. In other words, with the ink still wet on the 
paper of the Treaty of Shimonoseki, any last vestiges China had maintained in its world view in 
terms of regional and global dignity and power were broken. The Qing Dynasty had been dealt a 
fatal blow and was on a rapid path to collapse. Finally, the terms of the treaty inspired the 
narrative of China’s victimization even before the collapse of the Qing, and led to increasingly 
powerful calls among Chinese, especially the Han, to remove the Manchus from power and 
revive Chinese territorial autonomy and regional hegemony, which is also a major part of 




The war was also a turning point for Japan in terms of representing a milestone in its self-
realization and emergence as an imperial power in Asia. They had achieved substantial gains 
throughout the Eastern seaboard of China. They had pushed Chinese influence out of the Korean 
peninsula, which they would later annex in 1910 (Kawashima, 2006), they acquired the Island of 
Taiwan and the surrounding islets, and they gained the authority to establish structures in cities 
previously left untouched by external powers. Additionally, for monetary spoils and reparations 
the Qing owed them for waging a war against them, the Japanese obtained large sums of gold, 
which led to Japan’s transition to the gold standard, and gave them a base of currency used to 
fund further colonial activities throughout the western Pacific region (Banno 414; Osato and 
Son). 
3.2.6 The Interim Years from 1895 – 1931 
 Japan remained active in reinforcing and strengthening its position in continental Asia 
following the First Sino-Japanese War. They participated heavily in the Boxer Rebellion, in part, 
to ensure their interests were left intact in light of the heightened Western military presence in 
China. In terms of conduct in putting down the rebellion though, Japan’s conduct of war and the 
practice of decapitating enemies in Japanese warfare was disconcerting to some members of the 
predominantly western alliance. Although most members of the Eight Nation Alliance that put 
down the rebellion to protect their colonial interests in China remain scorned for participation to 
this day, no member’s conduct rivaled the sheer brutality and depravity that Japanese soldiers 
engaged in during the conflict (Cohen, 1997; Leonhard, 1900). 
 By the conclusion of the First Sino-Japanese War of 1894-1895, it was apparent to all in 
East Asia that Japan was a rising power. However, this observation was not realized among the 




causes of this war centered primarily again, on Japan’s preoccupation with preventing Russian 
expansion into East Asia, de facto control over Manchuria and the rail lines extending across the 
region, and solidifying Japanese control over Korea (Nish, 1987). The war proved to be very 
costly for Japan although their victory solidified their position as a great power among the 
Western powers. Not only had they defeated the Russians at sea, but also, and more 
impressively, on land. The costs of this on Sino-Japanese relations however were significant. The 
Japanese generally held that the Chinese should have been grateful for pushing the Westerners 
out of Northern China, however resentment for Japan’s conduct toward them during the First 
Sino-Japanese War, the unequal Treaty of Shimonoseki, and the Boxer Rebellion were but a few 
obstacles that prevented this victory of an Asian nation against the Westerners from resonating 
throughout China (White, 1968). 
 Relations normalized for some time following the Russo-Japanese War, and even the 
collapse of the Qing Dynasty and the creation of the Republic of China did not initially upset the 
equilibrium that had been established within the relationship. The initial contestation over 
control of the Republic of China was a dispute that Japan largely stayed out of. However, when 
war broke out in Europe in 1914, Japan opportunistically seized control over German holdings 
throughout China and solidified their control over former Russian assets in the Northeast, 
increasing the tension between the two countries (Coox and Conroy 1978). Japan’s role in WW1 
focused almost exclusively on seizing control of Qingdao in Shandong province where Germany 
had port and troop quartering rights. The confrontation took place in the form of Japan’s 21 
demands that redefined the relationship between China in Japan in leu of them pushing out a 
Western colonial power in China and renegotiating the terms of the Sino-Japanese relationship 




few other relatively minor revisions (Saito, 2001; Japanese Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 1965; 
Usui, 1972). The surrender of all German held Chinese territory to Japan was a substantial blow 
to both China’s perception of the international system as well as their bilateral relationship with 
Japan. This was a critical point in the relationship because it led to the May 4th movement which 
was the first major, organized protest against Japanese imperialism in China (Kawashima, 2004; 
Tang, 1998). 
In the brief interim between the end of the first world war and Japan’s abandonment of 
any façade of doing anything other than seizing control of as much territory as they could, the 
blood-letting of warlord squabbling in the north coincided with the tug-of-war struggle between 
Yuan Shikai and Sun Zhongshan for control of the Republic of China government in the South. 
Meanwhile, various Chinese factions claiming to be the legitimate government of China refused 
to work directly with Japan to revise the 21 demands and Japan’s control over assets in territory 
in China via third parties (Masuda 1995; Hattori, 2001). Eventually, the battle for control in the 
south spilled over into the international realm. Initially, the civil war was a cause for only 
moderate concern for the Japanese, however in the First National Assembly of the Chinese 
Nationalist Party19 (KMT) in 1924, the KMT overtly stated their claims to seek out Soviet 
support (Hattori et al, 2007). This measure by Sun Zhongshan was a call for help for unifying 
and consolidating KMT control over the remnants of the carcass of the Qing Dynasty’s Chinese 
empire. Following Sun’s call for Soviet help consolidating power over China under the KMT 
tensions between China and Japan heightened to new levels and the Japanese felt they must 
intervene to prevent the spread of Russian influence back into Asia proper. This is one of several 
catalysts for the actions of Japan in the 1930s and 40s (Bunker, 1972). By the time Jiang Jieshi 
 




consolidated control over the KMT and began pushing north, the Japanese perception of this new 
threat solidified the discourse among the inner-circle of Japan’s government of a need for 
increasing control over China and stabilizing China’s political system on favorable terms for 
themselves (Bamba, 1973). The remainder of the 1920s can be summed up by Jiang’s Northern 
Expedition to reunify China and Japan’s preoccupation with control over assets and rail lines in 
Northeastern China and their holdings along the Chinese coastline (Hattori, 2005; 2006; 
Yoshino, 1995). Additionally, and also of paramount important, the Japanese military 
increasingly began operating autonomously/without authorization for operations from the 
Japanese government. The “slow coup” of the Japanese military against its government would 
result in the circumstances it found itself in over the next two decades (Kato, 2007). To sum up 
the complications in Sino-Japanese relations up to this point, Northeast China, i.e. Manchuria, 
was becoming more and more of a chink in Japan’s imperial armor; its Achilles heel. And this 
vulnerability alongside unchecked actions by the Japanese military created the cascade of events 
that led to some of the worst atrocities in human history being committed, but more to the point, 
the emergence of China’s current government, and the climax to the victim’s narrative of the 
Chinese Communist Party’s novel on “the Japan question”.  
3.2.7 Invasion of Manchuria 1931 
 Japan’s preoccupation with their rail infrastructure and settlements in the Northeast 
region of China known as Manchuria, along with the increasing disregard that the Japanese 
military had for the government let to the first major event in the build up to the Second Sino-




bombed. The attack was carried out by two Japanese officers from the same unit20 that had 
previously operated without authorization from the government. The Guandong Army21, which 
was responsible for the defense of Japanese railways in the region blamed the bombing on 
Chinese forces and used this premise as an excuse to seize the city of Shenyang, then known as 
Mukden which was the capital city for Manchuria (Hata, 1981). Evidence revealed after the 
events leading up to the Second Sino-Japanese War had been untangled indicate that this 
operation had been planned by the Guandong Army for some time (Kobayashi and Shimada, 
1964). The logic of Japanese military forces in the region were that the Chinese nationalist forces 
posed a threat to Japan’s control over the region, that securing full control over Manchuria was 
necessary to protect the Japanese islands from any Soviet attacks, and finally, that the event 
would force the Japanese government to back the military in opposition to international law at 
the time established by, among others, the League of Nations (Tobe, 2011). Relations between 
the government and military in Japan became so bad that mid-level officers of the Japanese 
military attempted to depose the Japanese government the following month, effectively seizing 
control of the government even though the coup had technically failed (Tobe, 2011). Lastly, in 
the face of tepid opposition from the League of Nations, China, and others, rather that openly 
annexing Manchuria, Japan installed the deposed Chinese emperor from the end of the Qing 
Dynasty, Puyi.  
 
20 From this point on the unit may be referred to as the Guandong Army. 
21 I believe I have an obligation due to any lack of discussion of this unit beyond clinical commentary by the authors 
who reference this unit that the Gundong Army, also known as the Kwantung Army, was the Army that Unit 731 
was attached to. Unit 731 engaged in atrocities against the Chinese people that were at the very least on par with 
anything the Nazis engaged in, including at Auschwitz, in Europe. Although not the focus of this chapter, greater 
attention needs to be placed on the atrocities this unit committed to provide better contextual understanding and 




In sum, the maneuver of the Japanese Army at the tactical, strategic, and political levels 
revealed three critical points. First, the army was able to operate autonomously outside the 
control of the government. Second, the army succeeded in its first major operation to take over a 
large portion of Chinese territory, indicating that China lacked the military strength, political 
will, or both, to properly defend themselves. Finally, the international organizations put in place 
to prevent future aggression such as that committed by the Japanese Army during the Mukden 
incident indicated that the Western powers nor the Soviet Union had the desire to go to war at the 
defense of China. The Mukden incident was a significant event and turning point in the balance 
of power within Japan’s political system, representing a shift in power away from the civilian 
government and to the military leadership. Japan’s actions over the following years included 
military engagements across the government including a pitched battle in Shanghai (Huang 
2002; Tokito 1983). League recognition of Manchukuo, Japan’s puppet state in Manchuria, and 
the assassination and collapse of the civilian government of Japan. Lastly, the culmination of 
events in spite of protests from the League of Nations finally resulted in the withdrawal of from 
the League, with their new government in place, in 1933 (Uchida, 2006; Inoue, 1994). 
3.2.8 The Marco-Polo Bridge Incident 
 From the Japanese withdrawal from the league in 1933 to the official beginning of the 
Second Sino-Japanese War, several major military engagements occurred between China and 
Japan spanning across a wide span of Chinese territory. Simultaneously, Jiang continued to 
appeal to leaders in Japan to come to a peaceful resolution rather than continue to lose ground 
and troops to Japan as well as consolidate control over China more thoroughly. Jiang also 
reached out to the Soviets for aid but the division of power in China between the nationalists 




sides in hopes that they could stymie Japanese aggression across north and eastern China and 
create a stable government over the country. The events leading up to the beginning of the war 
were confrontations between Japanese and Chinese forces in Northern China as far south as 
Beijing, a perceived loss of face (面子 mianzi) by both the Chinese and Japanese forces as a 
result of these confrontations, and a commitment among Japan’s military leadership that if any 
subsequent clashes were to occur, the Japanese army would fully commitment and begin a full 
assault on China (Hata, 1996; Usui, 1998). 
 The Marco Polo Bridge incident occurred in Hebei province under a separate government 
than the territory of China under the control of Jiang and the Nationalists. On July 7th, 1937, a 
confrontation on opposing banks of the Yongding River in proximity to the Marco Polo bridge 
broke out between Japanese army and Chinese local military forces in the area. Throughout the 
evening and into the morning, the Japanese continued to escalate the situation and by 5:30am on 
July 8th, the Japanese high command ordered an all-out assault on Chinese forces in the vicinity 
as well as geographical objectives to seize in order to shore up their gains from the confrontation 
(Hata, 1996; Senshi, 1975; Yasui, 1993; Teradaira, 1970; Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan 
(MoFA) 1993). On the domestic political front, the Japanese military’s actions and political 
maneuvering forced the government into a full commitment to a campaign against Chinese 
forces in the area and ultimately, an expansion of the conflict throughout China. This decision 
was reached not only because of the political maneuvering of Japanese military leaders, but also 
inaction and/or apathy on the part of the League of Nations, the United States, and the Soviet 





3.2.9 The Second Sino-Japanese War 
 The escalation of the Marco Polo Bridge incident resulted in a combination of mission 
creep, sunk costs, and opportunism on the part of the Japanese military which had, by this point, 
become de facto autonomous from the civilian government. The action resulted in the beginning 
of the Second Sino-Japanese War. Even following what is regarded as the beginning of this war, 
normalized diplomatic relations did not cease, and neither did attempts or overtures for peace 
between the two. The Chinese government under Wang Jingwei, and the Japanese government 
both, did not want to engage in a full-scale war and attempts at reconciliation were made 
throughout the duration of the war. Japan’s primary focus was on crushing the KMT, and all 
sides had a shared interest in both destroying the Chinese Communist Party, and preventing 
Soviet influence from expanding into Asia proper (Tobe, 1983; Boyle, 1972; Bunker, 1972; 
Morley, 1983; Lee, 1967). Although there is no doubt that Japan sought to, and pursued, control 
over Asia, their military actions in China were less about conquering the entirety of the country, 
something that no one in Japan even considered given the magnitude of China in terms of land 
territory, population, and administrative leadership abilities of Chinese willing to work with 
Japan. That said, the Japanese did seize control of important and strategic ports and points of 
Chinese territory spanning from Beijing in the north in what was left of northern China, through 
Shanghai and the Yangtze River Delta, and down to Guangzhou at the near the southern-most 
extent of mainland China during this period.22 This strategy nonetheless resulted in Japan 
becoming bogged down across large swaths of Chinese territory that created the circumstances 
for atrocities to occur. Japan’s Referring to the sources I have discussed so far, many scholars 
 
22 I exclude Hong Kong and Macao because these territories had not been under Chinese control for some time and 




had dedicated a significant if not the entirety of their scholarship to this one period in history. 
Given this reality, this chapter will only summarize the major relevant incidents which form the 
bulk of Chinese anti-Japan narrative.  
 To call Japan’s conduct of the Second Sino-Japanese War barbaric would be both an 
understatement and disrespectful to the suffering and hardship that Chinese victims endured 
during this period. However, in regards to the war and, of greater relevance, the narrative that 
Chinese have used against Japan since then, the following incidences or issues have remained 
salient. First and foremost, and the most widely shared issue by countries across Asia was the 
comfort women issue. Second is the Nanjing Massacre and other similar atrocities that may 
touch on the periphery of this to demonstrate that this was a systemic issue with Japan’s conduct 
of the Second Sino-Japanese War. And finally, I will discuss Unit 731 and use this as an 
umbrella to illustrate the scope and depths of the horrors that the Japanese Army committed 
against the Chinese. 
Although in the case of China, Japanese atrocities are a toss-up between the comfort 
women issue and the Nanjing Massacre, in terms of Japanese conduct throughout the entire 
theater of the war, the comfort women issue is the most prominent and consistent among all 
countries that were victimized by Japan during this time period and make claims consistent with 
one another and only contradictory to Japanese scholars of the magnitude of the issue. This is 
important because governments from every part of the political spectrum from highly democratic 
to highly autocratic hold similar perspectives of what happened. This undermines Japan’s claims, 
primarily against China, that the PRC embellishes the issue for instrumental purposes. So most 
likely then, the war crimes committed were more egregious than what Japanese scholars and the 




3.3 The Key Narratives 
The comfort women issue was one of the worst crimes that Japan committed during the 
Second Sino-Japanese War and the Pacific Theater of World War 2 more generally. Through a 
multitude of strategies ranging from kidnapping, promises for education, promises for good jobs, 
promises to emigrate to Japan, women went to the Japanese to participate in these programs, 
only to find themselves in bondage and unable to escape, to be used for the rest of their lives, or, 
if they survived, the duration of World War 2 (Agribay, 2003; Yoshiaki, 2000; Fackler, 2007). 
Aside from the obvious, this issue remains controversial because of the momentous discrepancy 
between the number of victims the Japanese claimed and the numbers of other countries (Hata, 
2007; Rose 2005). These women were held against their will as sex slaves to “service” the 
Japanese Army. No serious scholar debates that this happened, it is the scope and severity that is 
debated, and what stirs up further anger in countries across Asia, why Japan would continue to 
publish such different numbers from other scholars across Asia.  
 The second major contribution to the contemporary anti-Japanese China narrative is the 
“Rape of Nanjing” or the “Nanjing Massacre”. This event has gained attention throughout the 
world for being one of the worst recorded events of the 20th century. The statistics are not the 
focus of this chapter, but it is included here for three reasons. First, symbolically, it represents 
both a literal and physical rape and emasculation of China and the Chinese people. Second, the 
atrocities committed reflect the conduct of Japanese soldiers across the Asian continent. Ranging 
from the treatment of POWs to civilians in occupied areas. Being under Japanese rule or being a 
Japanese prisoner was a fact of life many endured and quite a few did not survive.  
Finally, is the existent of Japanese military organizations that, normatively, could be 




by Unit 731 included a range of crimes against humanity such as injecting Chinese victims with 
diseases such as bubonic plague, exposing them to biological weapons, and even vivisecting a 
living pregnant woman (Harris and Paxman, 2002; Tamura 1992; Kristof, 1995; Parry, 2007). 
The findings and data collected by members of Unit 731 and units like it were even used in bio-
weapon attacks against Chinese cities such as the Kaimingjie Germ Weapon Attack in 1940 in 
Ningbo, Zhejiang Province, China (Gold, 2004; Pua, et al, 2017). Their legacy, and the legacy of 
more groups of this nature continue as an artifact in contemporary China as ground breaks on 
new construction projects and old Japanese chemical weapon shells are hit and explode, creating 
victims of Japan’s legacy in China to the present (Hongo, 2007; Asahi, 2003; Brombach, 2011). 
 The Second Sino-Japanese War remains to this day the most consistent action by Japan 
that is instrumental for anti-Japanese rhetoric throughout Asia. Grievances and narratives of 
Japanese aggression are maintained in Mainland China, Taiwan, Korea, Vietnam, the 
Philippines, Thailand, Singapore, Malaysia, and Indonesia. However, none, I argue, have 
cultivated these grievances to the extent of the post-Tiananmen Chinese government. To 
summarize, following the near collapse of the Chinese Communist Party during the Tiananmen 
Square Protests from April to June 1989, the ideological foundation of the party became 
increasingly perceived as illegitimate and no longer resembled the same party that claimed to 
have righted many of the wrongs done to the Chinese people by predatory warlords, the Qing 
Dynasty leadership, the Nationalists under Jiang, or foreign powers (Gries, Steiger, and Wang 
2016). Post-Tiananmen, the opium dens were gone, the comfort women were gone, the artifacts 
of Qing culture such as foot binding and cues were gone, nearly all and all remaining colonial 
holdings of Chinese territory were gone or being negotiated to be returned,23 the people were 
 




literate, educated, and the standard of living of the Chinese people had increased by an order of 
magnitude.24 Throughout this period of unmatched economic growth in the known histories of 
the modern nation-state, the CCP had increasingly abandoned the social programs that helped to 
pull the Chinese people from the ashes and embers of the Qing Dynastic and Republic of China 
eras in favor of economic growth. This growth proved insufficient for maintaining the support of 
the Chinese people given the increasing disparity of wealth that was developing, so the party 
increasingly leaned on nationalist narratives of restoring Chinese cultural, economic, and 
military power. The rhetoric utilized in these narratives predominantly targeted Japan and the 
United States and as such, has created a comparably less positive perception of China than that 
which Deng helped shape in the 1980s. 
3.4.1 History in Mao and Deng’s Chinas 
 Relations between China and Japan have been confusing and inconsistent since the end of 
World War 2. The Chinese narrative regarding Japan and its role in China’s Century of 
Humiliation have been used instrumentally in the form of a victor’s narrative (Meisner, 1999) or 
a victim’s narrative (Gries, 2004). Following the conclusion of World War 2, the Soviet Union 
seized control of Mongolia, Manchuria, and other parts of what had been the Qing Empire. At 
the time though, the people of China were more preoccupied with stabilizing control of their 
country, their people, and their territory before grievances could be addressed. Generally 
speaking, the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) and the Nationalist Party (KMT) had been 
fighting one another for control of the China since the 1920s (Li, 2012). Both sides claim to have 
been the victors over Japan, and both sides accuse the other of holding back against the Japanese 
 
24 Based on World Bank figures, China’s GDP expanded from 1979-1989 and 1989-1999 from 178 billion USD to 




to save resources for the resumption of the fight for control following the defeat of Japan 
(Meisner, 1999; Keck, 2014; Ye and Berry, 2003; Buss, 1972). All of this ended with the CCP 
emerging as victorious in 1948-49, and consolidating power and declaring the People’s Republic 
of China (PRC)25 in 1949 (Westad, 2003; Elleman, 2001; MacFarquhar et al, 1991). 
 Following the CCP’s victory in their war with the KMT and the ascension of Mao to the 
role of chief leader at the head of the People’s Republic of China, the CCP legitimately made 
great strides in increasing the standard of living for the Chinese people. They crippled the crime 
syndicates, got rid of the opium dens and had great success at suppressing the drug trade and its 
usage in China. They forced foreign powers out until new terms were negotiated. They brought 
parts of China under organized governance for the first time in over a generation, they firmed up 
and secured their borders, and they restored the dignity of the Chinese people. They even fought 
the most powerful country in the world into a stalemate on the Korean Peninsula in the Korean 
(Sino-American) War (Meisner, 1999). Whether it was a gamble, an acceptable risk, or wisdom, 
Mao and the CCP were able to fight American forces in Korea back to the 38th Parallel without 
the Americans resorting to the use of nuclear weapons, even over the pressure on Truman from 
MacArthur to do so (Tannenwald, 1999; Polmar and Norris, 2009). China’s victory also ensured 
a buffer zone between Chinese territory and US forces. Although the USSR and China were 
ideologically allies, China’s success in the Korean War also acted as a useful deterrent against 
future Soviet aggression against them (Wang, 2005). 
 
 
25 The People’s Republic of China or PRC is referred to by Chinese in Taiwan, Hong Kong, and Macau as the 




3.4.2 1950s – Informal Overtures 
 The relationship between China and Japan in the 1950s was almost exclusively informal. 
Officially, Japan, as much of the rest of the world, recognized the Republic of China (ROC) 
government in Taipei, Taiwan as the legitimate government of the mainland until the Western 
pivot to recognize the PRC in 1971 when they took over the China’s seat and delegation in the 
UN. China’s contact with Japan dealt primarily with the Chinese returning Japanese prisoners, 
discussing fishing rights, and China’s support of left-wing parties in Japan (Barnouin, 1988). 
Both the PRC on the mainland and the ROC on Taiwan upheld the policy of not recognizing 
diplomatic relations with states that recognized the other rather than themselves. Given that 
Japan recognized the ROC in Taiwan, relations with China were extremely limited, however 
there is no evidence to suggest that the CCP harbored any negative feelings toward Japan over 
the Century of Humiliation era.  
3.4.3 1960s – The Sino-Soviet Split 
 The 1960s were a tumultuous time period in China for a multitude of reasons. The second 
5 Year Plan of the PRC had been a fantastic tragedy known as the Great Leap Forward where 
millions of Chinese, especially farmers, died of starvation due to a famine in combination with a 
culture of fear constructed around Mao during the era. Further, Stalin’s death the ascent of 
Khrushchev, de-Stalinization, and Khrushchev’s change of foreign policy doctrine from Stalin 
contributed to Sino-Soviet Split (Meisner, 1999; Lorenz, 2008). This, in conjunction with the 
PRC’s isolation from the UN, and because of its One China policy, led the country to be left with 
very few allies in the world. On top of all this was Mao’s Cultural Revolution in his move to 
reconsolidate power around himself and purge those who had pushed him out of power following 




goodwill gesture in the Liao-Takasaki Agreement which expanded trade between the two as well 
as some of the first Foreign Direct Investment from China into Japan (Itoh, 2012). 
3.4.4 1970s – Rehabilitation 
Probably the most course altering decade in the PRC’s history was the 1970s. In terms of 
international relations and Chinese foreign policy, the decade is important because of two major 
events in 1971. First, was the push by several countries led by Albania to switch recognition of 
China in the UN from the ROC government on Taiwan to the PRC government on the mainland. 
The passage of this resolution gave the PRC all of the diplomatic privileges and roles that had 
been enjoyed by the ROC, including a permanent seat on the Security Council (UN Res 2758, 
1971). The second, was one of Nixon’s major backroom deals where he began the process of the 
United States normalizing relations with Mainland China (Dube, 2011). With diplomatic 
relations restored with the PRC and relations developing between China and the US as part of the 
US strategy to exploit the Sino-Soviet Split and increase strategic pressure on the Soviet Union, 
many countries began normalizing relations with the PRC. Toward the end of the decade, Mao 
died, which led to a temporary power vacuum and interim period where Mao’s handpicked 
successor ascended to the top leadership position, followed by Madam Mao’s coup with the 
Gang of Four coalition, and all which was finally ended with the ascent of Deng Xiaoping back 
to the head position of the PRC. This led to the Opening and Reform movement where Deng 
reversed or modified many of Mao’s policies in order to stimulate economic growth, enhance the 
stability and security of the PRC, and rehabilitate China’s image to the rest of the world 
(Meisner, 1999). 
Specific in regard to Sino-Japanese relations, following China’s recognition by the UN, 




relations between the two changed rapidly and dramatically. This began with the Japan – China 
Joint Communique in 1972 which established several agreements related to war reparations 
initially demanded by China, Japan’s agreement on China’s one China policy, as well as 
recognition of Taiwan as China’s territory (Communique, 1972; Kim 1975; Hsiao, 1974). 
Subsequent agreements led to a significant expansion in trade relations, FDI, and ODA between 
the two countries as well as successful diplomatic negotiations on a moratorium over contested 
territory in the East China Sea including the Diaoyu/Senkaku Islands, and an anti-hegemony 
agreement between the two in regards to Soviet influence in Asia (Masuda, 2003; Overview of 
Japanese ODA to China, 2016; Treaty of Peace and Friendship Between Japan and the People’s 
Republic of China, 1978). The opening of relations between the two countries is critical to the 
examination of this case because it presents the first data on the perspective of Japanese citizens 
toward China. In 1978, a poll was conducted of Japanese citizens on their feelings toward China. 
62.1% of respondents felt friendly feelings toward China while 25.6% did not have friendly 
feelings toward China. This identical survey was conducted again in 1980 with 78.6% of 
Japanese having friendly feelings toward China and 14.7% did not have friendly feelings toward 
China (Dreher et al. 2017).  
3.4.5 1980s – Normalization 
 The transition of the 1970s led to normal relations between the PRC and Japan in the 
1980s and everything that entails, including the occasional friction over disagreements. Trade, 
FDI, and ODA continued to flourish between the countries throughout the decade, contributing 
greatly to the rapid growth of China’s economy throughout this time period (Hagström, 2005). 
The two also worked jointly in opposition to Soviet aggression in Afghanistan, and (Girard, 




Generally, there was a strengthening alignment between China and Japan, and in light of 
concerns in Beijing of US-Japanese defense agreements, an alignment between the US, China, 
and Japan, on policies in opposition of Soviet foreign policy. All of this said, in addition to the 
emergence of friction between China and Japan over the status of islands in the East China Sea 
in 1978, two other major fault lines appeared that demonstrated that while Japan’s imperialist 
legacy may have been forgiven, it was not forgotten, nor should the Japanese government allow 
it to be forgotten by Japanese citizens. In this period, the Japanese textbook controversy and 
Japanese head of state visits to the Yasukuni Shrine to the chagrin of Chinese citizens (Masalski, 
2001; Jameson, 1985). Whether this information was state sanctioned and provided to the 
Chinese people for instrumental purposes is unclear as this period overlapped with a brief 
moment in history under the leadership of Hu Yaobang and Zhang Ziyang. Under their 
leadership, the Chinese population got a brief glimpse of the relaxation of CCP censorship and 
restrictions on citizen participation. Since the creation of the Chinese modern nation-state in 
1949 though, based on my assessment of politics and state-society relations in the People’s 
Republic of China, this time period was the closest that Chinese ever came to experiencing 
anything resembling a relaxation of restrictions and regulations or a liberalization of the that 
relationship. It is also the closest China and Japan have ever been in their long history in terms of 
friendliness and cooperation. However, as the Communist pole in the international system 
collapsed around the world, a knee-jerk reaction by the CCP would alter China’s course and its 
relationship with Japan up to and including the present-day relationship.  
3.4.6 The Tiananmen Square Protests of 1989 
 On April 15th, 1989, Hu Yaobang, who had been the head of the Communist Party until 




His death was considered suspicious by students because it was following his removal and 
during a politburo meeting (Calhoun, 1989). Hu had been a major reformer within the 
Communist Party and had pushed for the expansion of liberalization from oriented solely at 
economic reform to also include political reform and personal freedoms. Students initially 
gathered in the square to mourn Hu’s death and call for reforms to reduce corruption, introduce 
free speech and press, and increase government transparency (Zhang, 2001; Zhao, 2001). After 
the number of students in the square expanded in size the students were asked to leave and those 
who refused were coerced by police with batons and the square was closed until after Hu’s state 
funeral (Zhao, 2001). In spite of the square being closed, over 100,000 students in the Beijing 
area from Tsinghua University, Beijing University, Renmin University, and others gathered 
during Hu’s state funeral to then Communist Leader Zhang Ziyang’s eulogy (Zhao, 2001).  
The protests continued to expand in size with increasingly ambitious demands. Zhang 
discussed amicable solutions with other party leaders including the de facto successor to Mao, 
Deng Xiaoping. Deng is reported to have been receptive to reforms until the students, whose 
number had grown to over 300,000 by this point, declared a hunger strike on May 13th, two days 
before a state visit from Gorbachev (Zhao, 2001; Cheng, 2009). Alarmingly for the party leaders, 
the protest movement was also beginning to spread to other cities as well. On May 17th and 18th, 
over a million people across China, in over 400 cities, including not only students but also 
average Chinese citizens, many NGOs across the country, workers, and even soldiers in the PLA 
came out in support of the movement (Zhao, 2001). This escalation created a schism between 
Zhang and the other members of the Politburo. Li Peng made an appearance in the square on 
May 18th and called for the students to disperse and allow the authorities to take students sick 




leaders who now began calling for the specific removal of Deng and Li from the leadership 
(Brook, 1998; Pye, 1990; Wu, 2011). In light of the continuing escalation the majority of 
politburo members agreed that the only option they had remaining was to declare martial law and 
disperse the students with the military. Zhang however, refused to declare and execute this order 
and personally appeared in the square to make a direct appeal to the students to disperse. His 
break from the party line and direct meeting with the protesters led to his deposal, and the final 
resolve by Deng Xiaoping, Li Peng, and other members of the leadership to declare martial law 
and use military forces to disperse the protests in the square (Zhao, 2001; Li, 2010; Nathan, 
2002; Zhao, 2009).  
The situation continued to spiral out of control for the CCP due to initial failure of the 
army to disperse the protesters. On May 20th, approximately 250,000 soldiers were moved into 
Beijing, however, they were blocked from the square and dispersing the protesters by Beijing 
residents throughout ever entry point into the city (Wu, 2009; Richelson and Evans, 1999; 
Brooks 1998; Thomas, 2006). This was the most critical point of the entire incident and the 
reasoning for providing so much depth of the events that transpired. The five remaining leaders 
of the Chinese Communist Party, following the removal of Zhang Ziyang as General Secretary 
of The CCP, the expansion of the protests in both size, diversity26 and magnitude in the number 
of cities now involved, and the failure or refusal of the military to move with force against the 
residents of Beijing who were blocking access to the square, realized that their government was 
on the brink of collapsing and chose to declare the students to be counterrevolutionaries and 
move into the square and disperse all protesters with all necessary force (Wu, 2010; Zhang, 
2001; Matthews, 1989). Deng, Li, and the others met with military leaders and issued the decree 
 




that military units were to begin converging on the square at 9 pm on June 3rd, reach the square 
by 1 am on June 4th, and for the square and all protesters to be cleared no later than 6 am. They 
were not to allow any person to impede their progress toward the square regardless of the 
consequences (Wu, 2010). 
The events that followed have been engraved in history by all sides, and recorded for 
posterity by many Westerners and embellished as a marker for how autocratic the Chinese 
government was and is by others in the West. However, it is critical that scholars analyzing this 
event, even 30 years later, appreciate a) how close the Chinese government was to collapsing, 
and b) to question realistically, if governments throughout even the “democratic West” would 
have accepted the literal collapse of their government. Inferring from a multitude of protests 
across Europe, Canada, and the United States over this time span and up to and including violent 
clashes with police in the United States from May to July of 2020; it is unlikely that most 
governments even in the West would have accepted the total dissolution of their governmental 
system rather than dispersing protesters by any means necessary.  
The fallout from the entire incident, especially the military action from June 3rd through 
5th, permanently altered the trajectory of China’s development. Arms embargoes were placed on 
the PRC (GAO, 1998). Trade ties were damaged, (Naughton, 2007; Foot, 2000; Kelley and 
Shenkar, 1993) and a general negative stigma across the West toward China developed, perhaps 
unfairly when reflecting on the direness of the situation, resulting in the PRC’s isolation from the 
West (Zhang, 2001; Cabestan, 2010) and the manifestation of resentment among CCP leaders, 
and even average citizens of current day China toward the West, especially toward western 




Overall, the incident resulted in the end of political liberalization in China, which 30 
years later has not recovered, increasingly sophisticated police surveillance, media censorship, 
and expansion of the power of the military, ministry of state security, and police in general 
toward the civilian population. The most important realization by all however was the 
bankruptcy of the legitimacy of China’s political system at this time. Deng’s opening and reform 
movement of the late 1978s, the liberalization of economic activity and general relaxing of 
restrictions up to the incident created a paradox within China’s state-society dynamic. The laws 
never changed but enforcement of them was loosened which created the inaccurate assumption 
of Chinese citizens of the late 1980s that political reform and liberalization were on the brink of 
realization. This was never the intent by Deng and the inner-circle of Chinese leaders however 
and upon reflection realized that the vacuum left by waning Marxist-Leninist and Maoist 
doctrine had to be filled by something, leading to the Patriotic Education Campaign and the 
CCP’s pivot toward three major rhetorical narratives. First, the growth of the economy, second, 
an endless campaign to purge corruption, which has increasingly become politically convenient, 
from the CCP, third, the restoration of China to its rightful position as a leader of the 
international system, and finally, that the CCP was the only institution capable of executing these 
objectives (Wang, 2008; Sneider, 2013; Zhao, 1998; Dor, 2015). 
3.4.7 Post-Tiananmen CCP Embellishment 
 In the aftermath of the Tiananmen Square protests and the CCP leadership’s realization 
of the need to construct a new narrative to legitimize their continued governance, they 
increasingly began to adopt, or revive narratives focused on externalizing domestic tension onto 
foreign forces or influences. The overarching narrative of the CCP on its relationship both with 




one of a victor who had survived and overcome colonization, imperialism, exploitation, and 
atrocities. Post-Tiananmen China emphasizes a victim’s narrative focused on a century of 
humiliation and the need for all Chinese to unite as one27 China and return to its rightful place in 
the world. This narrative has emphasized the need for China to oppose any who attempt to 
obstruct its return to a prominent position in the world. It also emphasizes China’s ascent as a 
super power capable of reshaping the world order on equal terms and to set aside internal strife 
and differences in the interim (Gries, 2004; Ikenberry, 2008).  
The primary target of this tactic has been the bilateral relationship between the PRC and 
Japan. Upon examining evidence in the empirical section of this chapter there is a significant 
relationship between the shift in China’s national conversation about Japan and the perspective 
of both the Japanese government and citizens toward China. It is plausible and in need of 
empirical testing beyond the scope of this chapter how statistically significant the relationship 
between China’s rhetoric and Japanese perspectives on the relationship are. Future research will 
test this when better data becomes available, either due to better technology or a relaxation in 
China’s censorship policies.  
China’s anti-Japanese rhetoric has primarily centered on three main issues. First is the 
issue of the Yasukuni Shrine. Second, is the Japanese textbook issue. And finally, is the narrative 
that Japan is generally unapologetic about its imperial legacy. China is not alone in its issue with 
these issues, Korea and Taiwan also protest about Japanese conduct on them, but nothing to the 
extent of China. China’s diplomatic approach in this issue area is consistent with what Peter 
Gries describes as China’s “apology diplomacy” (Gries, 2004). Another issue that has become 
 




less relevant in the 21st century was Japan’s reemergence as a global power in the 1980s and 90s. 
I will touch on this briefly in the empirical section due to its relevance to contributing to a 
decline in relations, but has not been as large of a factor for the past 20 years or so. Once 
discussions of adding Japan to the security council and other measures that would have expanded 
Japan’s influence over international relations had diminished, that subject became a tapped well 
for anti-Japanese rhetoric. Related to that is the end of Japan’s economic growth in the 1990s and 
the relative equilibrium they have lingered at since then. Another complexity that doesn’t help 
the situation is Chinese rhetoric on the prominence of Japanese nationalism in antagonizing the 
Chinese and heightening tensions in the region. Finally, are the territorial disputes that exist 
between China and Japan in the East China Sea. This issue is made even more complex by China 
being locked in, audience costs-wise, on Japan’s claims being an artifact of its imperial legacy, 
and Japan’s on these always being a part of Japan. This is an issue that will also be discussed that 
factors greatly in to the current tensions between the two countries.  
For the Japanese, the key issues are Chinese Nationalism, Chinese Militancy, territorial 
disputes in the East China Sea, and China’s disregard for Japanese sovereignty by giving 
Japanese the impression that the Chinese government is under the perverse conception that they 
have the authority to approve or disapprove of Japanese norms and practices. The idea of writing 
historical textbooks in a way that does not paint Japan to be monstrous in the first half of the 20th 
century is misleading, but so are American historical textbooks that leave American primary 
school students thinking that the United States single-handedly won World War 2. It is highly 
improbable that not ingraining into Japanese youth the extent of the massacre that their country 




Japanese imperialism in the western Pacific. Casual conversations in China about wiping Japan 
off the map on the other hand, that might.  
The idea that China has the authority, or even the Japanese government has the authority 
for that matter, to regulate religious practices in Japan, and the way that Japanese citizens engage 
in those religious practices, even in the context of the Yasukuni Shrine, while again, the practice 
is unpalatable, the reality is that it is absurd to suggest that a modern state has the authority to 
regulate religious practices that they disapprove of in another state, and to the Japanese, appear 
to be characteristics of Chinese Nationalism and heightened militancy. Finally, the dismissive 
nature of China toward both Japanese territorial claims in the East China Sea and international 
law has caused grave concern about the future intentions of the Chinese state. These are the 
terms I examine in my SMS analysis in the subsequent section. 
To conclude the historical analysis of the Sino-Japanese relationship, prior to the 19th 
century, both countries existed in the Chinese tributary system of international relations. 
However, following their forced opening by the west, both countries began to change. China was 
essentially colonized in terms of the concessions they were forced to give in response to losing 
wars to Western powers. Japan’s response was to force industrialize as quickly as possible and 
they became a global power less than 50 years after their exposure to the West. This was 
followed by Japanese imperialism across East-Asia and creating a legacy that they still bear the 
consequences of to this day. Following World War 2, China began to stabilize relative to the 
previous 100 years and relations between the two countries began to improve until after the 
Tiananmen Square Protests and subsequent crackdown in 1989. Following the emergence of the 
Patriotic Education Campaign in the early 1990s, Chinese rhetoric toward Japan has become 




will now discuss the model in the context of this case and then move on to an examination of the 
Chinese rhetoric that has damaged Sino-Japanese relations.  
3.5 The Model 
 Given that this if the first empirical chapter, I discuss in depth the model, the data I 
collect, and the way in which I collect it in more detail to eliminate the need to do so again in 
subsequent chapters. Revisiting the theoretical literature, the narratives utilized by the state, 
China in this case, are necessary for creating practices and narratives of legitimation. Practices in 
terms of means for elites and the mass public both to engage in the state, and narrative in terms 
of what these practices are grounded in and what their contexts are. Legitimacy, the noun, and 
legitimation, the verb describing how a regime attempts to create or build upon its legitimacy, 
are challenging concepts to measure. Insofar as legitimacy is concerned, I would argue it is 
impossible to empirically or positivistically, measure legitimacy. We can create a typology and 
categorize the types of legitimacy a regime has, (Weber, 1958) but beyond that a regime’s 
legitimacy cannot be extrapolated on. It has it, until it no longer does and is deposed. It may wax 
and wane, but again, how would one measure it? It is tautological insofar as determining whether 
or not a regime has it. Either it does or it does not. Legitimation is a bit less subjective. It is an 
action rather than a thing that exists or does not exist, and we can identify types, build a 
typology, and measure the intensity of the action relative to other data points throughout time, 
but temporality affects the need for action, the intensity of it, and the resources needed, available, 
and expended for it so this is challenging to measure as well (Goddard and Krebs, 2015). 
Of the three narratives mentioned, economic development, war on corruption, and 
nationalist (patriotic) sentiments, the nationalist narrative is the focus of this case. The nationalist 




discourse within the state-society narrative between members of the government and the 
corresponding elites in their relationship with mass politics within society. Second is a civic 
nationalism which appeals to Chinese citizens as belonging to the Chinese state. Third, is ethnic 
nationalism which focuses on the state-society discourse on what being Chinese actually means. 
And the final, and primary focus is on state-led, pragmatic nationalism which emerged in light of 
the decline of Communism culminating with the Tiananmen Square Incident (Zhao, 2004). 
The first three nationalist narratives focus on different angles of the same 
question/problem. What is Chinese and what does it mean to be Chinese? In the era of the 
modern nation-state individual and group identities insofar as how they relate to the state has 
been a challenge to regime legitimacy insofar as the willingness and ability of individuals or 
groups to “buy in” to the regime or state. This is most clear with the tension between ethnic and 
civic nationalisms, the first encompassing people who are “ethnically Chinese” in this case, Han, 
vs, the other minority groups in China, predominantly the Tibetans and Uyghurs. The first relates 
to the discourse between state and society on these two. The final however, is again, to narrow 
down the scope of this analysis, is the primary focus of the model. China’s state-led, pragmatic 
nationalism began as an instrumental attempt to restore the legitimacy to govern of the CCP 
following the post-Tiananmen collapse of their communist roots from their inception to the death 
of Mao. This began in earnest with the previously mentioned Patriotic Education Campaign 
which to reiterate, became an essential piece to the CCP’s legitimacy narrative following the 
Tiananmen Square Incident (Zhao, 1998; Fifield, 2019; Fifield and Shih, 2019). Some scholars 
have since argued that the narrative and practices involved evolved it into an institutionalized 




still only instrumental and the shape that it takes is whatever it is the CCP deems necessary at the 
moment, the focus of this model is its instrumental use.  
China’s posture, primarily toward Japan and the United States, but with some belligerent 
rhetoric directed toward European countries, has been constructed on the core belief that Japan 
severely handicapped and stunted China’s growth for the 50 years of its imperialist aggression, 
and the United States has attempted to contain and prevent China’s rise ever since the CCP 
gained control of the country. Both of these narratives are contradictory to the CCP’s 
rehabilitation of both relationships between the 1960s up until 1989, however this also highlights 
the instrumentalism present in their current discourse. This chapter focuses on the Sino-Japanese 
relationship; however, the following chapter will examine the Sino-American relationship and 
how that has been impacted by the same phenomenon. In both cases, the pivot of the CCP away 
from cooperation and toward confrontation, away from a victor’s narrative and toward a victim’s 
narrative, has damaged the relationship with both. 
In sum, China’s anti-Japanese rhetoric has been instrumental in maintaining the 
legitimacy of the CCP and providing a convenient distraction to externalize domestic turmoil 
(Brulé and Williams, 2009). Based on the model I presented in chapter 2, theories on Democratic 
Diversion are approximately equally applicable when discussing authoritarian states insofar as 
both rely on a selectorate of some sort and both are accountable, so both will engage in similar 
types of tactics. So, to summarize, the CCP was forced to change its legitimation strategy post-
Tiananmen from a communist narrative to something else. The alternative it selected was a 
nationalist narrative. This provided the CCP with a method of regime legitimation to appease its 




consistent with the literature on democratic diversion theory as mentioned by Brule and Williams 
as well as many others. It can also be summed up well by Zakowski who says: 
There is no easy answer as to why Chinese citizens had become so sensitive about 
historical issues… (which also included) state policy. Together with the gradual 
introduction of a free market economy, communism became only a hollow slogan and 
the CCP leaders needed to find a new way of legitimizing their power. Due to the 
democratization of Taiwan, the communists no longer could refer to the Guomindang as 
an external threat, because it became a potential ally against the independence 
movement led by the Democratic Progressive Party. One way of legitimizing CCP rule 
and strengthening national solidarity was to bolster patriotism by educating Chinese 
society about the Japanese invasion during the Second World War (Zakowski, 2012). 
 
 China adopted a belligerent rhetoric directed toward other states for instrumental 
domestic purposes. And finally, the primary target of this rhetoric has been Japan. The effect of 
this has been a deterioration of relations between China and Japan. With the historical analysis 
and contextualizing of the model, I will now examine the rhetoric specific to this case. I will then 
discuss the impact this rhetoric had on generating transnational audience costs in Japan. 
Following this, I will discuss what the Japanese government has done in response to the feelings 
and threat perception of Japanese citizens. From there I will conclude the chapter.  
3.6.1 The Rhetoric 
 Generally speaking, China’s anti-Japanese rhetoric has centered on three primary issue 
areas. First, is what they say is Japan’s lack of remorse for its imperial past. Second, are 
accusations that Japan continues to maintain claims to territory obtained in its imperial past. And 
last, is its post-World War 2 resurgence as a powerful country. Of course, Japan, as any other 
country, is going to portray their history positively as much as possible,28 and this is not going to 
conform to the CCP’s school curriculum on history, however to act invasively into another 
 
28 Even though German schools are emphatic about the atrocities that Germany committed during the second world 




state’s school curriculum and societally held beliefs with the conception that they can influence 
or alter it is by general agreement a gross violation of another state’s sovereignty. Further, 
coming from China, the state that takes the state sovereignty position to justify all of its activities 
across the world, it is both ironic and extremely convenient. In other words, generally speaking, 
while it is not unnecessarily unfounded, it is nonetheless hypocritical. In this section on Chinese 
rhetoric directed toward Japan I will list and discuss examples pertaining to each of those issue 
areas, and in the next section I will discuss the reaction of Japanese elites and the public to this 
political rhetoric followed by how, based on that reaction, Japan has responded.  
3.6.2 Japan’s Rise in the 1980s and 1990s 
 Following its occupation by the United States in 1945, Japan was tasked with almost 
completely rebuilding their country from the ground up. They had to adopt a new way of trade 
consistent with the international trade framework laid by the United States in various UN 
affiliated organizations as well as the WTO and the IMF. They had to abide by a new, 
democratic, constitution written by Americans that they had to conform they society to, and they 
had to accept a new reality of permanent demilitarization. They would no longer be allowed to 
possess the means to defend themselves by the great powers and instead would be dependent 
upon aid from the United States in the event that their territory or sovereignty in general were to 
be threatened. In spite of all this, from the 1950s through the 1990s the Japanese economy began 
to grow at an astounding rate. Ironically, it was Japan in the 1980s and early 1990s that 
American IR realists would identify as the emerging security threat to the US, not China. 
However, depending on how one phrases it, it could be said that Japan went into a recession in 
the 1990s it has never truly recovered from, or it could be said that economically speaking, Japan 




other growth indicators of the country. In other words, Japan’s population is not growing 
sufficiently to make much significant annual GDP growth however there has not been any major 
contractions outside of exogenous shocks since the 1990s. Given that, the issue of Japan’s rise is 
important to note because of how China’s reaction to it aided in souring the relationship between 
the two countries beginning post-Tiananmen, however it is no longer a major topic of discussion 
so I will briefly summarize it for context rather than conduct a full examination as with disputes 
over historical revisionism and territorial disputes.  
 In the 1990s and building up into the Anti-Japanese Riots of 2005 in China, the CCP 
engaged in a rhetorical assault on Japan focused on “the rising threat of Japan” throughout the 
period. Fueled by a narrative of Japan’s lack of remorse over its wartime atrocities, China 
constructed a narrative about Japan’s desire to restore its military and its dominance over Asia. 
The myth of Japanese militarism during the period permeated discourse from the politburo level 
down to chat rooms by Chinese netizens in internet cafés throughout China. As James Reilly 
discusses in his book on this specific subject, Japan was a convenient target for the post-
Tiananmen CCP to utilize to redirect frustration on domestic issues to external forces instead, in 
this case Japan (Reilly, 2012). The catalyst that pushed the issue over the edge however was 
diplomatic discussion and pressure to grant Japan a seat on the UN Security Council in the early 
2000s (Shirk, 2007; Reilly, 2012; Starr, 2011). This culminated in the Anti-Japanese Riots of 
2005 which saw the most violent outbreak of protests by Chinese since the CCP had assumed 
leadership over the country in 1949.  
Consistent with the logic presented in this dissertation, China was using its domestic 
audience, and the angry feelings it had fostered within the Patriotic Education Campaign to 




distracting the Chinese public from issues on the domestic side including censorship which many 
in China correctly associated with the unnecessarily high infection rate of SARS from 2002-
2004, dam construction for hydroelectric power primarily across the south which led to the loss 
of considerable land where communities had previously been, and increasing pressure on 
national leaders to crack down on political corruption at the local and provincial levels of 
governance (Mertha, 2010; Cai, 2010; Saich, 2011). The allowance of the protests proved to be 
effective for the CCP which helped prevent Japan’s ascension to a leadership position in the 
international system and avoid domestic criticism throughout the period. Although it prevented 
Japan from obtaining its political objectives at the time, it generated costs insofar as how 
Japanese perceive China. Although China succeeded in delaying Japan’s bid for increased stature 
in the world for over a decade, making this category a non-issue moving into the present, it 
facilitated the declining view of China that may have been less intense contemporarily had they 
not been blocked from a literal seat at the table.  
3.6.3 Controlling Shintoism  
 China’s grievance that Japan lacks of remorse for its imperial past is illustrated by 
primarily by continued visits to the Yasukuni Shrine by Japanese elites, especially its prime 
ministers, comfort women who were sex slaves, usually either Chinese or Korean, and by 
Japan’s “historical revision” in its textbooks. Both of these issues are simultaneously very 
subjective and very political. I will briefly explain what the Yasukuni Shrine is, why it is 
important, and what the grievances that China and other East Asian countries have against visits 
by heads of state and other important Japanese figures to the shrine. I will then discuss 
specifically the issue that China and others have with the information written in, and image 




 The Yasukuni Shrine is a Shinto Temple located in Tokyo. It was founded in 1869 and 
was called Shokonsha until the Emperor Meiji’s visit to the shrine in 1874. It was at that time 
that the shrine was renamed Yasukuni. Avoiding getting into the intricacies of Shinto spirituality, 
the shrine is considered to be the literal home of 2,466,000 souls of Japanese who have fallen in 
battle for Japan since that time. This includes every Japanese killed in: the “Boshin War, the 
Seinan War, the Sino-Japanese and Russo-Japanese wars, World War I, the Manchurian Incident, 
the China Incident, and the Greater East Asian War (World War II).” The maintainers of the 
shrine add that: “These people, regardless of their rank or social standing, are considered to be 
completely equal and worshipped as venerable divinities of Yasukuni.” (“Yasukuni Shrine,” 
n.d.). Importantly, not only does this include every Japanese soldier who fell in battle for Japan, 
it also includes the leaders of Japan who led these war efforts. Framing this in a different, but 
equally tinted lens, the Yasukuni Shrine, based on the Shinto religion, is the home of every 
soldier and leader of soldiers who were killed during Japan’s era of imperial conquest including 
leaders such as former prime minister Hideki Tojo who was executed for war crimes during 
World War 2 during the International Military Tribunal for the Far East (Pritchard, Zaide, and 
Watt, 1981). So, based on Shinto, when people visit and pay respects to the memory of Japanese 
killed in combat, they are worshipping people including him, and every other soldier who had 
ever committed atrocities and killed in combat. Both Taiwan and Korea also take issue with state 
visits to the Yasukuni Shrine and this is why.  
 Chinese responses to Japanese state visits to, and even the continued existence of, the 
shrine have been vehemently negative. This has been communicated to the Japanese both in 
words and deeds. A visit to the shrine in 2001 by Japanese Prime Minister Koizumi led to the 




foundation of Sino-Japanese relations and hurt the feelings of the Chinese and other Asian 
nations,” and that it “will affect the future development of healthy bilateral relations.” 
(Uchiyama, 2010). A later visit was condemned directly by then Chinese leader Jiang Zemin as 
being an injury that can never be forgiven29 (Shimizu, 2003). Statements such as these are much 
graver in meaning in Chinese and in Asian international relations in general than their English 
translations can convey. Similar to the word schadenfreude in German, there is no English 
equivalent. Many scholars infer that this is what led to changes of China to adopt the Japanese 
Bullet Train design for its high-speed rail system in the early 2000s. Instead, they gleaned what 
they could from the Japanese design and made their own version, which even has the same 
colors on the train as the genuine Japanese trains, but are not of Japanese construction or up to 
Japan’s specifications (Hood, 2007: Zakowski, 2012; Hong, 2007). 
3.6.4 Political Convenience and an Unescapable History 
 Another heated issue is that of the enslavement and use of comfort women, typically 
Chinese or Korean, primarily during the Second Sino-Japanese War. The Japanese military on 
the Asian continent took part in the capture or enticing with false pretense, Chinese, Korean and 
Filipino women whom they used as sex slaves. For example, job flyers would be put out seeking 
women for administration assistant positions, only to find themselves literally in chains as forced 
prostitutes for the Japanese army (Agribay 2003; Mitchell, 1997). Some were recovered by 
advancing Allied troops as far away as Burma where they discovered that approximately 800 
Korean women were deceptively recruited to relocating to Burma under the pretense that they 
would be visiting the wounded in hospitals, rolling bandages, and generally making the soldiers 
 




happy (Japanese Prisoner of War Interrogation Report 49, 1944). Conditions for these women 
were egregiously inhumane, ranging from being raped and beaten, forced abortions and 
sterilization, and in some cases even being the victims of cannibalism by the Japanese Army 
(Ruff-O'Herne, 1994; Hicks, 1996; Nelson, 2007). To summarize, this was a terrible practice by 
the Japanese military, and many, including philanthropists all the way up to the Japanese 
government itself has made apologies and paid reparations to try to help the victims, but it 
remains a sensitive subject. The puzzle is not that people are angry and sensitive about the issue, 
it is that, as has been said and will be said again, why was this not something that was focused on 
with the same severity from the end of World War 2 up until the 1990s? 
 Since the Japanese apologies directed toward Korea in regards to the comfort women 
issue, China has become increasingly assertive in the victimization of Chinese women forced 
into the practice (Morgan, 2018). The Chinese government has dedicated entire sections in white 
papers on the issue insofar as how to exploit the issue in improving its position relative to both 
Japan and the United States (Dreyer, 2018; Qiao and Wang, 1999). The CCP has also invested 
heavily in organizations such as the Confucius Institutes in the US and other similar types of 
organizations across the world (Rogin, 2017; Ward and Lay, 2019; Moteki, n.d.; Shimbum, 
2018). Some of these organizations have been used to spread anti-Japanese propaganda across 
the world. Not all parts of all organizations, such as the Confucius Institutes have been involved 
in this, but some have (Statement on the Confucius Institute at the University of Chicago, 2014; 
SCMP, 2014). As recently as 2018, after seventy years of issuing apologies and reparations, the 
Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs continues to issue statements that Japan has not done 
enough to make up for its misconduct during the Second Sino-Japanese War/World War 2 




its crimes during the war, while state media in China played off of this dismissing “the deal as 
geopolitical puppetry by U.S. officials seeking to contain Beijing (Wong, 2015). The worst part 
of this particular issue is not that the Chinese government is wrong, what the Japanese did during 
World War 2 is unforgivable. However, the instrumentalist use of these crimes by the 
government to redirect frustration with the CCP and toward someone else is counterproductive 
toward attempting to repair relations between Japan and every country and their peoples that they 
victimized 75 plus years ago.  
 The final example in terms of using Japan’s wartime actions to fuel current day anger is 
the controversy over a revised version of history textbooks by Japan which began in 2001. Issues 
of textbook revisions include the figures and narratives of incidences such as the Nanjing 
Massacre, forced suicides on Okinawa, comfort women, Japan’s annexation of Korea and 
advance into China in the 1930s, etc (Saaler, 2005). The common denominator in these cases is a 
reaction to, and over-inflation of a resurgence in Japanese nationalism in more recent years. 
There is no evidence to support that there is a mass movement or wave of nationalism across 
Japan, however that is the picture that the CCP has painted, and quite successfully, convinced the 
Chinese people that this is a major systemic problem going on. Given the level of censorship in 
China as of 2020, it is understandable that Chinese believe that this nationalist movement in 
Japan is larger than it really is. The censorship issue in China has become so challenging at this 
point, that not only do Chinese have difficulty accessing information outside of China, it is 
impossible for non-Chinese and even people from Hong Kong to access information on internet 
sites inside of China. With this I conclude my discussion of how the treatment of history between 




territorial disputes between China and Japan in the East China Sea. Specifically, I examine the 
Diaoyu/Senkaku Islands controversy. 
3.6.5 The East China Sea and Economic Exclusion Zones 
 The Diaoyu/Senkaku Islands are 8 islands situated in the East China Sea near the Ryukyu 
Islands. They are claimed by both China and Japan. The grounds for China’s claim go back to 
historical records they claim to be from the Ming Dynasty which ruled China from (1368-1644) 
and the Cairo Declaration which mandated that Japan surrender all Chinese territory it had 
annexed. Additionally, it demarcated the boundaries between the two countries in terms of 
islands in the East China Sea based on how they were situated on the continental shelf. Japan’s 
grounds for claiming the islands goes back to the 1895 Treaty of Shimonoseki, which was not 
part of the Cairo Declaration, in which Japan took control of Taiwan and other islands off the 
Chinese coast. Additionally, Japan claims specifically that the islands were terra nullius prior to 
their occupation, unlike Taiwan which have a preexisting indigenous population. They further 
substantiate this claim in international law based on the US’s return of administrative rights over 
the Ryukyus and other islands in the region, including Okinawa and the Diaoyu/Senkaku islands, 
in 1972. They also assert that the line of demarcation in the continental shelf argument supports 
their claim based on international maritime law (Gries et al, 2016). To summarize, M. Taylor 
Fravel writes that: 
China and Japan hold conflicting claims over the sovereignty of the Senkaku Islands. 
Japan asserts that the islands were determined to be unoccupied and terra nullius (“as 
empty land”) in 1885 and formally incorporated into Japan in 1895. China claims 
discovery of the islands under the Ming dynasty and asserts that they were ceded to 
Japan along with Taiwan in the 1895 Treaty of Shimonoseki and thus returned to China 
at the end of World War II. From 1945 to 1972, however, the United States 
administered the islands directly as part of the Ryukyu Islands (which included 
Okinawa) and used one of the islets as a bombing range. With the conclusion of the 




1972. China (People’s Republic of China) issued its first formal claim to the islands in 
December 1970, after Taiwan (in the name of the Republic of China) and Japan both 
issued claims in bids to ensure access to nearby petroleum resources (Fravel, 2010). 
 Protests over the islands occurred as early as 1971 in a confrontation between Japan and 
Taiwan over the islands resulting in the Japanese navy removing reporters raising a flag on one 
of the islands. The issue was also brought to light by vocal anti-Japanese protestors in Hong 
Kong as well. However insofar as the PRC is concerned, when the issue was brought up during 
the normalization of relations between the Mainland and Japan in 1972, the two sides agreed to 
table the issue for later when wiser minds less attached to history were able to negotiate the 
dispute. The first public outcry in Mainland China over the uninhabitable islands took place as 
the Patriotic Education Campaign began to reap its results with the 1996 Chinese book “China 
Can Still Say No” (zhongguo haishi neng shuo bu中国还是能说不). This was the beginning of 
the territorial dispute between the Mainland and Japan that continues on today (Gries et al, 
2016). 
 The most severe of the incidents regarding the islands came following the collision of a 
fishing boat with Japanese Coast Guard vessels in the vicinity of the Islands in 2010. This began 
a cascading downward spiral over the issue over the next few years. The fishing boat incident 
was not the first such action that had the potential to create friction within the dyad on the issue 
however in this case, it overlapped with domestic issues simmering under the surface on the 
Mainland. In this case, the CCP chose to spotlight the issue to the public and the showmanship of 
the audience costs game began. China’s initial statements began with relatively benign 
statements such as its “indisputable sovereignty over the Diaoyu Islands which have been an 
inherent part of China since ancient times.” And that Beijing “had raised solemn representations 




CCP also began taking more forceful material measures over the issue including maritime 
fishing vessel probes of the islands (Ma, 2012). In April of 2012, Tokyo’s governor, Shintaro 
Ishihara, himself one of the marginalized nationalists in Japan that China has projected to be a 
widespread movement previously mentioned, announced that the city would buy the islands 
(Janowski et al, 2012). This contributed to a chain reaction of belligerent rhetoric and 
brinkmanship over the subsequent year.  
 As the year progressed, the Chinese discourse on the dispute moved from what could be 
construed as unemotive statements of fact to threats of military confrontation over the islands. 
An important note to reinforce that cannot be emphasized enough, these islands are 
uninhabitable. They are situated in an area that are thought to contain significant petroleum 
reserves under the sea bed but the issue over the islands themselves is exclusively a clash of 
identities and the constructed narratives of each participant. By the 2010s Japan and the Japanese 
people had begun suffering fatigue or burnout over apologizing profusely for actions their 
country committed 65 years earlier, actions which the actual offenders of had mostly long been 
dead by this point. Japan has grown weary of apologizing and, increasingly perceived by the 
Japanese people, being asked to kowtow to China regarding those past offenses. This clashed 
with an increasingly aggressive and wealthy mainland China that resembles an imperialistic state 
each year as they move to “retake” territory lost to China since its Century of Humiliation began.  
 Ishihara’s justification of his announcement to purchase the islands was that “the 
purchase of these islands will be Japanese buying Japanese land in order to protect it. What 
would other countries have to complain about? (Dickie, 2012). The CCP responded by saying 
that “any unilateral action taken by the Japanese side would be illegal and invalid,” and that 




Diaoyu Islands.” (Wang, 2012). They further remarked that “given the complex and sensitive 
nature of the issue… Japanese politicians at both the central and local levels… should exercise 
caution in their remarks and should not take any provocative moves (Wang, 2012). Rhetoric in 
China continued to escalate throughout the year. In July, a Chinese individual was quote in the 
state-controlled media that “diplomatic protests are not enough. We should not be afraid of 
Japan’s possible fierce reactions. After a few rounds, Japan will have to rethink its sense of 
propriety (Yao and Ma, 2012). Another statement read: 
From the Chinese perspective, no matter whether the Tokyo metropolitan government 
or Japanese government purchases the Diaoyu Islands or nationalizes them by other 
means, it’s still a step to consolidate the legality of Japan’s control and jurisdiction over 
the Diaoyu Islands. China won’t indulge such behavior, and will inevitably take strong 
countermeasures 
By a month later in August, the narrative that was circulating in China about the CCP’s 
“weakness” on the issue due to the priorities of personal enrichment of Chinese politicians by the 
West (Henochowicz, 2012). This specific point is important because with this statement, China 
had not only signaled its resolve on the grounds of its nationalist legitimacy, but it now also 
invoked the narrative of corruption in the Chinese government. This was a critical escalation.  
 Other statements over the next few months included Chinese protesting with banners with 
messages such as “defend the Diaoyu Islands to the death,” and “even if China is covered with 
graves, we must kill all Japanese (Henochowicz, 2012). Tong Zeng, a fervent Chinese nationalist 
was even commented in the media, suggesting that the government “does not echo the patriotic 
enthusiasm of the public, and that needs to change.” This astroturfing30 was followed in 
September with statements directly from Chinese officials that “China’s will and determination 
 





to defend its territorial sovereignty is unshakable,” and that “China is watching the situation and 
will take necessary measures to protect its territorial sovereignty” (Takenaka, 2012). 
Additionally, they threatened to begin a trade war as well (Zhu and Yao, 2012). Following 
violent protests in mid-September the CCP, as I among others argue having sufficiently signaled 
its resolve on the matter, began to crack down on the “grassroots protests” and “uncontainable 
anger of the Chinese people” (Wee and Duncan, 2012). I foreign ministry spokesman called on 
Chinese citizens to “express their demands in a legal and rational way” (Li and Wang, 2012).  
 In sum, to bolster domestic support and deflect criticisms by Chinese toward the CCP, the 
government initiated and allowed several months of escalation of protests over this territorial 
dispute before they began to restrict access to the narrative once the message had been 
sufficiently communicated to Japan. The territorial dispute with Japan over the Diaoyu/Senkaku 
Islands is just one of many such disputes that China is currently involved in. This is not a sui 
generis phenomenon that is unique to China and Japan’s history, it is a tactic that China employs 
in every one of its territorial disputes regarding territory along its periphery. These disputes 
change from areas of the East China Sea, the Yellow Sea, and the South China Sea, and with 
countries including Japan, Korea, Vietnam, the Philippines, etc. In every one of these instances, 
China’s rhetoric has resembled that presented in this chapter, and in every case, it has created 
transnational audience costs for China, which is increasingly causing it to contain itself rather 
than creating a situation like Stephen Walt may have posited where a country such as the United 
States, in cooperation with all these countries on China’s periphery, cooperate to balance the 
threat China presents and contain it. As I have argued throughout this dissertation, that is not the 
logical flow of what is taking place. Rather, China is inadvertently creating situations where it is 




will now move into examining the transnational audience costs that the CCP has created. 
Specifically, I discuss the declining perception and warm feelings of Japanese toward China 
throughout this time period, and then move in to how the Japanese government has responded.  
3.7 Survey, Media, Search Terms (SMS) Analysis 
 In this chapter so far, I have highlighted the historical origin and context for Chinese 
hostile rhetoric toward Japan, and how the CCP has exploited that history to its advantage, 
predominantly in the Post-Tiananmen Square Crackdown era. The argument so far has illustrated 
the advantages the CCP gained by using its anti-Japanese rhetorical strategy. However now I 
move into the costs. The Japanese people and government have not sat by idly throughout this 
period. The feelings and perceptions of Japanese from the political elite level down to the 
average worker has deteriorated drastically since the mid-1980s. In the survey section I discuss 
what the costs have been in terms of Japanese perceptions. Following the SMS analysis, I 
highlight notable measures the Japanese government has taken to protect itself from an 
increasingly belligerent China and an increasingly uninterested or apathetic United States.  
I employ my SMS Analysis framework to gauge how much of an impact Chinese rhetoric 
had on the Japanese public in the 2010s. I first look at, as will be a recurring theme, the limited 
available survey data to examine the impact over time. I then combine that with a look at media 
coverage of rhetoric and Japanese response. And finally, I look at search terms and interest over 
time based on search term analytics throughout the 2010s. I use Google Trends to do this and 
will discuss the validity of using that search engine data in that section. The terms I examine are 
China, and War as constants insofar as these are terms that should covary with the terms 
interpreted by Japanese as being associated with Chinese belligerent rhetoric which are Chinese 




these two topics that correlates with increased rhetoric which will be examined in the media 
section as well. Given the fairly exhaustive historical analysis I have done already in this chapter, 
my media analysis will be brief in comparison to the next two empirical chapters. Additionally, 
feelings about China in Japan have largely been static since the already heavily discussed 
Diaoyu/Senkaku Island Dispute and broader dispute over claims in the East China Sea.  
A key point that will be reiterated throughout each empirical chapter is how future, 
rigorously conducted analyses, using the survey, media, and search method can be combined to 
better capture the dynamic between leadership political rhetoric and issue sentiment and salience 
within the audience/selectorate of the adversary state. Although what I demonstrate of my model 
at this point in development is largely an illustration of its potential, with sufficient funding and 
resources this method may greatly expand our understanding of the complexity of state-society 
relations and two-level games in the international system. What I present in this chapter and the 
subsequent empirical chapters are an exploratory exercise to serve as a plausibility probe of both 
the model and method for future research. Without a question, the main methodological 
contribution of my dissertation is the emphasis placed on the search interest passive indicator as 
a method that a future iteration will be useful for measuring issue saliency among 
audiences/selectorates. I am not suggesting that this approach will ever be 100% free from elite 
manipulation, only that passive indicators, like search interest over time, are a novel alternative 
method for measuring issue salience while avoiding elite manipulation as much as possible.  
 Starting out will be the survey data which uses traditional survey data by organizations 
conducting valid scientific surveys. Media data is traditional and social media sources, primarily 
traditional, that discuss the topics, in this case Chinese nationalism and/or Chinese militancy. 




1st, 2010 to December 31st, 2019 that include the keywords China OR Chinese OR Japan OR 
Japanese AND Japanese Self-Defense Forces OR Japanese Constitution OR Article 9 of 
Japanese Constitution AND rhetoric. Results are further narrowed to only include exchanges 
noted by the BBC, NYT, CNN, and the Guardian. Finally, to conclude the SMS analysis I utilize 
the search term approach using the terms mentioned to identify patterns across all three data 
types. Additionally, my criteria for search term data is narrowed down to searches related to law 
and government. 
 One major caveat before proceeding: my absence of data in this section or this chapter in 
general should in no way be inferred as support for the Japanese position in this dispute and in 
the dyad in general. I do not support one side over the other and I do not believe that Chinese 
grievances are not valid and justified. To think so would be to deliberately or ignorantly ignore 
history, the atrocities committed by Japan during the Second Sino-Japanese War, and their 
generally unapologetic attitude since then. The reason that this chapter has been structure this 
way is the same reason my data analysis section is absent any data that speaks on behalf of the 
Chinese perspective. At this current time, there is just no reliable primary source data available 
that can be determined with any degree of confidence to not be a direct statement by the Chinese 
government. As I said at the beginning of this chapter, by seizing total control over the narrative 
about China, the Chinese government has taken the voice of the Chinese people, and what is 
viewed as important, away from “China” and which is instead viewed as a direct reflection of 
political regime, in this case, the CCP. Given that this dissertation is specifically scrutinizing a 
phenomenon closely associated if not directly synonymous with public opinion, it cannot be 





3.7.1 Survey Data 
I utilize polling and survey data conducted by Pew, and the Genron NPO31. I also look at 
changes in Japanese trade, investment, and export data from the Japanese External Trade 
Organization. I use Pew as a baseline due to its high visibility as a survey and polling agency. I 
use the Genron NPO to use as a validity check to ensure consistency between Pew and the 
findings of Pew. Finally, I use the data provided by the Japanese External Trade Organization to 
illustrate that the survey data is not limited to the respondents of an aggregation of Japanese 
society, but also includes tangible changes to how Japanese interact with Chinese as well. I used 
data exclusively from the 2000’s to narrow the scope and reduce the number of epiphenomenal 
variables influencing Japanese public opinion such as the 1996 Taiwan Strait Crises. As unstable 
as a great deal of politics in the 21st century have been, the period has been relatively consistent 
based on a metric of internal comparison in contrast to the influence that unaccounted for 
systemic shocks may have had on survey and polling data.32  
 Beginning with the Pew data, examining three separate Pew Surveys from 2016, 2018, 
and 2019, Japanese perception of China has fallen substantially (Pew 2018; 2019). In 2002, 55% 
of Japanese citizens had a favorable opinion of China which has fallen to 14% by 2019. Looking 
at this compared to the major flare ups in anti-Japanese rhetoric in China in 2005 and in 2012-
2013 this matches up perfectly. The narrative of Chinese elites following the first fruit to mature 
from the Patriotic Education Campaign began in the early 90s shows that Japanese perception of 
China fell as China’s rhetoric became more and more belligerent. Following the Anti-Japanese 
 
31 A Japanese think tank that tanks surveys on Japanese public opinion on relevant policy issues to the country. 
https://www.genron-npo.net/en/aboutus/ 
32 For example, the fall of the Soviet Union, collapse of the Japanese economy, rapid growth in Chinese hostility 





Riots of 2005, the CCP appeared to change its position and move away from that narrative which 
many scholars observed hopefully (Reilly, 2012). However, in 2012 the dispute over the 
Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands sparked a new way of belligerent rhetoric and Anti-Japanese Riots and 
at the height of that dispute Japanese perception of China had risen to its peak of a 93% 
unfavourability opinion of China at the end of 2013.   






The Genron survey data paints an almost identical picture. This is important for two 
reasons. First, because generally speaking, the Pew surveys and Japanese surveys mirror one 
another well, supporting the validity of the findings of each. Second, the Genron survey was 
conducted by Japanese which challenges any potential concerns about the findings of a western 
survey organization as opposed to an indigenous organization. The Genron findings are nearly 
identical. Their data, across several years of polling, identifies the same pattern where public 
opinion toward China declined substantially following the flareup in tensions in 2005 and 2012 
with a respite relative to other time periods between 2006 and 2011. An interesting observation 
that is not party of my analysis but nonetheless lies on the periphery is that Chinese public 
opinion toward Japan follows much of this trend lending credit to my hypothesis about elite 




is driving the perception of threat of both audiences that Chinese public opinion toward China 
mirrors Chinese elite rhetoric whereas Japanese perceptions remain bad following the CCPs 
changing tone toward Japan. Whereas following the flareups the percentage of Chinese who 
view Japan negatively drops quickly as the narrative changes, Japanese threat perception remains 
consistently high even after the CCP’s rhetorical priorities shift toward other targets (Genron 
Public Opinion Surveys 2010-2019). Since the Japanese survey looks at public perception in 
both countries, it provides a strong indicator that this plausibility model is accurate given the 
back-and-forth perception of Chinese, whereas Japanese public opinion holds a stable extremely 
unfavorable view of China.                                                                                                            
Fig. 3.3 
 
Finally, looking at graphs highlighting business practices and prospects for future exports 
both in jobs and products from Japan to China, there has been a significant shift in Japanese 




from the Japanese External Trade Organization (JETRO) throughout the 2010s, China’s share or 
stake in Japan’s economic priorities has dropped significant (JETRO Trade Surveys 2010; 2019). 
Japanese exporting destinations by exporting firms dropped by 10% from 69% down to 59% 
over the time period and even more significant is the decline in Japanese manufacturing centers 
in China which dropped from 76.3% of companies with bases in China down to 56.4% over the 
span of the decade. On its own this data could be interpreted an infinite number of ways, and 
even now there is no hard indicators based on the data provided that these shifts are due to 
tensions between the two countries, however the correlation between the two is strong enough to 
justify further investment in research on this model.  
Fig. 3.4                                                              Fig. 3.5 
  
3.7.2 Media Data 
 As previously stated, this section will be short relative to the following two chapters 
given the already extensive discussion throughout the chapter on key issues. Therefore, I will 
keep this as concise as possible. The theme of the 2010s in Japan in relation to China revolved 
around security in the East China Sea, the credibility of US reassurances to support Japan in the 
event of a confrontation with China over disputed territory between the two, and related to the 
uncertainty of US credibility to defend Japan (Japanese Economic Newswire, 2010). Specific to 




question of having a standing military force. From the collision between the Chinese fishing boat 
with a Japanese Coast Guard ship in 2010, to the standoff between Chinese naval and air force 
units against their Japanese counterparts, to what can objectively be called a destabilizing 
consequence of the Trump foreign policy in the Western Pacific, Japanese discussions on their 
relations with China turned increasingly toward the need for a genuine Japanese military force to 
supplant the existing self-defense force, which would require amending Article 9.  
 Proponents of amending Article 9 in light of Japan’s confrontation with China over the 
Diaoyu/Senkaku Islands and the intense and often violent rhetoric erupting from China over the 
issue faced substantial resistance from anti-war and anti-military groups domestically (the 
Guardian, 2012; Lee, NYT, 2012; Soble, NYT, 2015). Anti-war activists had maintained the 
argument that the United States had consistently assured Japan that they would provide any 
necessary security for the country. However, following Trump’s pivot away from the Western 
Pacific, confusing relationship with North Korea, and China’s filling of the void left by what 
appeared to be a departing United States, Japanese uncertainty increased and more and more 
Japanese voices began to support an independent Japanese military force (Japanese Economic 
Newswire, 2016). A specific piece of evidence in regards to this shift was Trump’s departure 
from 70 years of US foreign policy in the region and offers to sell Japan large amounts of US 
military equipment (Landler and Hirschfeld Davis, NYT, 2017a; Landler and Hirschfeld Davis, 
NYT, 2017b; Japanese Economic Newswire, 2018; 2019).  
 All of this considered though, North Korean belligerency in the last part of the decade 
caused a brief shift in focus from the militarization of Japan. It was replaced by a call for greater 
cooperation between the Northeast Asian countries on dealing with the Korean Peninsula nuclear 




China, the respite was short-lived and Japanese leaders resumed calls for amending Article 9 
(Japanese News Wire, 2019). In sum, Chinese anti-Japan rhetoric throughout the 1990s, 2000s, 
and extending into the early 2010s led to a serious conversation among Japanese about how to 
respond to their rhetorical brinkmanship and increased calls for the country to remilitarize. 
Compounding this issue was the inconsistent signals the Japanese received from the United 
States and a heightened uncertainty about whether the US would continue to provide security, or 
whether Trump was telling them they were on their own. The issue became moot before it could 
be exacerbated any further following the COVID-19 outbreak and the usual decrease in bellicose 
rhetoric during Summer Olympics hostings, but what the future holds for Sino-Japanese relations 
is unclear.  
3.7.3 Search Term Data 
 As I mentioned previously, there is only data available for Japan. In the following two 
graphs, I illustrate one measure of validity of using Google search analytics as an accurate 
representation of interest over time. It is clear from the data the graphs illustrate that it would 
indeed be misleading to use Google analytics to evaluate Chinese interest over time in the key 
terms. In Japan on the other hand, Google has a respectable 75% market share footprint from 
2018 onwards. Yahoo! has an outlier level of market share presence in Japan relative to the rest 
of the world for reasons beyond the focus of this dissertation. Further, Google’s market share 
variation in Japan compared to the India and Pakistan dyad and Greece and Turkey dyad has 
significance that future research should investigate. I speculate that there is likely a cultural 
characteristic or hurdle with using Google that is present in East Asia that is not present in other 









Interpreting these graphs, first, with China, Baidu clearly maintains the majority of the 
market share in China throughout the 2010s. However, there are some discrepancies with to what 
extent that majority exists given the spikes by Shenma and Sogou. In the case of the former, the 
statcounter analysts note issues with artificial inflation of numbers with their spike in market 
share, further calling into question the reliability of this data as well as how much competition 




market share as of 2019. In contrast, in Japan, Google ends the decade with a 75% market share 
which is commanding, but is still puzzling given A) this variation compared to the other four 
cases in this dissertation where it enjoys over 90%, and B) that Yahoo! was the company that 
was in almost parity with Google in terms of market share mid-way through the decade. 
Regardless, Google’s footprint is sufficient that we can infer the interest of the Japanese public 
over time throughout the decade.  
 Going over the data for Japan, there is a pattern that needs to be accounted for before 
moving forward. Yahoo! Japan’s market share was significant until late 2016 when it began to 
decline. This was in conjunction with the announcement that it would no longer contain a search 
engine function in 2017 (ITmedia, 2017). This being the case, some data in the following graphs 
will be skewed as a result. However, given that variables are moving in relation to one another, 
there is still a trend that emerges. Furthermore, what would look on these graphs to be small 
trends would be much greater when looked at prior to the influx of higher Google usage prior to 
the termination of Yahoo! search engine usage. 
 In the first graph, the terms China, War, and Japan Self-Defense Forces are examined 
together. The most notable change in Japanese search interest over the time period is in regards 
to Japan’s Self-Defense Forces. The peaks in interest correspond almost exactly with rhetorical 
exchanges involving China, Japan, and the United States. During the early 2010s, China greatly 
ramped up rhetoric insofar as their territorial claims over the East China Sea, especially in 
regards to a fishing boat collision between a Chinese fishing boat and Japanese Coast Guard 
ship. These events created pressure on Japanese leaders to respond from Japanese citizens and is 
illustrated in greater search interest. The disputes in the East China Sea kept up steady interest in 




Over Japan day” in 2015. Furthermore, toward the end of the decade, when Trump said in no 
uncertain terms that Japan was on its own insofar as defense was concerned, we see the most 
extreme spike in the data on this subject. Finally, as I will mention periodically, the drastic dip in 
the spring of 2021 corresponds with the transition in Emperors in Japan which diminished 
Japanese search interest in any other topics.  
Fig 3.8 
 
In the second graph, Fig 3.9, I keep the same search terms from Fig 3.8 but remove the war term 
to better illustrate how closely the Japan Self-Defense Forces and China (interest over time) 
terms move in relation to one another. With the exception of the 2011 spike related to the fishing 
boat incident, the two terms move almost identically. An interesting observation that warrants 
further investigation in future research is why Japanese interest drifts to defense rather than 
research into China when tensions flare. I myself would likely begin by investigating 
intersubjective understanding of ideas, rules, and norms between the two as well as investigating 
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that the rhetoric out of China has been consistent for a long enough duration that Japanese no 
longer feel uncertain about China, but rather about their country’s capability to take care of itself. 
Fig 3.9 
 
In fact, although not a search term included in the analysis, if plugged into the list of terms, 
interest in the United States over time conforms even more to Japanese interest in their Self-
Defense forces than China does, which, inferring in relation to the preponderance of supporting 
evidence in multiple formats throughout this chapter, demonstrates that Japan has historically 
been reassured by US commitment to the Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security, but that as 





























































































































































































China and Self-Defense Forces
































































































































































































Insofar as the massive trough in early 2019, interest in the abdication of Emperor Akihito and the 
ascension of his successor pulled interest away from almost every topic from February until 
April 2019. Finally, there is a weak but noticeable pattern between war, Article 9, and 
Constitution that has no discernable relationship with any of the rhetoric analyzed. 
Fig 3.11 
 
In sum, this brief exploration on limited data into the shift in perception by the Japanese 
public toward China strongly corroborates with the model proposed in this dissertation. Not only 
has public perception of China been harmed by Chinese rhetoric, it has had tangible economic 
damage as well. Using these distinct types of indicators across multiple sectors suggests that 
there is not a short-term epiphenomenal correlation conforming the data to my model or any 
other covariation in general. That said, more significant testing, with drastically more rigorous 
standards will be necessary to provide a quantitatively valid picture and indicate whether these 
changes shed light on Sino-Japanese relations in conjunction with rhetoric, what percentage of 
the picture they reveal, and whether or not they are meaningful in any way and statistically 




conducting an inverse examination of the impact of Chinese rhetoric against others has had is a 
useful starting point. Further research and data collection using a combination of polling and 
more relevant survey data, in conjunction with a rigorous content analysis and supplemented by 
a discourse analysis of what rhetoric is making its way through the filter from China to Japan 
could quantitatively confirm the preliminary findings of this plausibility probe.  
 In addition, although not the objective of this dissertation, future research that has the 
necessary technology or resources should systematically examine any correlation between 
domestic tension in China with a rise in anti-Japanese rhetoric. The probability that Chinese anti-
Japanese rhetoric is a diversionary process by the CCP to redirect domestic criticism is crucial to 
the long-term objective of this model. In the case of both public opinion surveys and declines in 
business activities, there is a correlation with this narrative and domestic issues, which again, 
should be explored in future research. The years leading up to the 2005 protests were mired with 
a tug of war between an increasingly active social media culture in China and the official party 
line of the CCP. Similarly, 2012-2013 saw a rocky transition in power from Hu Jintao to Xi 
Jinping which included a coup attempt by other party elites attempting to prevent Xi’s ascent to 
supreme leader in China. In sum, there is sufficient evidence to explored the idea that Japan is a 
convenient target to create a foreign diversion or target for domestic frustration.  
3.8 From Goodwill to Rearmament 
 Before concluding this chapter, it is worth briefly noting that the Japanese government 
has responded to growing concern in Japan about the threat that China poses to Japan. Many 
have argued that China’s belligerence, not simply its rise in power relative to Japan and the 
United States, necessitates Japan to increase its capabilities to go it alone if necessary (Nadeau, 




of need has been severely undermined throughout the past 15-20 years to the point where 
countries such as Japan and Taiwan have less confidence that the United States will come to their 
aid in time of a crises with China (Schelling, 1966). 
 In light of this, since the intense confrontation between China and Japan in the East China 
Sea in 2012-13, the Japanese government has pushed to amend their renunciation of war in 
Chapter 2 Article 9 of their Constitution which states that: 
Aspiring sincerely to an international peace based on justice and order, the Japanese 
people forever renounce war as a sovereign right of the nation and the threat or use of 
force as means of settling international disputes. 
In order to accomplish the aim of the preceding paragraph, land, sea, and air forces, as 
well as other war potential, will never be maintained. The right of belligerency of the 
state will not be recognized (Japanese Constitution, 1947). 
Although Japanese opinion on the issue remains mixed, with many seeing amending Article 9 as 
causing more problems than it would solve, the debate has gained traction over the years, 
especially as China has penetrated deeper and deeper into Japan’s territorial waters (Cai, 2012). 
Other Japanese politicians including Abe’s primary competitor Shigeru Ishiba have called for 
completely removing paragraph 2 of the article (Murao, 2018). Although the Japanese public has 
maintained a highly unfavorable perception of China throughout most of the 2010s, they have 
remained hesitant to amend Article 9. Whether through wisdom of fear, the Japanese people have 
not reached the point where they are willing to accept the consequences of the paradigmatic shift 
to their country’s image that the expansion of their military capabilities would create for the 
region. The key though, is that the conversation has become increasingly common, especially 
since the crises in the East China Sea in 2012-13 and all incidences since then. With more data, 
and more directly related data, the opinion of the Japanese people may be different. Further, a 




preventing the future rearmament of Japan in response to Chinese aggression, whether it be in 
response to the impact that Trump’s presidency could have moving into the 2020s and the 
negative perceptions Japan has of that, (Silver and Devlin, 2020) or, a military confrontation 
with China.  
3.9 Conclusion 
 This chapter has examined the relationship between China and Japan to explore the 
plausibility of the model proposed in this dissertation. In this case, I looked at the relationship 
between historical rivals with a contested and bloody history where one is on the rise in the 
international order and the other has remained static or is declining. Beginning with the opening 
of China and Japan to western influence and the industrialization of both countries, I discussed 
the backdrop to still harbored feelings of animosity in the relationship, as well as the persuasive 
and prevalent anti-Japanese narrative that has flourished in China, especially post-Tiananmen 
following the beginning of the Patriotic Education Campaign. From the beginning of the 1970s 
to 1989, relations and cooperation between the two countries grew increasingly closer. However, 
following the crackdown on the Tiananmen Square Protests and the subsequent reimagining of 
itself the CCP underwent, relations began a steady decline between the two leading to where we 
are now, with approximately 85% of the Japanese public holding negative views of China and 
increasingly viewing them as a threat. This time period endured two very significant rhetorical 
incidences in 2005 and 2012-13 where the Chinese government opened the floodgates of the 
animosity of the Chinese people that it had cultivated throughout the 1990s. In response to this, 
trade has suffered and talk within Japanese politics about amending Article 9 of the Japanese 
Constitution which prohibits the creation and maintenance of a Japanese standing military. 




Sino-Japanese relationship. This dyad has a long history of rivalry and animosity, as well as 
including the possibility of IR realist theory shedding more light on this relationship than non-
realists would care to admit. Conversely, the more refined iteration of my method may reveal 
that there is merely covariation between the variables I have identified and examined in this 
chapter at best. As such, I will now shift focus onto chapter 4 which focuses on a static power 




























 Continuing the same process as before, in this chapter I examine the Indo-Pakistani dyad 
and the nature of rhetoric within this relationship. I briefly examine the historical evolution of the 
two countries, from a British colony on the Indian Sub-continent, to briefly, a singular entity, and 
then two sovereign states that have engaged in military conflict numerous times since their 
independence and even proliferated nuclear weapons as a deterrent against the other. Similar to 
the case of the Sino-Japanese dyad, elites in both countries exploit the relationship vis-à-vis 
belligerent political rhetoric for political capital within their constituency. Going beyond what 
was possible in the Sino-Japanese chapter, in this chapter I will examine the flow of rhetoric in 
both directions. This is possible due to less restrictive control over citizen access to information. 
This is likely due to a less sophisticated system of censorship relative to China; regardless 
however, it provides an opportunity to see how political rhetoric affects constituencies in both 
autocratic and democratic states. Therefore, in this chapter I examine the impact of transnational 
audience costs in both India and Pakistan. That said, this chapter provides less of a robust 
historical treatment relative to the Sino-Japanese case. This is the result of 1) a shorter history as 
sovereign independent states, and 2) lessened emphasis on history and more emphasis on 
religious and ethnic, particularly vernacular, cleavages between the two states. I begin by 
providing a background treatment of the dyad. Following this I will provide and discuss some 
examples of political rhetoric used by political elites in both countries. More specifically, I will 
identify contentious issues between the two countries to provide a context for the rhetoric used. I 
then discuss the presence of transnational audience costs created by this rhetoric. Finally, I 




this dyad impacts the hypothesis proposed in the dissertation. The most critical contribution of 
this chapter is the examination of transnational audience costs from the perspective of both sides.  
4.1 Background 
 The foci of belligerent rhetoric in the Indo-Pak relationship revolve around 1) the 
territorial dispute over Kashmir, 2) other sporadic territorial clashes between India and Pakistan, 
3) India’s role in the Bengali declaration of independence33 in 1972, and most importantly 4) the 
nature of the partition of the Indian Subcontinent in 1947 and the tremendous loss of life that 
took place therein, especially in terms of migration of Muslims into Pakistan and Hindus into 
India. Tensions between Indian Muslims and Indian Hindus dates back to the introduction of 
Islam to the subcontinent. Further, narratives of mass scale persecution of Muslims by Hindus 
that do not acknowledge the opposite as well are incredibly misleading. While non-Abrahamic 
religions may be less oriented toward conversion, Hindus in India have nonetheless viewed 
Indian Muslims as apostates and thus frequently persecuted them in the form of anti-Muslim 
pogroms (Jaffrelot, 1999; Gaikward, 2013; Hansen, 1999). In sum, since the existence of 
cleavage between the ethnic groups of the Indian Subcontinent as a result of the expansion of 
Islam, the people who comprise these groups have had a tense and violent relationship.  
 One of the often-discussed features of the relationship is the perceived “democraticness” 
of India and the rocky political instability of Pakistan. As of writing this, India scores a 10 out of 
10 on the Polity Index with Pakistan at a 7. For comparison, the US is at a 5 and Russia is a 4 
(Marshall et. al., Polity V). Generally speaking, however, this does not tell us much. It does not 
illuminate the tedious process of maintaining democracy in a country as diverse both ethnically 
 




and vernacularly as India, and it does not portray the institutional adversaries jockeying for 
power in Pakistan. Although I will not discuss those issues, it is important to highlight that they 
exist for the purposes of noting both how fragile democracy is in both countries, and, what this 
dissertation does spend some time discussing, what glue holds these states together. If not 
ethnicity, and if religion is only part of the picture, what is keeping the system intact and in a 
relative state of equilibrium? The stability of the governments in both India and Pakistan relies 
on nationalist rhetoric that is sufficiently belligerent enough to keep the main body of the state 
focused on the other rather than more carefully scrutinizing domestic policies. Some have argued 
that India’s democracy is relatively stable through deals made between the many ethnic groups 
(Chandra, 2005) and others have discussed how brittle and fragile Pakistan’s political system is 
(Hussain, T, 2018; Cheema et. al., 2015; Aqdas, 2020; Shah, 2014; Hussian, Z. 2020), but taking 
a more quantum, big picture view of the whole puzzle, the primary distinction between India and 
Pakistan politically speaking is that given India’s hyper-diversity, the political system tends to be 
more flexible and adaptable, thus making it less in danger of undemocratic political change 
(Chandra, 2005).  
On a side note, in passing, future research on democracy in Pakistan should investigate 
the military presence in Pakistan in terms of a how Pakistan’s threat perception has legitimized 
or justified the military having a greater presence in everyday life as a result of their history and 
proximity with India. What sort of institutional configurations has Pakistani threat perception 
and perceived need for a strong military presence created in the structural environment that a 
democratic regime type must try to survive within? In other words, is the presence of India as a 
proximal and ontological threat the primary obstacle to more robust democratic institutions in 




stabilizing measure meant to reorient the country back toward democratic institutions in order to 
prevent religious fundamentalists from controlling the country as has happened on a number of 
occasions in the past. In that light, one could even argue that Pakistan is even more stable than 
India, given Pakistani wariness toward entertaining religious fundamentalism relative to India’s 
absolutely essential necessity to sate the appetite of Hindu nationalists (Jaffrelot, 1999; Gaikwad, 
2013; Hansen, 1999). Lastly on the discussion of Pakistani democracy, it should be noted that all 
of the overt conflicts with India have taken place while Pakistan was under military control 
rather than democratic control. Once the transnational audience cost model has been further 
validated based on more consistent data, future research should explore regime type and the 
stability of the regime’s selectorate in other applications of model, e.g., differences in how 
democratic and autocratic selectorates impose costs.   
 In sum, the reality of politicking done on the ground in both countries is much different 
than how it is portrayed through a Western lens, and India is not the great democracy and 
Pakistan the constantly stumbling younger brother. The countries are relatively similar in terms 
of the government to society dynamic, which, is not surprising considering they occupy the same 
space and were part of the same “country” for most of their history. This final point can be even 
further emphasized with the magnitude of migration that took place after partition in 1947. The 
political boundaries on the map between the two countries have taken a great deal of time to sort, 
and that did not magically happen with the arbitrary drawing of a line on a map in 1947. With the 
case made about how to perceive these two countries through this chapter being organized, I will 
now focus on how transnational audience costs operate within this dyad. Moving into the next 





4.2 Key Narratives 
4.2.1 Kashmir 
 Kashmir is a region in the Northwest of the Indian Subcontinent, consisting of contested 
territory in the Northwest of India and Northeast of Pakistan. The region was formerly the 
princely state of Jammu and Kashmir prior to the partition of the Indian Subcontinent. The 
territory is partially to wholly claimed by India, Pakistan, and China (Chang, 2017), and 
primarily occupied by India, followed by Pakistan, and finally China claiming control over the 
Northeastern-most portion of the region (Margolis, 2004; Hobbs, 2008; Snow, 2016). The origin 
of the conflict, like almost all tension between India and Pakistan, is linked to the 1947 partition. 
Almost immediately following the partition, dispute over the fate of the region came under the 
scrutiny of the UN and the Security Council who, in UNCIP Resolutions on 5, January 1949, and 
13, August, 1948, determined that there would be a popular referendum in the region to decide 
its fate in the partition. Both India and Pakistan agreed to remove strategically placed nationals 
and military forces out of the region in order to ensure that the vote accurately represented the 
local population of the region. However, neither party reached a point where they were satisfied 
that all conditions had been met for the plebiscite to proceed and thus the vote was never held, 
leading to the state of relations in the present (Schofield, 2000; Radnock, 1998).  
 The dispute over the territory has contributed to several wars between India and Pakistan 
as well as the 1962 Sino-Indian War (Verma, 2006). Wars between Pakistan and India over the 
territory, excluding insurgencies, intifadas, and other internal conflicts, include the Indo-
Pakistani War of 1947, the 1965 Indo-Pakistani War, the 1971 Indo-Pakistani War, a multitude 
of minor confrontations, local uprisings, and protests, and more recently, the 2020 India-Pakistan 




 The most pressing question related to this dispute, as with most others that seem arbitrary 
from the outside, is why? Why is this mountainous region of the Himalayas so hotly contested 
that it has led to this long string of conflicts resulting in the deaths of hundreds of thousands to 
millions of people? To summarize the dispute concisely within the context of this chapter, the 
dispute comes down to the construction of a primordial feud between Hindu identity and 
nationalism in opposition and violent contention with the presence of Islam on the subcontinent, 
as evidenced in part by the fact that a majority of the region as a whole is Muslim (BBC, 2019; 
Esposito, 2004; Komireddi, 2019).  
4.2.2 Other Provinces 
 Although the territorial dispute over Kashmir is the predominant territorial dispute, there 
has been friction in other areas as well. I will speak briefly on the water crisis and Afghanistan, 
and then I devote an entire subsection to the discussion of the Bengal Crisis. Water has been a 
subject of concern throughout the 2010s with uncertainty going into the future. The water 
sources that flow into Northeast Pakistan move through Indian controlled Kashmir which has 
harnessed the flow water for power generation. As inevitably occurs with significant dam 
projects, this has caused major water issues downstream, which, in this case is Pakistan, further 
fueling fragile relations. It has been taken as a rally cry by military tacticians and jihadists alike 
in Pakistan for stoking the flames for continuing to fight against, what they claim to be, India’s 
strategy for ceasing their existence (Economist, 2011). Thus far however, the two countries have 
been able to find diplomatic solutions for the problem and avoided conflict. This has primarily 
been accomplished through the Indus Waters Treaty (Haines, 2017; Guardian, 2002) however 




Hydroelectric Plant which was finished in 2014 and has continued to contribute to the 
diminishing fresh water supply in the northern provinces of the two countries.  
 The topic of Afghanistan has been a complex issue for the two countries given both their 
shared origin and contemporary adversarial relationship. To most concisely sum up the subject of 
Afghanistan in terms of the Indo-Pak dyad, Afghanistan is a historical rival of Pakistan and both 
India and Pakistan have used the Afghanis to engage one another asymmetrically, similar to the 
proxy conflicts between the Saudis and Iranians in the Middle East. Politically, excluding any 
role or influence of the US, historically, Pakistan has supported the Taliban and India the 
Northern Alliance (Withington, 2001; Ians, 2021). Afghanistan has been a training ground for 
insurgency groups utilized by both India and Pakistan to conduct attacks against the other. This 
has been most publicized in terms of terrorist attacks against India including the 2001 Indian 
Parliament Attack, and the 2008 Mumbai Attack, among many, many others. While important to 
understanding the full context of the dyad, it is not a primary source of tension, but rather a tool 
that both sides use to conduct relatively insignificant but high-profile operations against one 
another (Al Jazeera, 2021; Business Standard, 2021; Business Standard India, 2020; Byman, 
2005; Noor, 2007; Adil and Sajid, 2021; Mahadevan, 2017; Dmello et. al., 2020). 
4.2.3 Bengali Independence 
 Friction regarding Bangladesh is ingrained in the history of the region, was part of the 
partition issue, was a prominent issue during the era of East Pakistan and West Pakistan, and 
continuing to have a minor role in contemporary Indo-Pak relations. During the Dominion of 
India era when the Indian subcontinent was still under British rule, the primary clusters of 
Muslims resided within the eastern and western territories of India. Following partition, these 




government. This formed a non-continuous state with a large population with two very diverse 
groups of people whose primary similarity was their religion and not much else. In terms of how 
this played into the Indo-Pak dyad, first, similar to the large migration of Hindus and Muslims 
that took place in the west, a similar exchange took place in the east, again, contributing to a 
significant humanitarian crisis, a great deal of human suffering, and loss of life. This was 
followed by the Bangladesh Liberation War of 1971 which played a significant role in the Indo-
Pakistani War of 1971 (Nawaz, 2008; Rashiduzzaman, 1972).  
 Since the partition, there had always been tension between East and West Pakistan given 
their immense cultural differences34 and given the political pole of Pakistan centering on its 
contemporary territory, this contributed to increasingly loud calls for the Bengali people to 
separate from Pakistan in pursuit of their own self-determination and independence. Pakistan 
responded to this by executing who they saw to be the leading Bengali nationalist ringleaders. In 
common tit for tat relations both sides continued to retaliate against one another which ultimately 
ended up involving Hindus living in East Pakistan and thus, spilling over the border into India 
leading to the Indian intervention in the conflict and the Indo-Pakistani War of 1971 which saw 
the independence of Bangladesh, led by the Bengali nationalists that India had backed, and icier 
relations and resentment within the India-Pakistani relationship (Lyon, 2008; Kemp, 2010). 
4.2.4 Partition of the Indian Subcontinent 
 Of all issues that contribute to tension between India and Pakistan, all paths lead back to 
the 1947 partition. Many volumes have been written on this subject. My attempt here is to 
emphasize its importance and uncontestable primary role in poor relations between the two 
 




countries rather than try to rehash the story, recount the narratives, or lose sight of the topic of 
this chapter for the sake of sufficiently communicating the importance of the partition itself. In 
sum, this section needs to be relatively short because it is impossible to discuss the issue in a 
subsection of a single chapter and satisfactorily explain anything. It is the most important issue in 
this dyad and there is little to no debate about that being fact.35 
 The overarching question leading into Indian independence was whether or not there 
should be a partition. The British had initially wanted to preserve a single India to exist as part of 
the British defense network, known as their imperial defense, similar to the role Canada and 
Australia have played (Roberts, 2003; Darwin, 2011). Gandhi and many other Indian nationalists 
also wanted to preserve the territorial integrity of the Indian Subcontinent as one state (Stein and 
Arnold, 2010; Khan, 2007). However, there were legitimate fears among Indian Muslims about 
Hindu dominance over the political system and the marginalization and persecution of Muslims 
in a single Indian state (Talbot and Singh, 2009). The debate over the fate of Indian Muslims 
devolved into violence and atrocities committed by Hindus against Muslims, Muslims against 
Hindus, and attacks by other groups fighting for autonomy and a place at the bargaining table. 
Ultimately, the British accepted the partition, as did Gandhi36 and the lines began to be drawn, 
and great migrations both voluntarily and involuntarily of Hindus and Muslims began as each 
moved to their respective new state. Additionally, though, there were many accounts of ethnic 
cleansing that also took place to “purify” the respective territories to reflect the correct ethnic 
majorities across both countries and especially within the border territories (Talbot and Singh, 
2009).  
 
35 A basic introduction to the topic should include Sekhara, 2004; Bose and Jalal, 2004; Brown, 1994; Dyson, 2018; 
Peers, 2006; and Robb 2002. There are many books and an entire section of literature on this one topic. 




The conduct of both Hindus and Muslims and the Indian and Pakistani governments 
during the partition and generally, and predominantly regarding the migration of peoples across 
borders, contributed to the general disdain between Pakistanis and Indians to this day. However 
there have been instances of thawing in the relationship, which has always been countered by 
refreshed, reinvigorated, or rejuvenated sentiments of hostilities in the relationship. It is at this 
cross-section where the theoretical foundation of transnational audience costs comes in to play.  
4.2.5 Factoring in to Transnational Audience Costs 
 In the case of India and Pakistan, more so than almost any other dyad, belligerent 
political rhetoric has been pivotal in the conduct of both domestic and international relations in 
both countries. Indian leaders talk tough on Pakistan to Indian citizens, Pakistani leaders talk 
tough on India to Pakistani citizens, and leaders in both countries continue to have their fears of 
political instability due to very real and tangible domestic problems assuaged due to the strength 
at which these frequently invoked narratives resonate with. Consistent with other dyads that fall 
within the enduring rivalries framework, India and Pakistan have a solid foundation of atrocities, 
tragedies, and rivalry to use against one another. Also similar to the Sino-Japanese dyad, the 
majority of these events are still fresh within the collective memory of both societies. Another 
recurring characteristic in these cases in their instrumental use to deflect domestic tensions onto 
regional/international issues. 
4.3 Regime Structure: 
Basic Regime Characteristics in India and Pakistan 
 Both India and Pakistan rank as democracies as of the most current Polity score in Polity 
V with India scoring a 10/10 and Pakistan a 7/10. India is considered to be an older, more stable 




though, both countries have strikingly similar political systems. Both countries have a hybrid 
Parliamentary-Presidential system. In India the role of the President is mostly symbolic in spite 
of the president’s role as commander-in-chief due to a robust constitution. Power has 
consistently been held by the Prime Minister of India who is the head of government in contrast 
to the president’s role as head of state (Granville, 2003; Kulke and Rothermund, 2004). 
 Pakistan also has essentially an identical system in theory, with a strong constitution and 
a parliamentary head of government in the Prime Minister of Pakistan and the President of 
Pakistan as head of state (Crilly, 2013). However, that said, the president, also acting as 
commander-in-chief, has on occasion seized control of the government and assumed 
responsibilities as head of government from the prime minister during periods where the balance 
of power via constitutional checks and balances between the competing civilian political 
institutions, the intelligence sector of the government, and the military has broken down (Hirschl, 
2010; Baxter, 2003). In spite of this, Pakistan has maintained a relatively stable democratic 
system and avoided backsliding into the system of theocratic governance as was the case in the 
1980s due to similar political upheaval, again attributable to a disequilibrium between 
constitutional institutions in the government.  
 In spite of increasingly robust democratic institutions however, the pivot to belligerent 
rhetoric is pervasive between these two countries. Restating the general thesis of this 
dissertation, the question is if the rhetoric antagonizes the other state’s domestic audience. 
Further, the recurring theme and question throughout this examination remains: how can we tell? 
Within the research design and the subsequent empirical chapters I examine public opinion as 




or domestic audience’s access to this actually is vs how much of it is astroturfing, in terms of 
statements, protests, rallies, and other means of public outcry. 
4.4 The Model 
Transnational Audience Costs Between India and Pakistan 
 The remainder of this chapter will examine belligerent rhetoric utilized by both India and 
Pakistan. Similar to chapter 3, I have covered the foundation of the narratives used in this 
relationship and I will focus particularly on 2010s. One of the most interesting aspects of this 
dyad is how much political change has occurred in these countries, in the region, and in 
international relations over this time, however even through significant changes to the political 
regime, the rhetoric toward each other has remained consistent. This presents an interesting 
observation insofar as it goes a step further than the Sino-Japanese relationship because the level 
of autocracy or democracy has not influenced the use of this rhetoric. It is possible that this is 
still consistent with the categorization of new democracies as being comparatively volatile with 
autocracies and in contrast to old democracies, but that is something that can be revisited later.  
 The literature on political rhetoric within this dyad has primarily emphasized tension 
related to Kashmir. Based on a careful examination of the general relationship and shared history 
between the two countries, Kashmir is more of a substantive, tangible manifestation of 
preexisting adversarial sentiments between the two countries rather than a battle over a highly 
strategically significant territory (Komireddi, 2019). Therefore, although the primary area of 
discourse and/or general narrative is on the Kashmir issue, this should be understood as an outlet 
or pressure valve so to speak in the dyad rather than a self-sustaining issue. Put another way, 




 As is the case with all of the empirical cases I use but especially in this chapter, 
identifying the independent variable of the model within this dyad is challenging given how two 
dyads emerged from one. The additional layer of shared history makes unlinking and isolating 
political rhetoric from the whole of reciprocal tensions more problematic. This being the case, 
within this dyad, belligerent rhetoric is discussed with the understanding that it does not exist in 
a vacuum; and in the proto-theoretical stage of this model currently, it is not yet isolatable from 
the broader narrative. Therefore, I identify belligerent rhetoric being exchanged and parallel it 
with existing tensions while acknowledging that at this time I cannot further isolate the 
relationship or plausibility of a relationship to even a correlation without substantially more data 
and scholarly expertise about the relationship these two countries share. In layman’s terms, tough 
talk about the other is such a common feature in this relationship that without further 
specialization specific to this dyad, I am unable to satisfactorily isolate the relationship between 
the dependent and independent variable. However, I will illustrate how important the narratives 
of hate are to both India and Pakistan and how popular sentiment in both countries reflects these 
narratives while being upfront that I am limited on concretely establishing the boundaries 
between the dependent and independent variables at this time. 
 Narayanan provides an excellent summary of the state of relations between India and 
Pakistan up to 2010 (Narayanan, 2010). This covers all of the most significant flare up in 
hostilities within the dyad, however generally speaking, they maintain a Wolfers “billiard ball-
esque” presentation of each state. Dissecting domestic politics was not their aim so this is 
understandable, however it doesn’t capture how more or less meaningful political rhetoric, 
leaders sticking to the narrative, and its reaction from the other actually is. However, what it does 




international relations and comparative politics have been enraptured by the dynamics of each 
state, the bilateral relations between them, and mass-elite exchanges within each state, however 
no one has provided a meaningful analysis of how these narratives resonate with the others 
audience. This is an oversight that my model will correct in future research following a deeper, 
more robust, and sufficiently adequate analysis. However, that is not the agenda of this project. It 
is one for another day. I will spend the remainder of this chapter discussing exchanges and how 
they have a relatively stable self-sustaining chain reaction. A curiosity to explore for future 
research will be to pose the question: what would happen if one side refused to continue “playing 
the same game” and did not continue the rhetorical engagement? Could this lead to a legitimate 
thawing of relations? Or would it result in an inevitable toppling of the regime that refused to 
continue perpetuating this narrative? In other words, how much is the legitimacy of each state, 
both of which are currently categorized as “democracies” at the moment, tied to maintaining the 
belligerent quid pro quo? 
4.5 SMS Analysis 
 In this section I share and discuss the findings of my SMS Analysis approach. As with 
the other two empirical chapters, the state of my method as it has been deployed within this 
dissertation is exploratory and for illustrative purposes only. The purpose is to show that passive 
indicators that are better able to overcome elite manipulation in capturing audience/selectorate 
issue sentiment and saliency is a plausible possibility in the future. This is combined with an 
examination of media and NGO survey data where available to act as markers or time stamps 
that do not themselves inform us of anything but do suggest there could be a connection between 




coverage. Given the challenges of operationalizing the audience costs variable, a method that 
takes both types of data into account is essential. 
I first examine rhetoric and the political narrative based on a sample of media data to 
build a timeline of the relationship in the 2010s. I then provide existing survey data. Following 
this I provide graphical depictions of search engine interest over time over key terms in India and 
Pakistan. Finally, I contextualize these three components in relation to one another to provide as 
in depth of a picture as possible of the transnational audience cost dynamic within the dyad.  
 Media data illustrating the narrative of the relationship and the rhetoric utilized is 
collected from Lexis-Nexus using the search engine to identify all texts from January 1st, 2010 to 
December 31st, 2019 that include the keywords India OR Indian AND Pakistan OR Pakistani OR 
Pak AND rhetoric. Results are further narrowed to only include exchanges by the BBC, NYT, 
CNN, and the Guardian. Search data is data generated from Google trends based on “Interest 
Over Time”. I limited my search into areas pertaining to “law and government”. Narrowing the 
search analytics down to law and government was critical because it eliminated search hits for 
inquires for topics including the word “war” that were used in reference to a popular Disney-
Marvel movie that came out during that time period with that word in the title. Numbers 
represent search interest relative to the highest point of the chart for the given region and time. A 
value of 100 is the peak popularity for the term. A value of 50 means it was half as popular as at 
its most popular. A value of 0 means there was not enough data to score this term during this 
time period. Although in this preliminary examination I am using Google Trends due to language 
and location/access obstacles, the most popular search engine in some countries or regions may 
be different. In both India and Pakistan however, Google has a 99% share of the market in terms 




terms in the multitude of languages spoken across the Indian Subcontinent to determine any 
discrepancies and what we may infer from these variations, e.g., what class, caste, race, religion, 
etc who speak each language has more or less interest in different terms at different times.  
 Lastly before beginning the analysis, the terms selected follow a thorough preliminary 
review of salient topics that have intersubjective meaning between these neighbors on the Indian 
Subcontinent. Both view the other as simultaneously the greatest threat to their existence as well 
as a defining characteristic of their existence. Terrorism is a constantly recurring theme in their 
relationship. In spite of other issues such as drug smuggling, human trafficking, and other much 
more frequent and devastating regional issues, terrorist attacks maintain a disproportionate place 
on the stage in the spotlight of bilateral relations. Hindu Nationalism, or, Hindutva, embodied by 
the Bhartiya Janata Party (BJP), is the most significant ideological destabilizer within the region, 
even greater than Islamic Fundamentalism according to scholars and Indian statesmen alike 
(Leidig, 2020; Kuncheria, 2010; BBC, 2010). Finally, and perhaps intertwined, are the topics of 
War, and Jammu and Kashmir. Jammu and Kashmir are the two provinces that are understood in 
the West to be “the Kashmir Issue”, but are, like the very existence of one another, are 
foundational to the necessary and adversarial relationship between the two. And war of course, is 
a term used to gauge the saliency of bellicose rhetoric from each country over the time series. It 
is used for illustrative purposes and does not necessarily correspond with what is actually salient 
in either country at this time. There are too many alternative possibilities including simple issues 







4.5.1 Media Analysis 
Prime Minister Modi and Hindu Nationalism 
 Early in the 2010s many scholars were hopeful that the movement toward greater 
democracy in Pakistan would contribute to a thawing of relations and realize greater cooperation 
(Waraich, 2018). In spite of any supposition we might engage in, it remains a “coulda, woulda, 
shoulda, scenario given that within the same time period, the Hindu Nationalist Party (BJP) and 
their current leader and Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi have gathered increasing support 
throughout the decade (Danziger, 2020; Kaifee, 2019). To nurture support from his base, Modi 
has made statements including that “India has successfully managed to isolate Pakistan in the 
global arena,” and that the blame for the human catastrophe in Kashmir, and terrorism 
throughout India rests solely on Pakistan. Further, he has said that “it would be a big mistake to 
think Pakistan will start behaving after one fight. It will take a long time for Pakistan to start 
behaving (Kaifee, 2019). Modi has also revoked Kashmir and Jammu’s special status and 
relative autonomy within India, which was essential to any stability in bilateral relations with 
Pakistan. He says that “economic well-being requires a strong nation, which requires, in turn, 
overcoming hurdles to the nation’s strength such as minority appeasement, anti-nationalism, or 
stone-pelting Kashmiri youth.” India’s Home Minister Amit Shah has also remarked that 
“Kashmir will now move on the path of development. If anyone tries to create any disturbance in 
Kashmir, remember our soldiers are standing by.” (Tremblay and Bonner, 2019). Domestically, 
this nationalist narrative has increased the amount of sectarian violence in India toward non-






Pakistani Reaction: Synchronized Rhetoric or Responding to Threats? 
 The rise of Modi and the BJP has been paralleled with the rise of nationalist populism in 
Pakistan as well. In 2013 the nationalist Pakistan Muslim League (PML-N) and Pakistan 
Movement for Justice (PTI) won a large enough share of the Pakistani parliament to form a 
coalitional government. The coalition first went with the leader of the nationalist PML-N Nawaz 
Sharif who has since been succeeded by the populist Imran Khan who has ramped up nationalist 
rhetoric even more than his predecessor in his anti-Indian rhetoric. Initially Khan had made 
overtures to thawing relations with India by pursuing peace through boosting trade (Waraich, 
2018). However, with Modi ramping up rhetoric and shoring up support from his base, Khan’s 
goodwill gestures have increasingly turned to a hardening resolve, going so far as threatening a 
military response to India’s “Hindutva Supremacist Fascist ideology” (Danziger, 2020; India 
Today, 2019). Khan’s response has been consistent with general sentiment in Pakistan toward 
India both in the political and secular spheres as well as the military increasingly. Generally, 
more reserved and removed from bellicose political rhetoric by civilian leaders, the Pakistani 
military has become increasingly unhappy with the idea of friendly relations with India. Given 
the military’s role as a final arbiter in foreign policymaking by the Pakistani government, these 
sentiments are consistent in timing with Modi’s nationalist narrative. The challenging aspect of 
an empirical analysis of the India-Pakistan dyad however is determining who is leading and who 
is following. In all of these relationships it is challenging to impossible to determine where the 
origin of bellicose rhetoric lies at within bilateral narratives, however this dyad is particularly 






The Paradox of Pakistan’s Rhetoric 
 Even within the 2010s, Modi and the BJPs rhetoric in India has not originated from a 
vacuum. The narrative they have embraced within domestic Indian politics is based on hardline 
rhetoric from Pakistan, interference in Indian politics from Pakistan’s Inter-Service Intelligence 
(ISI), terror attacks from ISI trained paramilitary cells,* skirmishes along the border with the 
Pakistani Border, and nationalist rhetoric from Pakistani political leaders. Further, the ever-
looming fear in India is grounded in a tangible reality, that there are more Muslims that live in 
India than there are in Pakistan (Danziger, 2020). The challenge for future research following 
further development of this model should also be capable of isolating political rhetoric from 
these other factors to more precisely measure their impact on bilateral relations.  
 The rhetoric utilized by Pakistan’s secular political government, from the Pakistan 
People’s Party (PPP) led by Asif Ali Zardari, through Sharif’s PML-N, to Khan’s PTI, has 
consistently expressed anti-Indian sentiment regardless of Indian rhetoric. In spite of overtures 
for peace during the tenure of Zardari in Pakistan and Singh as India’s Prime Minister, Zardari 
continuously failed to follow through on overtures made toward the Indian PM, empty promises 
that the Pakistani coalitional government could not nor would not deliver on, and ultimately 
contributed to the circumstances, similar to Singh’s, which led to both leaders being ousted for 
leaders in both countries utilizing the “correct” othering narrative within the dyad (Dhar, 2015). 
Subsequently, Pakistani leaders have gone tit for tat with India’s Modi in ramping up rhetoric go 
so far in 2020 to promise false flag attacks and joint operations with China against India to 
thwart India’s nationalistic policies (Sarkar, 2020).  
 
* The ISI also uses terror cells domestically to influence Pakistani politics, attack US troops in Afghanistan, and 




4.5.2 Survey Data 
 What is and will remain a recurring theme throughout this dissertation is the sparce 
availability of survey data on bilateral relations, public opinion, or an overall barometer of 
people in most parts of the world on their views. One of the few exceptions to this is views on 
Superpower politics. Conductors of valid international surveys have persisted with what could 
cynically be called an obsession for continuing to paint the world in broad strokes of a three-
world system. What was once “Team USA”, “Team USSR”, or “Unaffiliated” has merely had 
the USSR category replaced with PRC. Outside of barometers on how countries across the world 
feel about the US in relation to China, survey data is inconsistent. If regular temperature checks 
could be conducted, the other two prongs of the SMS Analysis would likely be redundant. 
Rigorous and robust surveys which ask informative questions about local feelings and record 
feedback from participants would provide as good as, if not a better picture of relations based on 
media inference and search inquiries.  
To rephrase and hopefully add further clarity to this, what is needed to capture the least 
manipulated image as possible of public opinion is survey data collected by NGOs external to 
state influence. Further, to be even more precise a time series analysis conducted over a realistic 
but meaningful period of time would be needed although this would be a greater challenge to 
accomplish. What I have utilized in this dissertation is survey data that serves the sole purpose of 
comparing the data in the other collection methods to look for consistency.  Short of a robust 
discourse analysis or ethnographic study that looked at how the other is viewed, regularly 
retested survey data would best represent actual views of each country, in this case India and 
Pakistan, vis-à-vis one another. That being said, the occasional global attitudes data conducted 




illustrate the negative sentiments held by Indians and Pakistanis toward one another and how 
much they view one another as threats.  
Lastly on the survey data available, frankly, I do not have a sufficient amount of the type 
of survey data I would prefer to have to draw anything stronger than a plausible inference. In 
addition to limitations in the type of questions asked, there is not a time series with consistent 
plot points across the time period I examine between 2010 and 2019. Further, the independent 
NGO survey data I have included in this chapter is exclusively by PEW and is limited largely to 
Global Attitudes surveys from 2017 and 2018 with the exception of a graph depicting a time 
series of mutual sentiment from 2009 to 2014. That in combination with the 2017 and 2018 
global attitudes surveys gives us a preliminary idea of what we might expect to see from a more 
robust survey done asking specific questions targeted or refined to focus on identical 
operationalized variables with the media and search data prongs of the analysis.  
Rather than commenting generally on each graph, I will say that what the graphs 
associated with PEW’s survey data tells us is that Indians and Pakistanis continue to hold a great 
deal of distrust toward one another. Furthermore, it the one graph that presents an actual time 
series, it is plausible that there may have been a decline in ill will between the two countries but 
the pivot back toward strong distrust in the relationship mirrors the rise of Modi in India. This is 
not suggesting that there is a causal relationship between these two variables, only that it is 
plausible that there could be a relationship. There could be other yet to be identified variables 

























The last graphic in particular highlights how Modi and the BJP’s rise in 2014 mirrors an 
increase in Pakistani distrust toward India. This also mirrors the graphs in the search analysis 
section as well. On a side note, it would be interesting to investigate the relationship between the 
rise in threat perception toward the Taliban in relation to the perception of India. How PEW 
operationalizes threat perception in Pakistan would be important to know insofar as how 
informative this graphic actually is. Furthermore, future work that better operationalizes the 
perception of threat posed by India toward Pakistan that doesn’t score different threats but the 
intensity of the feeling of threat instead may be more accurate in identifying the sentiment of 
feelings in both directions, which in combination with a search algorithm that effectively 
captures the saliency of issues, can yield stronger, more valid results, about how each country 
feels toward the other, and ultimately, whether the audience/selectorate is holding leaders 
accountable, i.e. if there are costs or constraints placed upon them.   
4.5.3 Search Terms Interest Over Time 
 In my examination of this dyad, based on the narrative and rhetoric highlighted in the 
media section as well as further information in the survey data section, the terms I use and 
discuss are: war, terrorism, nationalism/BJP/Hindutva, Jammu and Kashmir, and the other 
country. As discussed at length in the previous portions of my SMS analysis, these are the most 
qualitatively significant and cross cutting terms that resonate in both countries. Also, briefly 
restating as a reminder, Google holds 99% of the search engine market in both countries so this 
data is more significant than it would be in China where it holds 2% of the market. I will 
annotate each graph with discussion of the illustration as well as providing linkage between the 
graph and the other components of the SMS analysis. As previously mentioned, Google holds 




further emphasize the illustrative nature of this data, the Google Trends data does not tell us 
much because that is not what it was designed to do. It was not built by a team using identically 
operationalized variables to examine across multiple data collection methods so in this stage of 
development, what is being displayed is a demonstration of what is possible, not a causal 








This first graph on search term interest over time depicts Indian and Pakistani interest in 
each other. This graph illustrates that the saliency of each state as a general topic of interest 
toward each other declined throughout the early 2010s but began to pick up in intensity in the 
latter half of the decade, specifically with spikes in 2016 and 2019 that parallel major political 
changes in each country in terms of the intensity of rhetoric in 2016 with the rise of Imran Khan 
in Pakistan and then in 2018-2019 in rhetorical exchanges between the two in mutual threats 
during this time period. Both made overtures toward finding common ground following this 
though which again, is consistent with the de-escalation of tensions throughout the end of 2019. 
The search data results make a strong case within this exploratory model that the rhetoric that 
was used by both leaders resonated and was salient among their audiences/selectorates. This 
graph suggests that audience costs may have had a constraining effect on leaders in both 






The second graph depicts the saliency of war as a search topic in both countries. There is not a 
strong trend in the case of either country, however there is a stronger trend in India than in 
Pakistan. This moves along the same timeline as when tensions flared briefly over Kashmir again 
in 2018-2019. Lastly, if my model is accurate, rhetoric directed toward India had a more 
constraining role, e.g., a more substantive presence of audience costs, however it is not clear 
whether those would be traditional or transnational audience costs based on the available data.  
Fig. 4.8 
 
As mentioned, there is an identical spike in interest in the term “war” in Spring 2019, especially 
in India. This suggests that Indians have been consistently more sensitive to the topic than 
Pakistanis have. The discrepancy here most likely is less interest in the topic in Pakistan, likely 
due to greater interest in terrorism and the activities of terror groups such as the Taliban in the 




phrase the question in Pakistani English or Urdu as opposed to Indian English or Hindi. It could 
also be that how Pakistanis conceptualize war could be associated with a term outside the scope 
of this examination such as genocide, armed conflict, territorial skirmishes, nuclear war, or some 
other specific culturally nuanced phrase. That being said however, based on this term, heightened 
Indian belligerency did not translate into increased interest or concern on the topic of war in 
Pakistan while it appears to have domestically in India.  
In this graph, the first half of the decade parallels the greater concern in Pakistan about 
terrorism in the frontier provinces mentioned earlier with a general lull throughout the decade 
and a small spike in India in 2019 consistent with the media discussion over fears of Pakistani 
coordinated terror attacks as discussed by Modi. In this example, a much clearer case could be 
argued that Khan’s rhetoric generated transnational audience costs in India and led to greater 






Again, Indians almost always had more interest in this topic than Pakistanis. Of note, Pakistanis 
were more interested following major attacks that many, including Pakistani citizens, could or 
would be tied back to Pakistan, whereas after Khan came to power in Pakistan, Indians became 
more concerned about future terror attacks consistent with Khan’s threats.  
 The next graph shows interest in BJP/Hindutva/Indian Nationalism. The three words are 
synonymous with each other but by searching for them this way it contributed search hits from 
all three terms. The graph suggests that the ideology was salient in India where it was an 
important part of the political system and could have created audience costs on Indian leaders to 
conform to the ideology, or constraints on political decisions to be consistent with the ideology. 
There was no interest in this subject in Pakistan. Further, it demonstrates essentially no audience 






This final graph displays how salient the search term of Jammu and Kashmir were in 
India and Pakistan throughout the 2010s. The issue has always been extremely important to both 
countries, as they have fought several wars over the issue, however there is a dramatic spike in 
2019 in Indian saliency of the issue which corresponds to when Modi ramped up rhetoric on the 
subject. Further, while it was not generally a salient topic of interest in Pakistan among people’s 
search histories during the same time, there was a noticeable increase there as well. In this graph, 




The graph also suggests, similar to a previous point, that the phrasing of the issue might be 
different in Pakistan than in India which would explain why an issue that is so important in 
Pakistan had very little saliency in terms of search interest. Alternatively, the average citizen of 




and Kashmir. Examples include fundamentalism in the frontier provinces, the democratic 
stability of the government, or the cleavages between the ISI, military, fundamentalist, and 
secular political factions of the Pakistani government.  
 The data presented in the previous graphs illustrates the plausibility of a pattern between 
rhetoric by Indian and Pakistani leaders. Another interesting observation is how search interest in 
Pakistan is lower relative to India across all search inquiries. There are many possible 
explanations for this. It could be a censorship issue we are not aware of, search terms being 
blocked from non-VPN IP addresses, a translation or transliteration issue, or Pakistanis may just 
generally be interested in other subjects such as sporting events or concerned about US activities 
in Afghanistan throughout the decade, etc. However, in spite of the low numbers in Pakistan, the 
graphs highlight that a relationship exists within the discursive space between political elites in 
both countries and the audiences of each. That being said, further research should explore why 
there is not a more significant relationship present. It could be, and most likely is, as suggested, 
that the specifically nuanced words are not being used. Pakistanis and Indians may use different 
words that technically have the same meaning. Another possibility is that other countries do not 
research topics the same way that Americans do, or they rely more heavily on information from 
other sources. I will provide an example from the US to illustrate the contrast between our 
cultural understanding of how to find information compared to India or Pakistan. This contrast is 
also relevant to the Greece/Turkey chapter as opposed to the China/Japan chapter which is an 
outlier within this empirical analysis.  
This graph shows US search inquiries on Vladimir Putin over the same time period. Note 
the 100 score that corresponds with the same time as the 2018 Helsinki Conference between 




would expect to see in relation to transnational audience costs could be one of the two 
explanations proposed, or, while unlikely at this point, could be that this phenomenon is more 
impactful in the Western world than in other regions.  
Fig. 4.12 
 
A final point in all of this is that while there is little movement in search inquiries in Pakistan, 
there was significant movement electorally in the rise of Imran Khan and his nationalist party in 
Pakistan, the Pakistan Tehreek-e-Insaf (PTI) or Pakistan Movement for Justice party. Adding 
that factor into the picture, the heightened interest in all of these topics in Indian, which Khan 
has also opined on frequently, may very well have as much to do with his rhetoric in addition to 
or instead of Modi’s. However again, a more in-depth field analysis or additional information 
supplied by specialists, primarily comparativists who specialize on India and Pakistan, would 





4.5.4 SMS Conclusion 
 To summarize the SMS analysis, this chapter makes a strong argument for the validity of 
the transnational audience costs framework. Furthermore, it suggests what will be discussed in 
further detail in the following chapter, a broader framework that transnational audience costs are 
saddled in, transnational two-level games, where Putnam’s two-level games model, the 
subsequent work done on it, and how it is defined in this dissertation, are expanded to include in 
even greater detail, the nominal selectorate in Putnam’s win-set. Finally, this chapter, being able 
to examine both parties in the dyad unlike the previous chapter, begins to show the utility of the 
SMS Analysis approach for inferential analyses within international relations. To restate a 
previous criticism of a great deal of IR literature, far too much focus is placed on top-down 
understandings of IR and the international system rather than microtransaction events between 
states and the components that comprise these “states” such as domestic audiences.  
4.6 Dyadic Implications and Broader Theoretical Implications 
 Given the nature of verbal exchanges and pandering to domestic nationalistic narratives, 
it is unclear how much if any reaction is taking place. The largely genial relations between 
Zardari and Singh from the early 2010s was replaced by belligerent rhetoric on both sides with 
the timing making it unclear who is responding to who, or perhaps the support base of neither 
government was ever in favor of the thawing of relations? This suggests the possibility that 
countries may instead get locked in to institutionalized narratives that they must adhere to in 
order to avoid losing power. Regime legitimacy is derived from remaining consistent with the 
preconstructed narrative and any deviation from that narrative will result in regime change. That 




state society dynamic exists than what has thus far been proposed by the transnational audience 
costs framework. 
4.7 Conclusion 
 In this chapter I have examined the Indo-Pak Dyad through the lens of the transnational 
audience costs framework. This dyad is particularly complicated given that there has not been a 
period at any point where brinkmanship was not a central characteristic of the relationship. 
Further, the issue framing on both sides of the relationship is focused on survival rather than 
dominance or superiority. In this sense it is on par with a reality where Israel and Palestine had 
two of the most powerful militaries in the world, and both possessed nuclear arsenals. Unlike 
many other scholars, I do not think the nuclear arsenal aspect is particularly compelling in terms 
of the relationship being complicated, but it does create greater geopolitical ripples when they 
feud because other statesmen do take it seriously. The narratives that the Muslims of the Indian 
Subcontinent got more than their fair share in terms of territory, that Hindu Nationalism poses an 
existential threat to Islam on the subcontinent, and that there are enough Muslim citizens of India 
to tear the country apart are what dominate the airwaves and cyberspace. Not how many nuclear 
warheads each side possesses and what their payloads are.  
 The feelings of hatred and distrust toward each other extend into the very existence of the 
Pakistani people in general. From being viewed as apostates against their people, to thieves of 
their land, to political and military adversaries on increasingly equal terms, the relationship is a 
prime example of existential. Additionally, territorial disputes over territory claimed by both 
sides as well as forces within, which are suspected of being plants for the other side, calling for 
their own independence, continue to be a convenient outlet for diverting domestic strife onto an 




Bangladesh from Pakistan, as well as other geopolitical conflicts and terror attacks aided by the 
other have left them in a state of total inability to construct and inlands toward a peaceful 
relationship. In sum, the Indo-Pak Dyad presents perhaps the most obvious choice for an 
exploration into the boundaries of the model, but ultimately in ends up demonstrating how much 
more work is necessary to further refine it. This dyad further strengthens the hypothesis that in 
the case of enduring rivalries transnational audience costs are a very real phenomenon. However, 
the task still remains that future research needs to determine how to satisfactorily contain, or hold 
constant, other variables in order to identify and avoid covariation that may not be properly or 
sufficiently isolated or accounted for within the analysis. 
 This concludes chapter 4 and the second empirical chapter of the dissertation. The final 
empirical chapter examines the Greco-Turkish dyad. This final empirical chapter will probe the 
boundaries of the regime aspect of the transnational audience costs framework. It is still 
constrained to the enduring rivalry characteristic; however, it provides a long, broad look at how 
political rhetoric may or may not be affected by the relative amount of democratic institutions 
present in each state at any given time. Following that, I will conclude the dissertation with a 
summary of the research design, theory, empirical chapters, their implications for international 
relations, and how future research should proceed within this framework. Most importantly, is it 
tethered to this somewhat sui generis enduring rivalry typology or upon further refinement, can 












 Concluding the empirical chapter section of the dissertation, in this chapter I discuss 
Greco-Turkish relations. This chapter is perhaps the most interesting insofar as its contribution 
to, and refinement of, the theoretical model presented in this dissertation. Specifically, this 
chapter adds substantial clarity to the criteria for transnational audience costs to occur, the scope 
and criteria of enduring rivalries at the mid-level of theorizing, and how both concepts interrelate 
and can be operationalized moving forward into future work on both concepts/phenomena.  
 The relationship between Greece and Turkey is complicated, challenging to categorize in 
any systematic sense, and very dynamic. The regime types of each state have been in constant 
flux, the fundamental identity of the players involved has been altered at the foundational level at 
different points, and there is an inherent cultural tension between “east” and “west” in addition to 
the charisma of leaders, political identities, shared history, and political institutions. However, 
that said, eerily similar with different aspects of the China-Japan dyad and the India-Pakistan 
dyad, the Greece-Turkey dyad includes a history of revolution, genocide, ethnic cleansing, 
population exchanges, territorial wars, territorial secessions and concessions, and religious 
oppression and suppression. These are a few of the multitude of complicated characteristics of 
the relationship that shape the environment that politics subsequently occur within.  
Put another way, each state in the dyad is being dealt cards from a deck containing only 
bad hands with little to no chance of favorable or positive sum outcomes. This is a consistent 
parallel among all of these cases though. Each pair follows a similar narrative. A history of 




institutions create that lead to uncertainty because neither state nor society in either country is 
sure what is genuine rhetoric, threats, promises, or other overtures of discourse, vs a bluff. The 
reason why transnational audience costs can be overcome outside of the conditions of enduring 
rivalries combined with autocratic or newly democratic regimes is because others have both 
history and institutional transparency to look to for reassurance that belligerent rhetoric is 
instrumental for domestic purposes rather than something that poses a genuine threat to their 
wellbeing. While future research will most certainly better refine the boundaries of where 
transnational audience costs exist, this body of work has shown that they do within dyads that 
meet these conditions. 
In this chapter I will first discuss the history of modern Greco-Turkish relations. What 
makes this chapter most complicated is the overlap and confusion, both intentional and 
unintentional, of Turkey with the Ottoman empire and Greece’s and Greek people’s place within 
the Ottoman empire. Separating the Turks from the Ottomans and the narratives of Greek 
independence highlights the fuzzy boundaries of identities within the dyad. Greece gained 
independence from the Ottoman Empire in 1830, the Ottoman Empire existed until just after 
World War 1, but had been collapsing in Soviet/Post-Soviet fashion for decades. This has 
complicated the narrative of the imperial legacy of the Turkic people of Asia minor/Anatolia in 
relation to the Greeks, so discerning Turk from Ottoman in the eyes of the Greeks is drastically 
different from that of the Turks who also view themselves as separate from the Ottomans 
(Kadioğlu, 1996; Karsavuran, 2019). 
Following this historical overview and exercise to essentially “operationalize” the 
Turkish identity in order to separate it from that of the Ottoman when and where possible, I 




since there existed a Greco-Turkish dyad in the first place when the Republic of Turkey was 
established in 1923 (Hakan, 2011). Finally, as with the dyadic analyses conducted in the 
previous two empirical chapters, I examine the relationship and rhetoric between the two 
throughout the 2010s to identify, discuss, and add refinement to the transnational audience cost 
model. I conclude the chapter by discussing the key characteristics of this dyad that contribute to 
the clarity it adds.  
5.2 Background 
5.2.1 A Lite Look into the Construction of Modern Greece 
 Similar to other countries with a rich historical existence that comprised one of many 
characteristics that led to modern state building like Greece itself, Israel, Palestine, China, etc., 
modern Greece emerged from an ethnic and/or vernacular based identity/group that had occupied 
political and geographic space in a past time. In the case of Greece, the Greek language evolved 
but existed continuously throughout time however an independent Greek state occupying the 
territorial space it currently occupies had never existed in a unitary state sense, had only loosely 
existed in a confederal sense and then enjoyed brief unification under Macedonian rule by Philip 
II and his decedents before being conquered by the Romans and continuing the Roman empire 
until the fall of Constantinople to the Ottomans in 1453 (Thomas, 2010; Bury and Meiggs, 
2000). 
 Greece and Greek culture have always maintained a historical presence in the territory 
traditionally understood as Greece as well as vernacular preservation, all very similar to China. 
The political system became unstable and the country was colonized by an imperial Ottoman 
Empire like the Chinese, however there was never the destruction, diaspora, and construction of 




of 400 years, that Greece found itself under Ottoman rule, the Greeks made continuous attempts 
to regain independence (Woodhouse, 1968). Successful momentum for Greek independence 
began in a protracted, decade long campaign starting with the Filiki Eteria plot in 1821, followed 
by the intervention by the Great Powers37 in 1827, and ultimately the destruction of the Ottoman 
Navy and surrender of Ottoman forces in 1829 leading to the London Protocol of 1830 which 
restored the autonomy of the Greek people and the resumption of sovereignty.  
 The challenging aspect of Greece’s war of independence against the Ottomans is that it 
was against the Ottomans, not the Turks. While the Turkey is considered in a layman’s sense to 
be the successors, decedents, or next step from the Ottoman Empire, it nonetheless is not, and 
while Turkey has been blamed, paralleled, compared, or confused with them, they are not the 
Ottomans. The Ottoman Empire was a multinational, multiethnic, empire, similar to the Austro-
Hungarian Empire or Soviet Union, consisting of many different people who would later form 
sovereign states (Soucek, 2015). Nonetheless, the Republic of Turkey took up the yoke of 
carrying the burden of the Ottomans against the peoples they had held under their rule and anti-
Ottoman sentiment became anti-Turkey sentiment, for right or for wrong. This holds true for 
Greece in addition to others and this anti-Turkey sentiment will be explored further in the 
chapter. Suffice it to say for the moment that after the collapse of the Ottoman Empire, it became 
expediate for Greece to project and/or redirect anti-Ottoman sentiment toward Turkey.  
5.2.2 Rise of the Turk-centric Identity 
 The Turks, ironically considering popular understanding of Asia minor (Soucek, 2015), 
began their own pursuit for independence from the Ottoman Empire to establish a distinctly 
 




Turkish identity throughout the late 19th and early 20th century via the Young Turk movement 
(Hanioğlu 1995). Although the Young Turk movement initially began as a multi-ethnic 
organization in the Ottoman Empire pushing back against the monarchy, (Rabo, 2005) following 
fracturing, rising ethnic tensions, and the seizing of power by nationalist factions of the Young 
Turks, the movement became increasingly centered on an exclusively Turkish identity within an 
exclusively Turkish state (Wilson, 2009). With the total collapse of the Ottoman empire 
following World War I and the population shifts that followed, Turkish nationalism became 
increasingly intense leading up to the establishment of the Republic of Turkey in 1923 
(Ozkirimli and Sofos, 2008). 
5.2.3 World War I 
 World War I was a decisive event both within the Greek-Turkey dyad as well as its 
contribution to the formative years of Greek and Turkish nationalisms. For the Greeks, who 
sided with the allies, WWI represented an opportunity to retake Constantinople and the other 
Greek enclaves in Anatolia (Asia Minor). For the Ottomans, it was a chance to restore the face of 
the empire, to spite the allies that had interfered with their territorial and political integrity via 
supporting opposition to their rule, and to potentially regain lost territory (Yasamee, 1995; 
Trumpener, 1968). Interestingly or perhaps confusingly, the war was important for the Turks 
within the Ottoman empire as well, as it served as an opportunity to depose the sultanate and 
create a Turk-centric modern nation-state following the war. With very little room for debate, 
Turkish nation-building is what contributed to genocides against the Armenians, Assyrians, and 
Anatolian Greeks throughout and just following the war (Schaller and Zimmerer, 2008; Bryce 




the relationship between genocide, ethnic cleansing, differentiating between the two, and nation 
building.  
 Insofar as a singular event’s impact on the construction of a dyad, World War I and the 
events immediately preceding and following it are that event between Greece and Turkey. 
Although many issues, incidences, and undiplomatic exchanges have taken place over the 
subsequent years, it was the nation-building that took place with Turkey after World War I 
enacted by a group of political and social elites who formed an opposition coalition to the 
continuance of the Ottoman Empire prior to World War I. This time period saw this nation-
building that I touched upon, in terms of the ethnic cleansing of non-Turks from Asia Minor, a 
decisive victory for the Turks over the city of the Black Sea, Istanbul, and mass genocides, all of 
which are of utmost importance in shaping how relations between states and feelings between 
societies would progress moving forward. The vast majority of modern historical animosity 
between the Greeks and the Turks have their roots in this upheaval to the same degree that the 
partition of the Indian Sub-continent did. Finally, World War I saw the splintering of almost all 
non-Turk ethnicities from the Ottoman Empire from the Arabs to the Armenians. Somewhat 
ironically, World War I was the single-most important event for Turk nationalism and the 
creation of the Republic of Turkey. Not just because the allies forced the disbanding of the 
Ottoman Empire, but because it gave the Turks the distraction to solidify and secure their 








5.2.4 Republic of Turkey 
 The Republic of Turkey emerged from the ashes of the Empire and was a push back 
against allied imperialism insofar as the dismantling of the Ottoman Empire and allocating 
territory to the victors of World War I. Underscoring the distinction of the Ottomans from the 
Turks is the Turkish War of Independence from 1919 to 1923 where the Ottoman Turks 
organized as the Turkish National Movement under the leadership of remnants of the Committee 
of Union and Progress (CUP) lead by Kemal Atatürk constructed the modern nation-state of the 
Republic of Turkey through politics, open warfare, and genocide (Zürcher, 1984; Avedian, 
2012). Specifically, the actions undertaken by the CUP were in response to the Treatry of Sèvres 
which, in addition to dividing up and partitioning the Arab territory of the Empire, partitioned 
Asia Minor, returning Anatolia to the Greeks, seizing control of Constantinople, and occupying 
other territories throughout the region (Helmreich, 1974). The extent of the partition almost 












This partition unified the Turks under a nationalist banner to protect their territorial boundaries 
and to eliminate, primarily through genocide but also population transfers, the ethnic groups who 
had been awarded territory formerly belonging to the Ottoman Empire under the conditions of 
the Treaty of Sèvres. Following the advances of Turkish nationalist forces across Asia Minor, 
they were able to renegotiate the terms in the Treaty of Kars and the Treaty of Lausanne in 1923 
establishing the contemporary borders of Turkey and eliminating Greeks, Armenians, and 
Christians in general from their territory (Kieser, 2010; Lawrence, 1924). The Treaty of 
Lausanne caused further controversy in the case of Greece due to the islands of Imbros and 
Tenedos being awarded to Turkey in spite of the fact that the population of Imbros was 
completely Greek and the majority being Greek on Tenedos. These populations were 
marginalized and stripped of participatory power by laws requiring that island representatives 
speak Turkish to qualify for leadership positions (Alexandris, 1980). Further, similar with the 
case of the partitioning of the Indian Peninsula between India and Pakistan, the partition of the 
Ottoman Empire and subsequent conflict between the Turks and the Greeks extended the 
adversarial relationship beyond the Ottomans and into continuation with the Turks.  
5.3 Key Narratives 
Post-Independence Tension 
5.3.1 Cyprus 
 Following the consolidation of the Turkish state and Greece renouncing claims to 
territory relations improved throughout the interim period between wars, during WW2, and 
immediately following the Cold War, to the extent that both states were, and remain, members of 
NATO. However, the relationship began to fracture over the issue of Cyprus in the 1950s, which 




as the 1930s there were nationalist movements calling for Cypriot union with Greece (Holland, 
1988). In the 1950s the issue again flared us and members of the Cypriot Greek majority began a 
paramilitary campaign against British occupation as well as the Turkish minority population on 
the island (Karyos, 2009). Turkish nationals in Turkey responded to this by launching the 
Istanbul Pogrom in 1955 which further resulted in Greece dissolving all bilateral relationships38 
with Turkey which led to the collapse of the Balkan Pact (de Zayas, 2007; 2010; Yaman, 2014). 
The conflict over Cyprus further spiraled with the Greek Cypriot declaration of Union with 
Greece and the Turkish invasion of Cyprus in 1974 resulting in Turkey occupying the Northeast 
one-third of the island (Morelli, 2011). The invasion, occupation, and expulsion of Greeks from 
the occupied portion of Cyprus has remained one of the major issues of tension between Greece 
and Turkey to the present. 
5.3.2 The Aegean Sea 
 Another area of tension between the two countries is issues with delineating control over 
the Aegean Sea and determining who has control of which parts, primarily in consideration of 
resource rights in the area. Aside from the two islands mentioned earlier, Imbros and Tenedos, 
Greece has had control over all islands in the Aegean following the Balkan Wars of 1913 (Farrar, 
2003; Michail, 2017). Control of these islands awarded Greece almost total and uncontested 
control over most of the Aegean Sea. The primary issue of contestation over the Aegean is 
control over territorial waters. Based on the current agreement, each side has control of 6 
nautical miles off their respective coasts, however, Turkey only recognizes the 12-mile line in 
accordance with the International Law of the Sea in the present day. An even more pressing and 
present issue is control over the continental shelf for the purposes of resource exploitation. Also 
 




of issue is the question of airspace. Greece currently claims 10 miles while Turkey only 
recognizes 6 miles (Acer, 2006). These territorial disputes over the area have resulted in 
numerous incidents, accidents, military actions, and general political and military brinkmanship 
between the two up to the present (Nedos, 2020; Cenciotti, 2020). 
5.3.3 Other Issues 
 Other issues of tension between the two spans over a variety of issues. These range from 
issues of illegal immigration, false flag attacks intended to invoke military conflict between the 
two countries, and the question of Turkey’s admission into the European Union.39 The issue of 
illegal immigration is primarily a result of Turkey and then Greece being the primary land transit 
route for illegal immigrants from Africa and Southwest Asia into Europe. The Greeks accuse the 
Turks of not properly securing their borders and even encourages immigration which then 
transits through Greece and creates local instability they claim (Kitsantonis, 2009; Becatorosa, 
2021). Discussion of Turkish ascent into the European Union have also been an area of 
contestation. After 1996, even Greek diplomats supported discussion of the idea of Turkey 
joining the EU, even despite only 25% of Greeks supporting Turkey’s incorporation into Europe 
(Repa, 2005). Again, paradoxically it would seem on the surface, in spite of Turkey’s continuing 
shift into authoritarianism and embrace of religious fundamentalism, Greek leaders have 
continued to caution other European countries, especially Germany, of terminating talks with 
Turkey about joining the EU (Hurriyet Daily News, 2017). The objectives of Greek diplomacy 
on the matter have become more transparent in recent time as an attempt to utilize ascension into 
 




the EU as an enticement for Turkey to renounce its claims in the Aegean and in Cyprus (Nikas 
and Tugwell, 2020; Meinardus, 2021). 
5.4 SMS Analysis 
5.4.1 Where’s the Survey Data? 
 Moving on from the historical to the empirical analysis of this chapter. Greek-Turkey 
relations in the 2010s offer an interesting insight insofar as the devolution of a country within 
one of the dyads being examined from a high democracy score to being expelled from the 
category completely while Greece has maintained a perfect 10 since 1986 (Polity V). This dyad 
is especially useful for the transnational audience costs model due to its ability to expand beyond 
the autocratic or new democracy characteristic previously thought necessary as components 
necessary for the phenomenon to occur. This increases the generalizability to incorporate 
democratic dyads as well. Further, as also mentioned in chapter 2, in addition to the applicability 
of this model to democratic dyads, it also supports the portion of the research design thesis that 
unlike the scholarship of other political scientists, transnational audience costs can constrain 
leaders to respond with more OR less belligerent responses. Elaborating on this, the dynamic 
between leadership and audience costs can have a mitigating effect in a dispute rather than 
bolstering conflict by constraining leaders to options that require a peaceful outcome.  
Furthermore, again to reiterate, the proposed explanation for this goes back to an even 
older line of research on complex interdependence (Keohane and Nye, 1979). The final piece of 
the puzzle that the Greece-Turkey dyad further clarifies is that transnational audience costs are a 
phenomenon existing under a larger umbrella of two-level games which I have referenced as 
transnational two-level games. The purpose for incorporating the transnational denomination in 




thesis began the line of research on expanding the number of players in the game, looking states 
as more than relatively unitary actors, and examining the role of constituencies. The use of 
transnationalism is to note that game extends to non-state actors in the sense that individuals and 
groups within states that have their own agency independent of the state play a role in win-sets 
and winning coalitions in addition to the formal and state-level agents participating in the 
bargaining process (Putnam, 1988)40. 
With all that said, again, where is the survey data? My time-series covers the 2010s 
exclusively and neither PEW nor Eurobarometer which are the NGO polling agencies that I 
examined for this time period conducted any surveys that fit within the scope of my variables or 
how I have operationalized any of the key concepts of this dissertation. With that said, there are 
many surveys that have been done, but none by impartial observers about strategically salient 
issues. Via the media and search sections I make a case that this subject matter is important to 
both Greeks and Turks, this is just an odd segment of time where there is a deficiency in survey 
data for whatever reason. As I continue to develop the method and this chapter specifically 
however, survey data will of course need to be included, or the time series expanded beyond ten 
years,41 or a different case selected.42  
In light of this review of the model, the Greek-Turkey dyad demonstrates the range and 
flexibility of its explanatory power. At the beginning of the decade, although they still fit neatly 
into the enduring rivalry framework, both states were strong democracies with Greece enjoying 
its score of 10 and Turkey being rated at a 9 (Polity V). Throughout the decade, as the trajectory 
 
40 The citation here is abbreviated to Putnam but includes every source of scholarship discussed in the research 
design in chapter 2. 
41 This runs into relevancy issues given the volatility of the geopolitical landscape. 
42 A different case may be needed but that would represent a significant loss to the broadness of the scope of this 




of Turkish politics became increasingly autocratic, rhetoric between the two countries became 
more and more bellicose and the perspective of the other became cooler between constituencies. 
However consistent with the nuance of the model’s ability to account for the efficacy of the two-
way flow of communication, calls for conflict did not resonate with the public, who remained 
indifferent to issues leaders were pushing, or committed to peaceful resolution of issues in spite 
of policymaker rhetoric, which has led to a moderation of policymaker rhetoric more recently 
(Al Jazeera, 2021; Hacaoglu and Tugwell, 2021). 
The Greek-Turkey dyad is particularly interesting because on the surface the relationship 
appears paradoxical. Throughout the 2010s, especially after the ascension of Erdoğan to power, 
belligerent rhetoric between Greek and Turkish leaders increased, and even the narratives 
encouraged by non-governing elites within the policy and news apparatuses of each state became 
more bellicose. However, while scant, no credible polling data suggests a relationship, or even a 
correlation, between public opinion and elite rhetoric. In fact, quite the opposite, Greek and 
Turkish citizens consistently stated a preference for finding peaceful solutions and positive-sum 
outcomes between their states (Nedos, 2021; Ferentinou, 2020; Athens Bureau, 2021; 
Grigoriadis; 2021). The data collected in these polls reflect the sentiments of each country’s 
respective publics over the previous decade and the consistent pattern in every single poll is a 
strongly expressed desire by both Greeks and Turks to find a way to move forward together to 
improve relations.  
This realization captures the flipside of my transnational audience costs model and again, 
more generally, transnational two level games, that audiences do not just play a role in 
exacerbating or heightening tensions; they can also moderate the position of the state and 




Greek-Turkey dyad supports the hypothesis that domestic audiences can encourage and 
incentivize leaders to take a cooperative approach to dealing with a rival rather than an 
aggressive approach. This is significant for two major reasons, first, for my model, and the 
second, related to this dyad. As far as the model is concerned, it highlights that the transnational 
audience costs model, within the broader transnational two-level games framework, is 
generalizable across all cases. Previous scholarship including my own has focused on audiences 
and their role in signaling state resolve couched more in terms of brinkmanship, however, as this 
case and others that are even less extreme such as that between Britain and France, show that 
public support for cooperation translates into governmental policies consistent with this 
preference. So, audience costs are not inherently negative nor do they inherently imply that states 
are willing to, or are trapped into, engag(ing) in conflict, but just that they have an influence over 
what the final outcome of the state will be. In the case of Greece and Turkey, and many other 
dyads that were examined as candidates for discussion in this dissertation, they moderate tension 
rather than amplify it.  
Second, and specific to this case, it leads to a follow up question for future research, 
which is, why do countries like Turkey support authoritarian leaders like Erdoğan if they want to 
work together with their rival? My off the cuff hypothesis here is entirely supposition, but I 
suspect that the rational is consistent with the confidence of the Turkish people in the resiliency 
or dependability of international organizations and regional organizations that make Greek 
policy predictable and viewed as stable to the Turks, freeing them up to be concerned instead 
with Kurdish and Levantine concerns across the southern and eastern portions of the country. 
Erdoğan’s tough talk on Greece was tolerated because more generally, he has supported 




restoration of Turkey’s place in the Islamic world, as well as policies of pushing back against the 
Kurds and the PKK and stabilizing their southern border with Syria. These two issues present 
much more proximal concerns for Turkey than anything related to Greece does.  
5.4.2 Media Analysis 
Consistent with the recurring theme throughout this dissertation, I will state as I have in 
all previous chapters that future research should identify or create more survey data to draw upon 
than what is presently available to more rigorously substantiate the validity of my findings. 
Using the SMS Analysis approach, I analyze and discuss the key components of this historical 
rivalry identified earlier in the chapter. They are: Aegean conflict, Cyprus, Immigration, Military 
conflict, and Turkish admission into the EU. For Google Trends searches I will also include 
searches of the other by each country. I will proceed by breaking the analysis down via major 
shifts throughout the decade, use a small sample of incidences, and examine the association 
between rhetoric and the SMS criteria. I will finish this section of the chapter by adding in and 
reviewing the search trend data and summarize how it follows the narrative of the other portions 
of the analysis. These are depicted graphically and use the key terms previously mentioned. 
Early 2010s 
 At the start of the 2010s, bilateral relations between Greece and Turkey were not a 
priority to either country substantiated by an absence of rhetoric, positive, neutral, or negative, 
directed toward one another. Turkey was battling an emerging anti-secular political movement 
that began with the ascent of Abdullah Gül as president of Turkey in 2007 (Friedman, 2011; Gül 
- CNN, 2007; Gül - BBC, 2007). Meanwhile, Greece was at the center of a stalling EU economy 
following the housing crises and was increasingly the focal point of these struggles and 




– BBC, 2010; Crumley, 2010). In conjunction with the limited amount of survey data and media 
attention, scholarly research was hopeful for a growing trend in rapprochement and détente in the 
relationship with the dyadic partners building better relations based on common agendas 
(Larrabee and Ries, 2010; Koukoudakis, 2015). One report in 2010 espoused Greek concern over 
an Islamic slide in Turkey that in hindsight foreshadowed the events of the decade (Peloni, 
2010).  
Aside from this, in absence of direct jabs at one another, a significant proportion of 
Turkish rhetoric in the early 2010s focused on Cyrus and resource extraction in and around the 
island (BBC, 2011; 2012; Smith, 2013). It was also around this time when Erdoğan first began 
engaging in Turkish nationalist rhetoric as well as Pan-Islamist remarks and an Islamic world 
centered on Turkey again (BBC, 2012; Baydar, 2013; Akyol, 2013; Tastekin, 2013; Gultasli, 
2013). He even went so far as to remark on a resurgent Ottoman Empire at one point (Karagul, 
2011). Erdoğan also commented during this time that Turkey should end its EU bid (Todays 
Zaman, 2013). Lastly, it was at the end of this period, in 2013, that many in Turkey began to 
express concern over the future of Turkish democracy (Yilmaz, 2013; Dagi, 2013). In sum, even 
prior to Erdoğan’s succession as President as Turkey, he was already making moves and 
engaging in threatening rhetoric as prime minister.43 
Erdoğan’s Presidency and the latter half of the 2010s 
 Erdoğan was rose from the position of Prime Minister to President of Turkey in 2014. 
Following his ascension to the role of president, he substantially intensified his use of belligerent 
rhetoric. For the remainder of this analysis of rhetoric in the Greek-Turkey dyad, I will be 
 
43 Erdoğan successfully transferred power from the prime minister position and parliament to the president during 




focusing only on examples that are specific to the dyad and not anything indirectly related. 
Furthermore, it should be noted that in sorting through the plethora of politicking conducted by 
Greece and Turkey in relation to one another, and mineral and resource exploration in and 
around Cyprus in and around the Aegean Sea, that there was a substantial amount of discourse 
on the rise and goings on of the Islamic State which I have excluded as much as possible. Again, 
to maintain the focal point of the picture on the dyad rather than peripheral issues external to it. 
Throughout the remainder of this section, I will focus on Turkish and Greek belligerent rhetoric 
when Greek rhetoric is available but to be upfront from the start, the Greek’s have approached 
relations without being antagonistic more often than not. 
2014 
 Erdoğan’s presidency began a new era in belligerent rhetoric from Turkey directed in 
every direction internationally but focusing specifically on relations with Greece, 2014 focused 
primarily on Cyprus. In one report, in a flurry of agitating statements toward everyone ranging 
from the statesmanship of the German President to the genocide of the Armenians, Erdoğan 
assured his supporters that he would resolve the Cyprus issue one and for all, regardless of who 
resisted by the following year (Today’s Zaman, 2014). He later continued steering Turkey away 
from EU membership in a speech in front of the body about how Turkey’s enemies in the EU 
meant to bound Turkey to EU laws through admittance which was no longer in Turkey’s interest 
(Baydar, 2014). Meanwhile, Greeks’ espoused frustration with the incompetency of their 
government to deal with geopolitical issues harming domestic agriculture from the Russians to 
the Turks (Mason, 2014). Erdoğan continued his calls for Ottoman restoration in his pandering to 




Later in 2014, Greece passed an anti-Racism bill which Erdoğan responded with the 
threat that “any references to the genocide of the Pontic Greeks as an aggressive step that would 
poison bilateral relations…” and that Anatolian Greeks were conspiring with the PKK (Kurdish 
Liberation Forces) to destabilize Turkey (Peloni, 2014). Cyprus continued to call upon the UN to 
intervene in Turkish aggression against their island (CNA, 2014). Finally, Erdoğan again stoked 
tensions with Greek with his resurgent Ottoman rhetoric and claims that Cyprus belonged to the 
Turks, playing on tensions with the Greeks extending back to clashes in the 60s, and near misses 
on wars in the 1980s and 1990s (Taraf, 2014; Konstandaras, 2014). In sum, the theme of 2014 
was claims of imperial grandeur by Erdoğan regarding neo-Ottomanism, reimagining Turkish 
boundaries and Turkey’s position in the Islamic world as that it had once held prior to it’s 
collapse, and reenergizing tensions with the Greeks which had been on the decline earlier in the 
21st century. 
2015 
 2015 began with Greek audiences channeling anxieties over regional insecurity through 
the discursive space of the 2015 elections, looking to rely more on the EU for security but 
simultaneously still angry over what was considered German mercantilist policies during the 
austerity measures of the early 2010s (Smith, 2015). Erdoğan congratulated Greece on selecting 
a new government but promised that his country would maintain the same intensity and pressure 
on Greece over salient and key issues of conflict between the two countries (Karakus and Ozer, 
2015). Turkish leadership expressed further doubt later in the year over the sincerity of Greek 
calls for improved relations while Greek leaders paralleled Turkey’s resurgent Ottomanism to the 
rise of the Nazis in Germany in the 1930s (Yinanc, 2015; Nougayrède, 2015). Erdoğan also 




and Europe and toward Islam and the Middle East (Kanli, 2015; Yurttagul, 2015; Demirtas, 
2015). Another jab at the Greeks by Turkish elites was that Greece was the model for Turkey to 
avoid following in terms of civilization, from ancient to contemporary society and that Greece’s 
debt problem was an unavoidable consequence of the flaws of Greek culture (Emre, 2015). The 
remainder of the year focused on threats by Erdoğan to open the Turkish borders to allow the 
free flow of Syrian refugees into Europe through Turkey (Allen, et al, 2015; Ignatieff, 2015; 
Traynor, 2015; Anderson, et. al, 2015).  
However, a trend that began to emerge this year was Turkish dissent against Erdoğan’s 
rhetoric as well as Turkish recognition of the general apathy of Greeks toward his antagonisms. 
One critic spoke about how the Turks owed reparations to Greek Istanbulites who had been 
forcefully ejected from the community and their property seize (Yurttagul, 2015). And finally, 
another critic spoke of the pitfalls of Erdoğan’s delusions of Ottoman restoration, his Islamist 
base, his ambitions for empire building, and the damage he had already caused to Turkish – 
European relations and specifically Greek – Turkish relations (Bozkurt, 2015). 
2016 
 2016 saw Erdoğan attempt to pivot back toward Cyprus again, however the Greek 
leadership refused to react to the rhetoric and maintained their position and that of the Greek 
people that the issue was already decided under EU law and would be treated as such (CNA, 
2016; Kanli, 2016). Greece further utilized EU rule of law regarding the refugee issue, calling for 
cooperation among EU members rather than divisiveness as Erdoğan had pushed (Hurriyet, 
2016; Corriere della Sera, 2016). By the midpoint in the year Turkey had conceded on the issue 
and began talks with the EU on the immigration issue (Rankin and Oltermann, 2016). This was 




toward Greece, and challenges from the Greek and Cypriot presidents against Erdoğan on his 
belligerent rhetoric how it was neither helping nor obtaining any traction in either of the two 
countries (Anderson et al, 2016; Bash et al 2016; ANA-MPA, 2016; CAN. 2016). Against all of 
this Erdoğan began talks with Greece and the EU about cooperation to handle the migrant crisis 
and 2016 ended on what was a primarily positive tone (ANA-MPA, 2016; Hurriyet, 2016). That 
said however, the terrorist attacks in Istanbul turned out to be a failed coup attempt to oust 
Erdoğan from the presidency by the Turkish military who was able to survive via his Islamic 
fundamentalist support base. Erdoğan praised his supporters for helping stymie the coup and 
proceeded to purge the Turkish military, which had been responsible for ousting 3 other 
autocratic leaders in Turkey in the 20th century, of dissidents (Arango and Yeginsu, NYT, 2016). 
2017 
 2017 saw talks to remove Turkish soldiers off of Cyprus continue, in spite of the fact that 
Erdoğan continued to antagonize all parties involved. The situation devolved to the point where 
no country working to mediate the issue was willing to work with him directly on the issue 
(CNA, 2017; Hurriyet, 2017). 2017 also marked the first visit by a Turkish president to Greece in 
65 years, however rather than being an occasion to try to reconcile and reduce tensions, the 
occasion was marked by war-drum rhetoric and red line threats by both sides (The Guardian, 
2017). Erdoğan was also called out for interfering in elections in Europe to which he responded 
by accusing the Europeans of being Nazis in the literal sense (CNN, 2017; 24 Chasa, 2017). 
Overall, however, 2017 was a relatively quiet year from Erdoğan aside from election meddling 
and attacking the legitimacy of European political systems. The vast majority of primary source 
data throughout the year focused on Trump’s rhetoric on election meddling and attacking the 




News et al, 2017). Furthermore, as will be discussed in the 2018 section, Turkish media and 
information about Turkey in general declined following the 2016 coup attempt for a significant 
period of time afterward (Gall, NYT, 2018a). 
2018 
 2018 saw the first substantial push back against Erdoğan domestically following the 
failed coup and the additional powers he sought for his position in power by another right-wing 
candidate, Meral Aksener. Although right-wing, Aksener, an ethnic Turk whose family was 
resettled in Turkey from Greece following population exchanges in 1923, promoted conservative 
ideals without the nationalist and anti-Greek rhetoric (Gall, NYT, 2018a). Gall continued her 
investigation in a follow up about the divide in Turkey among those in support of Erdoğan and 
his style of international brinkmanship as opposed to those in Turkey opposed to antagonizing 
regional neighbors (Gall, NYT, 2018,b). Erdoğan deflected the domestic challenge by 
heightening tensions with Greece even further, adding military might to his rhetoric and 
changing the narrative from simply anti-Greece, to Greece as a violator of Turkish sovereignty 
over islands and territory in the Aegean owned by Greece according to international law 
(Charalampakis, Ta Nea, 2018). Erdoğan then extended his threats to Italy as well over 
exploration and drilling anywhere in the vicinity of Cyprus (Hazou, Cyprus Mail, 2018). He then 
challenged Greece’s historical claim to territories in the Aegean and that based on the severity of 
the Greek defeat at the hands of the Turks in 1921, the Greeks should have no claim to any of the 
islands in the sea, thus, challenging the legitimacy of these claims. He stated further that if not 
for the European Union that Turkey would easily secure control over the islands and return them 




justification for Turkish claims over all sea territory in the area and threatened military 
confrontation to any who breached the area, threatening war against the Greeks (BBC, 2018). 
 The Greek response to Turkish belligerency was to condemn the actions, condemn 
Turkish interference with the issue of Macedonia, and call upon Greeks to support military 
spending to defend Greece’s territorial integrity in light of Turkish militancy (BBC, 2018). 
Greek political parties rallied together under this banner and line of rhetoric opposed to the 
words and deeds from Erdoğan over previous years and responded to the threats that they were 
not afraid of any country and would not hesitate to defend their territorial space (BBC, 2018; 
ANA-MPA, 2018; Greek Cypriot Press, 2018). This would seem to indicate that collectively, 
Greeks were prepared to respond in kind to any belligerency by the Turks. This verbal exchange 
was followed by territorial incursions by Turkish military forces into Greek territory (Kingsley, 
NYT, 2018a; Kingsley, NYT, 2018,b). Greek politicians grew wary in light of the escalations of 
upcoming Turkish presidential elections (Hurriyet, 2018). Greek audiences began to react to the 
years of antagonizations by Erdoğan as the mayor of Greece’s second largest city was beaten and 
hospitalized by Greek nationalists during a commemoration of remembering the genocide of 
Anatolian Greeks on Asia Minor during Turkey’s genocide of non-Turks during the collapse of 
the Ottoman Empire (Kitsantonis, NYT, 2018).  
 By the middle of the year tensions had begun to decline and move back into the political 
realm. Greece continued to rely on rule of law in response to Turkish belligerence and they 
pressed the Russians on obstructing peace in the region (BBC, 2018; ANA-MPA, 2018). Further, 
Turkey, and Erdoğan specifically, fell into the crosshairs of the US and Germany both based on 
his inflammatory rhetoric, damaging the Turkish economy, and diminishing Turkey’s regional 




2018). With the close of 2018, traditional and social media had come to two conclusions. First, 
authoritarian, right wing, nativist politics were on the rise and corroborated with public sentiment 
(BBC-Twitter, 2018; Polakow-Suransky, The Guardian, 2018; Smoke, The Guardian, 2018). 
Second, popular opinion in Greece had already begun to calm down on the topic of Turkish 
belligerence as many in Greece were dismissing Turkey as being relegated a second-tier player 
in the Mediterranean region (BBC-Twitter, 2018). 
2019 
 The beginning of the final year of the 2010s began with the same story that had been 
going for the latter half of the decade. Democracy was under assault by autocracies across the 
world, strongmen were acting antagonistically toward rivals and international organizations, and 
statecraft in general was drifting back toward realpolitik relative to prior time periods of 
emphasis on multilateralism. In terms of bilateral relations, the end of the 2010s remained a 
continuance of the new status quo set in 2018, Erdoğan’s continued use of anti-Greek, anti-
European, and anti-Western rhetoric, and general Greek apathy when tangible territorial threats 
were not present (BBC, 2019; BBC-Turkish Social Media, 2019). At one point the Greek Prime 
Minister, Alexis Tsipras, engaged in anti-Turkish rhetoric which not only gained no traction 
among the Greek populace, but was unpopular from the standpoint of engaging the Turks in their 
own game (BBC, 2019). This stalemate, if it should be called that, was how the rhetorical 
narrative of Greek-Turkish relations ended at the end of 2019. In the next section, I examine 
search interest by Greek and Turks over time using Google Trends. This information is helping 
at shedding some light on how the interests of Greek and Turkish audiences correlated with 
rhetoric and actions by political leaders in each country. That being said, this is a preliminary 




search engine analytics could possibly portray an inaccurate picture on the interests of audiences 
within these countries as a nuanced field study might reveal. Future research should build upon 
the data displayed in these graphical and rhetorical depictions to determine how these analyses 
appear from an indigenous perspective compared to an outsider’s.  
5.4.3 Search Terms Interest Over Time 
Below are graphical data for the key terms for this chapter that will be referenced 
throughout the remainder of this section. The terms I examine correspond with the areas of 
common importance to each with an intersubjective understanding of the term. In other words, 
both Greece and Turkey find the topic in the term to be important, and they have a shared 
understanding of why it is important. These terms are, as with the other two chapters, 1) EU 
interest over time, 2) the Aegean Sea, 3) Cyprus, 4) interest in each other, and 5) War. Interest in 
each other and war are the constants insofar as these terms carry the same meaning across the 
temporal space of this analysis. Interest in the EU is important for two reasons. First, it is 
important because until recently, Turkey’s trajectory was moving toward EU admission which 
would depend on several conditions being met in terms of governance, acknowledging and 
reconciling with the ethnic cleansing the founders of Turkey engaged in to establish its territorial 
boundaries, as well as the issue of Cyprus. Second and not independent of the first, potential EU 
membership had historical been a mechanism that Greece could defer to insofar as mediations 
over disputes between the two.  
The Aegean Sea is important in terms of resource wealth in proven reserves, strategic 
control over the waterways around the Black Sea, and historical ties to the territory within. The 
final of which has been much more important to the Greeks and interwoven into their culture and 




issue has been problematic historically based on general Cypriot identification with Greece, but 
conflicted because of a miniscule Muslim population that served as a point of contestation for 
Turkey that evolved from contestation, to a challenge to extracting themselves from based on the 
institutionalization of Cyprus as part of the Turkish narrative, and more recently, as a point of 
contestation again to rally Turks around a banner of Islamic resurgence in Turkish politics.  
The graphs depicted focus on the dyadic perspectives of each of the five terms used in the 
search engine analysis. They are scaled in relation to the other’s search interest to more 
accurately illustrate scaling instead of scaled to 100 in order to better identify the discrepancies 
in interest. Prior to examining the search term data however, to illustrate the reliability of Google 
Trends as a reflection of search interest in each country, I have included graphs from statcounter 
of Google’s search engine market share in each country. In the case of Greece, Google has a 
solid 99% share of the market. They also remain above 90% in Turkey as well, however have 
been declining with the introduction of domestic search engines that happen to overlap with the 
decline in democratic institutions within domestic politics. I am not inferring anything from it at 
this time, but note its presence nonetheless. Lastly, echoing previous disclaimers, the graphical 
data in these charts is for predominantly for illustrative purposes for demonstrating the scope of 
what a funded version of this method could reveal to us with a consistent set of operationalized 





















As illustrated above, Yandex, a Russian webservice, acquired approximately 15% of the market 
share over the last 24 months of the decade. From here, I move into the search term graphs. 
First, is Greek and Turkish interest in the EU:  
Fig 5.4
 
Based on this graph, interest in the EU earlier in the decade is predominantly related to each 
country’s individual friction with it rather than their relationship with one another in relation to 
the EU. Greece was struggling with the debt crises which was salient among Greeks and Turkey 
was under heightened scrutiny around the same time period due to the growing pan-Islamic 
movement from the EU toward Turkey. Later on in the decade, small spikes occur in relation to 
Turkish challenges to international law in regards to Greek territorial claims and legal disputes 
which they consistently referred back to international law and agreements conducted through the 
EU. This graph illustrates the plausibility that references to, and interactions with, the EU via 
rhetoric represented an audience cost, i.e., a constraining factor, on both Turkey and Greece 
during this time period.  





























































































































































































Greek-Turkey EU Interest Over Time






This graph illustrates that the Aegean Sea as an issue in and of itself has been a salient issue 
among Greeks but not among Turks. The fluctuations over time reflect several concerns among 
Greeks in relation to the Aegean. First is fishing and territorial claims to the area, second is how 
important the region is to Greek tourism, and finally, as reflected by a resurgence in interest 
toward the end of the decade, is Erdoğan’s challenges to Greek sovereignty over the area in the 
latter half of the decade as highlighted in the media section of this chapter. This exploratory 
model highlights the plausibility that Erdoğan’s belligerent rhetoric created heightened costs, i.e., 
constraints, on Greek leaders insofar as the scope of their bargaining positions on the issue with 
Turkey. As I argue throughout the dissertation, even if Erdoğan intended to antagonize the Greek 
public, it is unlikely that he could know with certainty what specific degree of constraints this 
































































































































































































Greek-Turkey Aegean Sea Interest Over Time




Next is interest in Cyprus: 
Fig. 5.6 
 
In this graph, similar to the issue of the Aegean, there has been some interest over the issue in 
Greece while essentially none in Turkey. This suggests the possibility that Erdoğan’s rhetoric has 
not resonated among Turks or that it has but based on a topic more directed to Turks specifically 
such as the fairness or unfairness of Turkish treatment by the EU and/or Greece generally 
speaking whereas based on the rhetoric actually used, as referenced in the media section, has 
caused interest, especially in 2013 when Erdoğan launched a strong challenge to Cypriot 
independence and their relationship with Greece over what he argued should be Turkish resource 
extraction rights on and around the island. Again, this did not generate any interest among Turks, 
but did generate interest among Greeks. However, in this case, as highlighted in the conclusion, 
the constraining effect may have been a moderating effect via Greek audiences constraining 




























































































































































































Greek-Turkey Cyprus Interest Over Time




The next graph depicts how Greeks and Turks view each other:  
Fig. 5.7 
 
In this graph, there is a clear pattern increasing search interest in each other at the same time that 
rhetoric increases. What is interesting, just as a plausible explanation at this point, is that aside 
from the flare up that nearly resulted in an armed conflict between the two in 2018, this is main 
graph where there is significantly greater interest or saliency in terms of search interest by Turks 
relative to Greeks. Just as speculation, the interest by Turks over this topic area could be 
associated with citizens attempting to substantiate Erdoğan’s rhetoric in relation to what people 
in Greece actually thought vs what he said Greeks thought. Aside from that, this graph highlights 
the plausibility that audience costs played an increasingly constraining role on rhetoric by both 
Erdoğan and Greek leaders in this time period. The more audiences/selectorates paid attention, 
the more tempered rhetoric became. 
































































































































































































Greek-Turkey Interest in Each Other Over Time






Toward the beginning of the decade, interest in war as a topic searched by Greek and Turkish 
citizens appear to be unrelated and the media analysis over rhetoric does not really explain why 
war was so salient in Turkey during the early 2010s. What could explain why war was so salient 
during the early part of the 2010s in Turkey would be the Arab Spring, destabilization of Syria 
along Turkey’s southern border, a rise in Kurdish separatism, and the influx of foreign military 
forces in the region as well as the emergence of ISIS. However, toward the latter half of the 
decade the two countries begin to follow a similar trend in terms of peaks and troughs although 
they are higher in Turkey. These peaks correspond with rhetoric by Erdogan regarding territorial 
claims in the Aegean, in Cyprus, and resource claims throughout the entire region. This 
highlights three possible explanations. First, the topic of war may just be what resonates more 
strongly among Turks, and imposes a constraining role of Turkish leaders. Two, while interest 































































































































































































Greek-Turkey War Interest Over Time




act within international law rather than unilaterally. And three, it was not something that was 
perceived as of important of an issue by Greeks as it was by Turks.  
 Furthermore, examining the data from each segment of the method utilized reveals 
important implications that need to be emphasized. As I have stated elsewhere, 
audiences/selectorates have agency in their relations with state leaders. And audiences can enact 
costs on leaders in a multitude of ways, not just based on the classical audience costs literature 
insofar as signaling resolve. This chapter more than any other offers the most compelling 
evidence that audience costs rest comfortably in the broader domestic politics literature within 
the subfield of international relations, specifically in the two-level games model. Further, when 
taken in combination with BBDM’s selectorate model of domestic politics, understanding the 
fluidity of nominal and real selectorates as well as winning coalitions becomes more apparent. 
Groups that have marginal relevance at best one year may play an integral role in governance 
just a few years later. Turkey, once a fiercely secular country within the Islamic world slips 
further and further into the grasp of a leader pandering on Islamic fundamentalism to the present. 
In this chapter, I have shown through significant empirical evidence that it is appropriate to infer 
that transnational audiences were never swayed by the rhetoric of a belligerent leader and 
maintained a course for pursuing diplomatic solutions based on a common rule of law to solve 
problems. The takeaway from this is that the leadership of that transnational audience conformed 
to the same tack at dealing with the belligerent. The metatheoretical implications of this will be 
discussed in the conclusionary chapter of the dissertation.  
5.5 Conclusion 
 In summary, in this final empirical chapter I have examined the Greek-Turkey dyad. In 




moderating relations rather than exacerbating them. Consistent with the previous two empirical 
chapters, state policy position has shifted in the same direction, along-side with public 
perception, and has been reciprocated by the transnational audience. The very substantial take-
away from this chapter being that audience costs do not necessitate belligerency, rather, they 
simply require sentiment in country A to be reciprocated by the audience, and ultimately, 
policymakers and elites, in country B. Future research on Greek-Turkey relations should 
examine why the publics within this dyad support cooperation whereas the publics in the China-
Japan and India-Pakistan dyads do not, or are at least less likely to do so. It should explore 
characteristics that encourage cooperation, which I have suggested, could be related to 
international organizations, relations with great powers, or more pressing proximal threats. 
Perhaps if China became more aggressive toward India, Indians would be more open to 
cooperation with Pakistan? Future research should also investigate how leaders like Erdoğan are 
successful in spite of the fact that they engage in belligerent rhetoric that is inconsistent with 
public sentiment, which I suspect is related to the previous statements.  
I will now move on to my final thoughts in the conclusionary chapter on the audience 
costs model, the two-level games framework, and how these empirical chapters inform us on 
these areas of research, on the enduring rivalries literature, on the roles that democracy and 
authoritarianism play in relation, and how future research should advance moving forward. In 
my conclusion I make the case that these empirical chapters present an untapped well for 
scholars of international relations and comparative politics in understanding how and why states 
cooperate, compete, or conflict, what specific nuances can be taken away for scholars of each of 
these countries, and the next steps for structuring the transnational audience costs and two level 




dyads in rigorously constructed and methodologically tested cases to draw conclusions that, 
while they may remain small in sample size, still possess strong p-value and r2 levels of 





























6.1 Implications and Conclusion 
 This chapter concludes the dissertation. In this chapter I will summarize the implications 
of my findings in the empirical chapters, discuss in great detail my research agenda insofar as 
future research based on this dissertation, and conclude with parting thoughts. The work 
completed in this document turned out to be much more insightful, thought provoking, and 
centering for future projects than I had anticipated. Numerous branches have been created to 
explore a multitude of topics to engage in even more mid-level-centric work than was presented 
here. As of my writing of this, there are 193 states recognized by the United Nations, an almost 
countless number of ethnicities, and between all of them, dyads that can be explored further. This 
fact has created the abilities for future projects to push even further beyond the largely 
qualitative, small-N quantitative, and mixed method approaches I have already and intend to 
continue using in future studies, and expand out into large-N purely quantitative analyses 
shedding light on this model from an entirely different direction and perspective.  
 In chapter 1 I introduced the topic to be discussed and identified, albeit in an informal 
sense, my dependent and independent variables. I briefly touched on some concepts that I went 
on to expand on in the following chapter. Finally, I outlined the remainder of the dissertation. In 
chapter 2 I presented my research design. First, I explained and justified how I used concepts 
throughout the dissertation. I then expanded on this to include theoretical assumptions based on 
existing literature across the social sciences. From there I concisely laid out my model and 
framework that this dissertation proposed. Next, I described in depth how my SMS Analysis 
works and why it was the appropriate method for this project. Then, I identified, justified, and 




my agenda for those empirical chapters as well as what my intentions were for this chapter. From 
here I will present my findings and their implications.  
6.2 Findings and Implications 
 In this dissertation I set out to substantiate further inquiry into conceptualizing audience 
costs as a transnational phenomenon that extends beyond national borders and acts as an 
intervening variable between players engaged in two-level games in the bargaining process. 
Absent material resources to conduct surveys, use more recent algorithmically based methods to 
measure public sentiment about issues that leaders bring up and the saliency and diffusion of 
those issues, etc. I have used publicly accessible data to illustrate ways that costly but much more 
effective data can add greater validity to the two overarching arguments I have made a case for 
throughout the body of this text.  
First, that transnational audience costs exist. Leaders are constrained by, or take into their 
decisionmaking calculus, what the constraints exist on their decisions from their 
audience/selectorate, and what costs they may impose if leaders make decisions outside of those 
constraints. Second, that audience/selectorate sentiment on issues and the saliency of those issues 
is affected by belligerent rhetoric from foreign leaders. To restate from the introduction, leaders 
in state A may very well attempt to manipulate and generate audience costs in state B for the 
leaders in state B but this strategy on its own would be risky in that even if it were done 
consistently and a predictable pattern were clear, that future constraints would not create a 
different outcome than what had previous been the case. An interesting case study to consider for 
future research could be using a Graham Allison-esque three views model to look at the US 




and salience of the prospects of invasion in the months leading up to the attack. This is just one 
example though.  
Although the model and method are still in development and in need of further 
refinement to provide some semblance of explanatory power, we can conclude that both aspects 
merit further exploration. With access to adequate resources to work with existing NGOs or 
independently conduct narrow and targeted surveys, a more valid survey component that 
captures audience/selectorate sentiment can be incorporated into the study. Furthermore, working 
with existing organizations to utilize search algorithm models, issue saliency among the 
audience/selectorate can also be better measured. Essentially, how I have applied my model and 
method in this dissertation has illustrated what it can evolve into. Regardless of the findings, 
having identically and consistently operationalized variables across all three approaches of the 
SMS Analysis will greatly expand our understanding of how audience costs work within state-
society relations. Even if the findings determine that there is no relationship among these 
variables, they will still greatly advance our understanding of to what extent audience costs 
constrain leadership decision making. Finally, these findings will be relevant to both the 
traditional audience costs literature as well as my transnational audience costs model.  
All told however, the empirical chapters explored in this dissertation each make a case in 
their own way for further exploration. Each empirical chapter that was covered in the dissertation 
revealed a new way of understanding transnational audience costs and informed how future 
research can continue to expand on the model. The Sino-Japanese chapter illustrated how long 
memories can be for people’s understandings of themselves in relation to the other. It also 
revealed more than in the other empirical chapters given the longevity of this relationship, how 




of narratives can be toward rehabilitating the relationship, and how costly they can make that 
reconciliation process. Secondarily, it highlighted how imperialism affected countries with what 
Westerners would consider to be very similar cultures, and what each of these countries would 
agree are very similar cultures relative to Western culture, differently. Japan was the first mover 
that very quickly became a global power after their opening whereas China was a slow riser who, 
perhaps because of rather than in spite of a more conservative approach, has created a substantial 
global footprint in the international system in less than 75 years.  
 The Indo-Pakistani chapter revealed that the complexities of partition and population 
exchanges can sow long lasting adversarial relations. Ethnocentric ideologies and religious 
cleavages created a perceived need by Muslims on the Indian Subcontinent to view a need to 
possess sovereign territory to ensure their survival, and Hindutva in India has only reinforced 
that over time. Further, the intersectionalism present in this case reveals that how we label 
democracy can be a little shallow insofar as putting forth theories that argue for a clear 
relationship between peace and cooperation, and democracy. It also highlights how complex 
categorizing a state as a democracy actually is. While the Polity Index scores both very high on 
the democracy scale, India and Pakistan’s intersubjective understanding of the other as being 
democratic does not concur with those scores. Both espouse the value of democracy and neither 
views the other as being one. Rhetoric has played a significant role in continuing to fuel mistrust 
in each other, as well as leaving both open to third party manipulation to keep tensions high. 
Secondarily, the complex process of partitioning and transferring populations creates distrust and 
hatred that extends far beyond the generations that personally experienced it. This held true in 





 The Greco-Turkish chapter reveals that nation building can be an ugly process that can, 
as of now, permanently stigmatize a group that goes about it in certain ways. Turks and Turkic 
peoples have existed for a far longer time than this study examines, but a Turkish state has only 
existed since 1923 and it came into being via Turks within the dying Ottoman Empire’s 
government conducting genocides against non-Turkish people in Asia Minor to create clear 
geographical boundaries for their existence. What many do not realize is that these genocides 
included Greeks as well as Armenians and other ethnic groups in the territory. Greek settlements 
in Anatolia had existed for thousands of years and were wiped out permanently to facilitate the 
creation of Turkey. Even after a century, the narrative around this event has persisted and 
facilitated an inherent other for leaders to target in order to increase a sense of unity within a 
state and a sense of insecurity within another. What this chapter reveals most significantly 
however, is that domestic and international institutions, as well as transnational audiences that 
can see prospects for cooperation beyond a single leader’s tenure, can reduce the impact that 
belligerent rhetoric has on that audience. Further, transnational audiences can marginalize the 
impact of a leader’s belligerent rhetoric rather than simply heightening tensions.  
6.3 Speaking to Existing Literature 
 This dissertation has been an intensive exercise in identifying and engaging in mid-level 
theorizing and how in that context, this model functions within empirical cases. However, the 
broader, metatheoretical implications, as well as where more precisely this study fits in that 
literature, need to be more satisfactorily identified. Moving from general to specific, small to big, 
first and foremost, this dissertation rests within the bargaining literature within international 
relations. Further, it bridges a gap and offers a means for reconciling differing paradigmatic 




specifically, how constructivist securitization of norms and ideas fits within the rationalist 
bargaining model. The fit is highly complementary and while what I have addressed throughout 
this body pays no particular homage to either approach per se, I have pursued an application 
focused agenda to say in this conclusion that these ideas can complement each other and present 
a means for deeper understanding of the motivators for bounded rationality and nested games. 
 More broadly, I have presented a single component of a much broader and more 
ambitious theoretical agenda. In this dissertation I have discussed transnational audiences, the 
costs they impose on leaders, and their impact on the international system. However, this is 
couched within a broader expansion of existing literature on two-level games. I argue throughout 
this text that this third component represents an intervening variable that expands the two-level 
game, to warrant expanding our scope and understanding of it in terms of transnational two-level 
games. Following this logic, as future work continues to build on this model and the foundation 
of the transnational two-level game, questions of complex interdependence are illuminated. Not 
necessarily in terms of economic transactions, supply chains, and import-export needs, but more 
specifically, in terms of the exchange of ideas. What is taking place that domestic constituencies 
have transnational influence over international relations? The implications here are not “the 
effect of domestic politics on international relations” or “the effect of international bargaining on 
domestic politics”. Rather, how do audiences, in a secondary and separate identity from that as a 
component of the state or state-society relations, affect the international system? What is causing 
this? 
 Put concisely, is what we are seeing new? Is this a product of globalization? Or is this 
something that has always existed that we perhaps did not account for? A case can be made for 




world that we live in. People has access to information globally at almost no cost and that takes 
place almost, if not exactly, in real time. Entire books by scholars, myself included, have asked 
whether increased access to information due to advances in technology and communication is 
changing the way international relations works, leading to an explosion in transnational actors 
(deLisle, et al. 2016).  
 So, this leads to the point where perhaps there is an answer to the question, or statement, 
that Francis Fukuyama proposed with the collapse of the three-world system (Fukuyama, 1992). 
Is this the end of history and the birth of a liberal international order? The abundance of data in 
this dissertation is a strong and resounding no. Yes, globalization has altered the way that we 
conduct international relations. But rather than leading to a cosmopolitan global polity, quite the 
opposite, it has led to entrenchment, the embrace of illiberal ideals, and authoritarian slippage. 
Or perhaps, that was always there, and the access to technology we have now has not caused 
anti-Globalization to occur, it has just provided us better access to information that globalization 
is something no one ever wanted or asked for. Based on that logic, transnationalism in general, 
and transnational two-level games specifically, is not a product of globalization, rather, it is 
something that always existed and we simply have the means to identify it now.  
 I argue the former case to be true, and the expansive body of social constructivism in 
international relations offers the broad, ontological lens for identifying this phenomenon. Identity 
is essential to the cohesion of polities, beyond just a rational understanding of agents, and more 
so about the entire worldview of whole societies, or their ontological security as Mitzen phrases 
it, has been challenged. Rather than autocrat after autocrat falling to the unstoppable momentum 
of justice cascades holding leaders accountable, or constituencies harnessing the institutions of 




the opposite and rallied around illiberal leaders promising a return to relatively tribal politics, 
nationalist politics one might say, promising a return to a moment in time where greatness had 
been achieved that globalization has sullied (Sikkink, 2011; Finnemore and Sikkink 1998; 
Barnett and Finnemore, 2004; Keck and Sikkink, 1998). 
 The constructivists were right about the broad phenomenon that was occurring in terms 
of an expanding footprint of international organizations, of transnationalism, of idea and norm 
sharing, and greater awareness and accountability of leaders as a result of globalization and the 
resulting norm diffusion. However, what they got wrong was the normative aspect of this 
phenomenon. Yes, globalization is occurring, yes, it is the catalyst that has activated these 
previously non-existent transnational actors, but no, this is not leading to a cosmopolitan future, 
democratization, greater accountability for war criminals, or the adoption of diffused liberal 
norms. My position is reserved and cautious about stating in any certain terms about what is 
happening. We are in the middle of a transition, but a transition to what is not yet clear. That 
said, quite the opposite of liberal norm diffusion could be argued and there is an abundance of 
data, in this document that you have read and in the cases that have not yet been added to this 
study, that globalization has led to the diffusion of autocratic norms as witnessed with decaying 
democratic institutions across the entirety of the international system. The United States, China, 
Brazil, Turkey, Britain, France, Russia, and so on, have all pivoted right and imposed jingoistic 
restrictions on groups within their borders that are “not us”, engaged in institutionalized 
nationalist identity boundary policing, and attempted to disenfranchise and strip agency from out 
groups within territorial borders over the past decade. Globalization has created the environment 




provocation from the state, to reject cosmopolitan globalization, and rather, embraced a tribal 
reaction to it and rejection of a global shared identity. 
6.4 Future Research 
 As mentioned frequently throughout the dissertation, this preliminary analysis opens the 
door for a wide range of research agendas. First and foremost, however likely the most 
ambitious, is to conduct the same analysis with the same empirical chapters again, but with fresh 
survey data collected on my own, or, to obtain survey data collected by others for the same 
timeline I used while conducting field work to add local insight into the relationship, structured 
in a classic case study approach that relies more greatly on primary source data than the current 
study does. This would be useful for two reasons. First, if the findings are similar or perhaps 
identify an even stronger correlation, this would further strengthen the validity of this study. 
Secondly, depending on the variation relative to the method employed in this dissertation, it 
could validate this alternative method for analyzing cases by demonstrating how comparable the 
results were relative to a classic fieldwork case study approach.  
 Second, as this dissertation is transformed into a book manuscript, additional chapters 
that examine an even more diverse set of dyads should be included. Although mentioned 
cheekily in the introduction, investigating relationships in South America especially would be 
interesting insofar as the type of regional nuances it could contribute. Anecdotally, a lot of 
Brazilians and Argentinians express a strong dislike for one another, and often, football comes 
up in these conversations, digging deeper into that particular dyad would be useful for expanding 
the boundaries of the project. Is it just about football between the two or is there something 
deeper and more significant going on? While my knowledge on Africa is even more limited than 




Finally, given the revelations uncovered in the Greece-Turkey chapter, going back and 
conducting the Anglo-French study would be interesting insofar as what the results might reveal. 
This extends the study into two additional avenues for future investigation.  
 First, would be to expand beyond states and examine dyads of ethnic groups. This could 
be intrastate, interstate, or both, and look at the variation between dyads in these circumstances. 
Do we see similar patterns in terms of rivalries and pressure on group leaders between rival 
ethnic groups? And is there a discernable difference between if the dyad extends beyond state 
borders or exist completely within a single state? Both offer further opportunities to strengthen 
the model. Second, is to continue to explore ways to generalize beyond the historical rivalry 
requirement. Under what other circumstances do dyads incur transnational audience costs against 
one another. Do strategic or resource logics open the door for rhetoric to be costly whereas 
before it might not have been? For example, if two countries that border each other and generally 
enjoy genial relations with one another come into a situation where one stumbles upon an 
increasingly scarce resource that the other is dependent on, does that change the dynamic of the 
relationship significantly? Do they cooperate as some within IR would argue, or do they compete 
to secure unilateral control over the resources as others argue? How much does geographical 
proximity play in this calculus? As is often the case in these types of situations, typically 
contested territory comes in to play. While not the primary focus of this study, contestation over 
portions of the East China Sea strain Sino – Japanese relations and contestation over portions of 
the Aegean Sea, islands within it, as well as Cyprus, play a role in the Greco-Turkish dyad. 
Focusing on material objects rather than words would also be an interesting direction to go.  
Further, plugging a very classic, defensive realist model into this model would be 




by testing them together. The findings from this dissertation strongly reinforce Walt’s thesis on 
threat perception, however it does so based on words rather than capabilities. On that note, a 
paper on this model in relation to the classic paradigmatic approaches could be interesting. My 
work does not ascribe wholly to any one paradigm, and I would argue strongly that the discipline 
is long past the paradigmatic debates, and most metatheoretical debates in general, at least for the 
moment. However, does any one theory, realism, neoliberal institutionalism, or constructivism 
resonate more strongly than the others? What about simplifying the question to rationalist or 
constructivist understandings of the discipline? Or individualist vs. structuralist epistemologies? 
These present some potential metatheoretical avenues into future research.  
More interesting are the multitude of mid-level theorizing that can be advanced here. Just 
a few, in addition to those already mentioned, would be to look at what differences if any 
autocratic vs. democratic leaders use? Nationalist rhetoric as opposed to other types? Perhaps 
nationalist as opposed to globalist, or cosmopolitan, or a multitude of other concepts that can be 
considered as a FOIL to nationalism? What role does a country’s Polity score play? Do new 
democracies behave significantly different than old democracies? Does this inform us of 
anything new about the democratic peace theory? Or what about theories of democratic 
diversion? 
The primary recurring source for saying throughout the dissertation that something 
should be investigated in future research is based on just how much ground needed to be covered 
in this initial proposal. Assuming that substantive work can be done that translates into peer-
reviewed publications, or the publication of this document once transformed from dissertation to 
book, would cover a lot of exposition that could be left to a large degree in a citation or reference 




linkages, and the histories in cases. Moving forward, the two paths to be covered for certain are 
1) expanding case selection and the development of more robust and rigorous cases, and 2) 
putting together a proposal for funding and resources to conduct survey work and/or a strong 
discourse analysis. Regardless though, the one certainty moving forward is that the feedback 
provided for this document, in combination with the first proposal of a transformation into book 
form with more cases, and more rigorously structured cases will be incorporated into the next 
step for this body of work. In addition to that, a more extensive examination of expanding the 
transnational logic to the two-level game will be incorporated into the book manuscript version. 
That will likely also be submitted in an article form as well. Following that, as mentioned, there 
are numerous avenues of future research to explore.  
The overall macrolevel takeaway from this document is that we are in the midst of a 
paradigmatic shift in the structure of the international system. The role of the state as the singular 
sovereign has been diminished and transnational actors from corporations, to organizations, and 
to domestic constituencies have a permanent seat at the bargaining table. This work has only 
examined one component of transnational two-level games that has created a framework for 
identifying other actors, how they fit into the power dynamic, and what their implications for the 
international system as a whole might be. 
6.5 Conclusion 
In conclusion, in this dissertation I proposed that scholars of IR and social science 
generally should think about audiences/selectorates in an agential sense moving forward. 
Further, there is a typology of audiences. Within this is a third category. In addition to domestic 
and foreign audiences, there are transnational audiences that play a role in the two-level game. 




dyadic foreign policy as well as the international system as a whole, was by examining the threat 
perception of transnational audiences, measured by their cost or constraining role on the policy 
position of their state, as the dependent variable of my study with belligerent rhetoric by leaders 
in the rival state being the independent variable. I have developed a novel method still being 
refined to operationalize audience costs. In my empirical chapters I approached each case in a 
slightly different way to explore different ways to operationalize, or, take into consideration 
additional characteristics, such as regime type. In this stage of model development, I did not 
explicitly identify and operationalize conditioning or contextual variables. However, the 
variation between approaches suggests incorporating additional conditions or context into the 
model might lend itself to more precise findings in the future. With this, I have highlighted the 
next task for bringing this framework to the social science community and how I will advance 














"Pakistan Took Modest Steps Yet Remains Safe Haven for Terrorists: US report". Business 
Standard India. Press Trust of India. 24 June 2020 
2010 JETRO Survey on Business Conditions of Japanese Companies in Asia and Oceania. 
(2011). Japan External Trade Organization. 
2019 JETRO Survey on Business Conditions of Japanese Companies in Asia and Oceania. 
(2020). Japan External Trade Organization. 
Adil, Ahmad, and Sajid, Islamuddin. (2021, September 2021). India Denies Involvement in 
Terrorist Attack in Pakistan. Anadolu Agency. 
Akyol, Mustafa. (2013, February 27). Turkey in Fact is the ‘Ummah’. Star.  
Aldrich, John H., Gelpi, Christopher, Feaver, Peter, Reifler, Jason, & Sharp, Kristin Thompson. 
(2006). Foreign Policy and the Electoral Connection. Annual review of Political Science, 9. 477-
502. 
Alexandris, Alexis. 1980. Imbros and Tenedos: A Study of Turkish Attitudes Toward Two 
Ethnic Greek Island Communities Since 1923. Journal of the Hellenic Diaspora, 7(1). 5-31  
Allen, Natali, Damon, Arwa, Gorani, Hala, Anderson, Becky, Van Dam, Derek, Watson, Ivan, 
Sciutto, Jim, Walsh, Nick Paton, Shubert, Atika, Lah, Kyung, Riddel, Don, Mann, Jonathan. 
(2015, September 4). Migrants Refuse to Leave Hungarian Train; Father Tells Story of 
Drowning of Two Migrant Boys, Mother; Turkey’s President Blames West for Migrant Deaths. 
CNN. 
Anderson, Becky, Pleitgen, Fred, Chance, Matthew, Liebermann, Oren, Lee, Ian, Damon, Arwa, 
Black, Phil. (2015, September 7). No Evidence of Russia Plans Attacks Inside Syria. CNN.  
Anderson, Becky, Robertson, Nic, Black, Phil, Shubert, Atika, Diokos, Eleni, Bell, Melissa, 
Karadsheh, Jomana. Turkey’s Foreign Minister Criticizes the Netherlands for Actions Taken 
Against Government Ministers. CNN. 
Aqdas, Tamseel. (2020, Septmber 10). The Dilemma of Democracy: Why has Pakistan Failed as 
a Democratic State. Modern Diplomacy. 
Arango, Tim, and Yeginsu, Ceylan. (2016, July 17). Erdoğan Triumphs After Cou Attempt, but 
Turkey’s Fate is Unclear. The New York Times.  
Argibay, Carmen M. (2003). Sexual Slavery and the ‘Comfort Women’ of World War II. 
Berkeley Journal of International Law, 21(2). 375–89. 
Armenia and Turkey in Context of the Treaty of Sevres: Aug - Dec 1920 - on "Atlas of 




Asada, Shinji and Tison, Stephane. (2016). The Siege of Qingdao: Mobilization and war 
experiences in a German leasehold in China during World War I. Presses Universitaires de 
Rennes 9(1). 75-91. 
Asahi, Shimbun. (2003). Japanese Chemical Weapons Left in China in 1945. The Asia-Pacific 
Journal 1(5).  
Athens Concrned Turkish Elections Might Increase Tensions. (2018, April 23). Hurriyet. 
Avedian, Vahagn. (2012). State Identity, Continuity, and Responsibility: The Ottoman Empire, 
the Republic of Turkey and the Armenian Genocide. European Journal of International Law, 
23(3), 797-820.  
Bamba, Nobuya. (1973) Japanese Diplomacy in a Dilemma: New Light on Japan's China Policy, 
1924-29. University of British Columbia Press. 
Banno Masataka. (1970). Kindai Chūgoku gaikōshi kenkyū (Study of the History of Diplomacy in 
Modern China) Iwanami Shoten. 
Banno, Masataka 坂野正高. (1973) Kindai Chūgoku seiji gaikōshi: Vasuko da Gama kara goshi 
undō made 近代中国政治外交史:ヴァスコ・ダ・ガマから五四運動まで. Tokyo daigaku 
shuppankai. 
Barenblatt, Daniel. (2004). A Plague Upon Humanity: the Secret Genocide of Axis Japan's Germ 
Warfare Operation. HarperCollins. 
Barnett, Michael and Finnemore, Martha. (2004).  Rules for the World: International 
Organizations in Global Politics. Cornell University Press. 
Barnouin, Barbara; Changgen, Yu. (1998). Chinese Foreign Policy during the Cultural 
Revolution. Columbia University Press. 
Bates, H. Robert. (1983) Essays on the Political Economy of Rural Africa. Cambridge University 
Press. 
Bates, Robert H., de Figueiredo, Jr. Rui J.P., & Weingast, Barry R. (1998). The Politics of 
Interpretation: Rationality, Culture, and Transition. Politics and Society, 26(4), 603-642. 
Bausch, Andrew W. (2014). An Experimental Test of Selectorate Theory. International 
Interactions, 40, 533-553. 
Baxter, Craig, (Ed.)., (2003) Pakistan on the Brink: Politics, Economics, and Society. Lexington 
Books/Fortress Academic. 
Baydar, Yavuv (2014, 28 May). United Europe – a Vote in Severe Doubt. Today’s Zaman.  
Baydar, Yavuz. (2013, August 2). Turkey Risks a Full Return to ‘Akara Criteria’. Today’s 
Zaman. 




Beissinger, Mark R. Nationalist Mobilization and the Collapse of the Soviet State. Cambridge 
University Press. 
Bennhold, Katrin. (2018, September 28). In Erdoğan’s Charm Offensive, Germans Find Offense. 
The New York Times. 
Bennhold, Katrin. (2018, September 29). Turkey’s President Visited Germany to Smooth Things 
Over. It Didn’t Work. The New York Times.  
Bodeen, Christopher. (2019, June 3) Prosperity, Repression Mark China 30 Years After 
Tiananmen. Associated Press.  
Boyle, J.H. (1972). China and Japan at War, 1937-45. Stanford University Press. 
Bozkurt, Abdullah. (2015, December 15). The Hazards of Irredentism in Turkey. Today’s 
Zaman.  
Brombach, Mike. (2011). Abandoned Chemical Weapons in China: The Unresolved Japanese 
Legacy. Global Green. 
Brook, Timothy (1998) Quelling the People: The Military Suppression of the Beijing Democracy 
Movement. Stanford University Press. 
Brown, David. (2004). Why Independence? The Instrumental and Ideological Dimensions of 
Nationalism. International Journal of Comparative Sociology, 45(3-4), 277-296. 
Brulé, David J. & Williams, Laron. (2009). Democracy and Diversion: Government 
Arrangements, the Economy and Dispute Initiation. Journal of Peace Research, 46(6), 777-798. 
Bryce, James, and Toynbee, Arnold Joseph. (2000). The Treatment of Armenians in the Ottoman 
Empire, 1915-1916 : Documents Presented to Viscount Grey of Falloden by Viscount Bryce. 
Gomidas Inst. 
Bueno de Mequita, Bruce, Morrow, James D., Siverson, Randolph M., & Smith, Alastair. (2004). 
Testing Novel Implications from the Selectorate Theory of War. World Politics 56, 363-388. 
Bueno de Mesquita, Bruce, Smith, Alastair. (2004). The Dictators Handbook: Why Bad Behavior 
is Almost Always Good Politics. Public Affairs 
Bukhari, Fayaz, and Naqash, Abu Arqam. (2020, November 13th). Indian and Pakistani troops 
exchange fire, at least 15 dead. Reuters.  
Bunker, G.F. (1972). The Peace Conspiracy: Wang Ching-Xrei and the China War, 1937-45. 
Harvard University Press. 
Bury, John Bagnell, Meiggs, Russell. (2000). A History of Greece. Palgrave Macmillan. 
Buss, Claude Albert. (1972). The People's Republic of China and Richard Nixon. Stanford 
Alumni Association. 




Byman, Daniel. (2005). Deadly Connections: States That Sponsor Terrorism. Cambridge 
University Press. 
Cabestan, Jean-Pierre. (2010). How China Managed to De-Isolate Itself on the International 
Stage and Re-Engage the World after Tiananmen. In Béja, Jean-Philippe (Ed.). The Impact of 
China's 1989 Tiananmen Massacre. Routledge. 
Cai, Hong. (2012, November 29). Japanese Candidates Debate China Policy. China Daily. 
Cai, Yongshun (2010) Collective Resistance in China: Why Popular Protests Succeed or Fail. 
Stanford University Press 
Calhoun, Craig. (1989). Revolution and repression in Tiananmen square. Society, 26. 21-38. 
Chandra India article (pg 3) 
Chandra, Kanchan. (2005). Ethnic Parties and Democratic Stability. American Political Science 
Review 3(2), 235-252. 
Chang I-Wei, Jennifer. (2017). China’s Kashmir policies and crisis management in South Asia. 
United States Institute of Peace. 
Charalampakis, Manos, (2018, February 16). Greek Daily Views Reasons for Turkish Air, Sea 
Violations. Ta Nea. 
Cheema, Ali, Khan, Adnan Q., and Myerson, Roger B. (2015). Breaking the Countercyclical 
Pattern of Local Democracy in Pakistan. In, Faguet, Jean-Paul, and Pöschl, Caroline. (Ed.)., Is 
Decentralization Good for Development? Perspectives from Academics and Policymakers. 
Oxford University Press. 
Chen Weiss, Jessica. (2013). Authoritarian Signaling, Mass Audiences, and Nationalist Protest in 
China. International Organization, 67(1), 1-35. 
Chen Weiss, Jessica. (2014) Powerful Patriots: Nationalist Protest in China’s Foreign Relations. 
Oxford University Press 
Cheng, Eddie. (2009). Standoff at Tiananmen. Sensys Corp. 
Chicago University Cuts Ties with China’s Confucius Institute. (2014, September 27). South 
China Morning Post. 
China Protest at Japan Disputed Island Visit. (2012 January 3). BBC. 
Cohen, Paul A. (1997). History in Three Keys: The Boxers as Event, Experience, and Myth. 
Columbia University Press. 
Cohen, Raymond. (1979) Threat Perception in International Crisis. University of Wisconsin 
Press. 
Conversi, Daniele. (1995). Reassessing Current Theories of Nationalism: Nationalism as 




Coox, Alvin D. and Conroy, Hilary. Eds. (1978). China and Japan: A Search for Balance Since 
World War I. Oxford University Press. 
Crilly, Rob. (2013, May 10). Pakistan election guide: How does it work? Telegraph, Pakistan 
Bureau. 
Cypriot President Seeks UN Intervention Against Turkey, (2014, October 8). Greek Cypriot 
News Agency. 
Cyprus Asks Turkey to Prove it Wants Cyprus Solution. (2017, February 2). CAN.  
Dagi, Ihsan. (2013, September 27). What Made the AKP Change its Foreign Policy? Today’s 
Zaman. 
Dahl, Robert Alan. (1971). Polyarchy: Participation and Opposition. Yale University Press. 
Danziger, Sunaina. (2020, June 5). Dividing Lines: What India’s Hindu Nationalist Turn 
Portends For Relations With Pakistan. South Asian Voices.  
Darwin, John. (2011, March 3). Britain, the Commonwealth and the End of Empire. BBC. 
Davis Jr. James, W. Threats and Promises: The Pursuit of International Influence. The John 
Hopkins University Press. 
Demirtas, Serkan. (2015, April 22). CHP Promises a Halt to ‘Middle Easternization’ of Turkey. 
Hurriyet. 
Denby, Charles. (1906). China and her People: Being the Observations, Reminiscences, and 
Conclusions of an American Diplomat vol. 1. L.C. Page & Co. 
Dhar Chakrabarti, Kaustav. (2015). Sadbhavana and the Paradox of 'Winning Hearts and Minds': 
An Institutionalist Perspective. Economic and Political Weekly, 50(24), 21-23. 
Dhar, Maloy Krishna. (2012). Fulcrum of Evil: CIA, ISI, Al Qaeda Nexus.  
Dickie, Mure. Tokyo governor in bid to buy disputed islands. Financial Times. 
Dmello, Jared R., Perliger, Arie, and Sweeney, Matthew. (2020). The Violence of Political 
Empowerment: Electoral Success and the Facilitation of Terrorism in the Republic of India. 
Terrorism and Political Violence.  
Dor, Alexandre. (2015, August) China’s WW2 Remembrance: ‘Patriotic Education’ in Action: 
China’s WW2 Remembrances are but the Latest Instance of a ‘New’ Chinese Nationalism 
Created by the CCP. The Diplomat. 
Downs, Anthony. (1957). An Economic Theory of Political Action in a Democracy. The Journal 
of Political Economy, 65(2), 135-150. 
Dreher, Axel, Fuchs, Andreas, Parks, Bradley, Strange, Austin M. and Tierney, Michael J. 
(2017). Aid, China, and Growth: Evidence from a New Global Development Finance Dataset. 




Dreyer, June Teufel. (2003) Economic development in Tibet under the People's Republic of 
China. Journal of Contemporary China 12(36). 411-430. 
Dreyer, June Teufel. (2018, February 6) A Weapon Without War: China’s United Front Strategy. 
Foreign Policy Research Institute. 
Dube, Clayton. (2011). Getting to Beijing: Kissinger's Secret 1971 Trip. USC US-China 
Institute.  
Dyer, Thomas Henry. (2010). Modern Europe V1, 1453-1530: From The Fall Of Constantinople 
To The Establishment Of The German Empire, 1453-1871. Kessinger Publishing, LLC. 
Elleman, Bruce A. (2001). Modern Chinese Warfare, 1795–1989. Routledge. 
Erdoğan Says Greeks were Almost ‘Brined’ During 1921 Battle with Turks. BBC.  
Esposito, John L., ed. (2004). Kashmir. The Islamic World: Past and Present. Oxford University 
Press. 
Fackler, Martin. (2007, March 6). No Apology for Sex Slavery, Japan’s Prime Minister Says. 
The New York Times. 
Fairbank, John King, Banno, Masataka, Yamamoto, Sumiko. (1970). Japanese Studies of 
Modern China: A Bibliographical Guide to Historical and Social Science Research on the 19th 
and 20th Centuries. Harvard-Yeching Institute.  
Fearon, James D. (1994a). Domestic Political Audiences and th Escalation of International 
Disputes. The American Political Science Review, 88(3), 577-592. 
Fearon, James D. (1994b). Signaling Versus the Balance of Power and Interests: An Empirical 
Test of a Crisis Bargaining Model. The Journal of Conflict Resolution, 38(2), 236-269. 
Fearon, James D. (1997). Signaling Foreign Policy Interests: Tying Hands Versus Sinking Costs. 
Journal of Conflict Resolution, 41(1), 68-90. 
Fearon, James, D. (1995). Rationalist Explanations for War. International Organization, 49(3), 
379-414. 
Fifield, Anna, and Shih, Gerry. (2019, June 1). How Today’s China was Shaped by the Events in 
Tiananmen Square 30 Years Ago. The Washington Post. 
Fifield, Anna. (2019, April 30). China’s Xi Looks to Stoke Nationalism as Tiananmen 
Anniversary Approaches. The Washington Post. 
Findley, Michal G., Piazza, James A., & Young, Joseph K. (2012). The Games Rivals Play: 
Terrorism in International Rivalries. Journal of Politics, (74(1), 235-248. 
Finnemore, Martha, and Sikkink, Kathryn. (1998). International Norm Dynamics and Political 




Foot, Rosemary. (2000). Rights beyond borders: the global community and the struggle over 
human rights in China. Oxford University Press. 
Fravel, M. Taylor. (2010). Explaining Stability in the Senkaku (Diaoyu) Island Dispute. In, 
Curtis, Gerald L., Kokuburn, Ryosei, and Wang, Jisi. (Ed.)., Getting the Triangle Straight: 
Managing China-Japan-U.S. Relations. Japan Center for International Exchange. 
Fukuyama, Fukuyama. (1992). The End of History and the Last Man. Free Press. 
Gaikwad, Rahi. (2013, July 21). Hindutva is India’s identity: RSS chief. The Hindu. 
Gall, Carlotta. (2018, January 5). A Rival Steps Up to Challenge Turkey’s President Erdoğan. 
The New York Times. 
Gall, Carlotta. (2018, January 6). Forging a Coalition to Challenge Turkey’s President. The New 
York Times. 
Gallagher, Mary E. & Hanson, Jonathan K. (2015). Power Tool or Dull Blade? Selectoate 
Theory for Autocracies. The Annual Review of Political Science, 18, 367-385. 
Geller, Daniel S. (1993). Power Differentials and War in Rival Dyads. International Studies 
Quarterly, 37(2), 173-193. 
Girard, Bonnie (2018, September) How 1980 Laid the Groundwork for China’s Major Foreign 
Policy Challenges. The Diplomat. 
Global Attitudes Survey. (2014, Spring). PEW Research Center. 
Global Attitudes Survey. (2017, Spring). PEW Research Center.  
Global Attitudes Survey. (2018, Spring). PEW Research Center. 
Global Attitudes Survey. (2018, Spring). PEW Research Center. 
Global Attitudes Survey. (2019, Spring). PEW Research Center. 
Goddard, Stacie E. & Krebs, Ronald R. (2015). Rhetoric, Legitimation, and Grand Strategy. 
Security Studies, 24(1), 5-36. 
Goddard, Stacie E. (2015). The Rhetorc of Appeasement: Hitler’s Legitimation Strategy and 
British Foreign Policy, 1938-39. Security Studies, 24(1), 95-130. 
Goertz, Gary & Diehl, Paul F. (1993) Enduring Rivalries: Theoretical Constructs and Empirical 
Patterns. International Studies Quarterly, 37(2), 147-171. 
Goertz, Gary & Diehl, Paul F. The Initiation and Termination of Enduring Rivalries: The Impact 
of Political Shocks. American Journal of Political Science, 39(1), 30-52. 
Gold, Hal. (2004). Unit 731: Testimony. Tuttle Publishing. 
Goode, Paul J. (2012). Nationalism in Quiet Times: Ideational Power and Post-Soviet Electoral 




Goodman, David S.G. (1994) Deng Xiaopingg and the Chinese Revolution: A Political 
Biography. Routledge. 
Google Trends China-Japan Relations. (2019, December 31). Google Trends. 
Google Trends Greece-Turkey Relations. (2019, December 31). Google Trends. 
Google Trends India-Pakistan Relations. (2019, December 31). Google Trends. 
Granville, Austin. (2003). Working a Democratic Constitution: A History of the Indian 
Experience. Oxford University Press. 
Greece rejects Turkish foreign minister's remarks on Muslim minority. (2012, November 16). 
BBC. 
Greek Foreign Minister Talks Greek-Russian Ties, Name Deal. (2018, July 22). ANA-MPA. 
Greek Presidnt Says Cyprus Issue to be Resolved Only on EU Terms. (2016, January 22). CAN. 
Gries, Peter Hays, Steiger, Derek, and Wang, Tao. (2016). Popular Nationalism and China’s 
Japan Policy: the Diaoyu Islands Protests, 2012-2013. Journal of Contemporary China, 25(98). 
264-276 
Gries, Peter Hays, Steiger, Derek, and Wang, Tao. Social Media, Nationalist Protests, and 
China’s Japan Policy: The Diaoyu Islands Controversy, 2012-13. In deLisle, Jacqus, Goldstein, 
Avery, and Yang, Guobin. Ed. The Internet, Social Media, and a Changing China. University of 
Pennsylvania Press.  
Gries, Peter Hays. (2004). China’s New Nationalism: Pride, Politics, and Diplomacy. University 
of California Press. 
Gries, Peter Hays. (2004). China’s New Nationalism: Pride, Politics, and Diplomacy. University 
of California Press. 
Gries, Peter, Steiger, Derek, & Wang, Tao (2016) Social Media, Nationalist Proteests, and 
China’s Japan Policy: The Diaoyu Islands Controversy, 2012-13. In deLisle, Jacques, Goldstein, 
Avery, & Yang, Guobin (Eds.), The Internet, Social Media, and a Changing China, (161-179).  
Gultalsi, Selcuk. (2013, June 23). Turkey-EU Ties at ‘Record Low’ Level. Today’s Zaman. 
Hagström, Linus. (2005). Japan’s China Policy. Routledge.  
Haines, Daniel. (2017). Rivers Divided: Indus Basin Waters in the Making of India and Pakistan. 
Oxford University Press.  
Hanioğlu, M. Şükrü. (1995). The Young Turks in Opposition. Oxford University Press. 
Hansen, Thomas Blon. (1999). The Saffron Wave: Democracy and Hindu Nationalism in 




Harris, Robert and Paxman, Jeremy. (2002). A Higher Form of Killing: The Secret History of 
Chemical and Biological Warfare. Random House. 
Hata, Ikuhiko. (1981, August). Ryūjōko jiken no saikentō” (Reexamination of the Liutiaohu 
Incident). Seiji-keizaishi gaku 183.  
Hata, Ikuhiko. (1996). Rokōkyō jiken no kenkyū (A Study of the Marco Polo Bridge Incident). 
University of Tokyo Press. 
Hata, Ikuhiko. (2007). Nankin Jiken (The Nanjing Incident). Chūō Kōron Shinsha. 
Hattori Ryūji, Tsuchida Akio, and Gotō Harumi, eds. (2007). Senkanki no Higashi Ajia kokusai 
seiji, (International Politics in East Asia During the Inter-war Period). Chūō University Press, 
2007 
Hattori, Ryūji. (2001). Higashi Ajia kokusai kankyō no hendō to Nihon gaikō 1918–1931 
(Changes in the East Asian Diplomatic Environment and Japanese Diplomacy 1918–1931). 
Yūhikaku Publishing. 
Hattori, Ryūji. (2005). ‘Tanaka jōsōbun’ to Nit-Chū kankei’ (The “Tanaka Memorial” and Sino 
Japanese Relations) In Institute of Cultural Science, Chūō University, ed., Minkoku kōki 
Chūgoku Kokumintō seiken no kenkyū (Studies on the Chinese Nationalist Administration in the 
Latter Years of the Republic of China). Chūō University Press. 
Hattori, Ryūji. (2006). ‘Tanaka jōsōbun’ o meguru ronsō: jitsuzon setsu to gizō setsu no aida 
(The Debate Surrounding the “Tanaka Memorial”: Real or Fake?) In Liu Jie, Mitani Hiroshi, 
Yang Daqing, eds. Kokkyō o koeru rekishi ninshiki: Nit-Chū taiwa no kokoromi (Cross-Border 
Historical Recognition: An Attempt at Sino-Japanese Dialogue). Tokyo University Press. 
Hattori, Ryūji. (2006). Shidehara Kijūrō to nijusseiki no Nihon: gaikō to minshushugi 
(Shidehara Kijūrō and twentieth-century Japan: Diplomacy and Democracy) Yūhikaku 
Publishing. 
Hazou, Elias. 2018, February 20). Turkish Side Can’t Remain Patient Forever. Cyprus Mail. 
Helmreich, Paul C. (1974). From Paris to Sevres: The Partition of the Ottoman Empire at the 
Peace Conference of 1919–1920. Ohio State University Press. 
Henochowicz, Anne. (2012, August 16). Diaoyu Protesters ‘Backed by the State,’. China Digital 
Times. 
Henochowicz, Anne. (2012, August 29). Unnamed Protesters: Kill all Japanese. China Digital 
Times. 
Hevia, James Louis. (1995) Cherishing Men from Afar: Qing Guest Ritual and the Macartney 
Embassy of 1793. Duke University Press. 
Hicks, George. (1996). The 'Comfort Women, In Duus, Peter; Myers, Ramon Hawley; Peattie, 




Highlights from Greek Cypriot Press. (2019). Greek Cypriot Press. 
Highlights From Greek Press (2019, March17). BBC. 
Highlights from Greek Press. (2018, April 1). BBC. 
Highlights from Greek Press. (2018, March 31). BBC. 
Highlights from Greek Press. (2018, October 21). BBC. 
Highlights From Greek Press. (2019, October 27). BBC. 
Highlights from Turkish Cypriot Press. (2018, March 17-23). BBC. 
Highlihgts From Greek Press. (2018, May 26). BBC. 
Hindutva is Problematic Because of its Non-Democratic Aspects: Shashi Tharoor. (2019, March 
1). India Today. 
Hirayama Yō. (2004). Fukuzawa Yukichi no shinjitsu (The Truth about Fukuzawa Yukichi). 
Bungeishunjū.  
Hirschl, Ran. (2010). Constitutional Theocracy. Harvard University Press. 
Hobbs, Joseph J. (2008). World Regional Geography. CengageBrain. 
Hong, Junhao. (2007) The Internet Public Opinion and China’s Foreign Policy Making. In, Hao 
Yufan, and Lin Su, Chinese Foreign Policy Making: An Analysis of Societal Forces, (118-137). 
Shehui Kexue Wenxian Chubanshe. 
Hongo, Jun. (2007, June 26). Mitutoyo execs receive suspended terms. Japan Times. 
Hood, Christopher P. (2007). Bullets and Trains: Exporting Japan’s Shinkansen to China and 
Taiwan. The Asia-Pacific Journal 5(3). 
Hopf, Ted. (2012). Reconstructing the Cold War: The Early Years, 1945-1958. Oxford 
University Press. 
Howard, Philip, N. (2005). New Media Campaigns and the Managed Citizen. Cambridge 
University Press. 
Hsiao, Gene T. (1974). The Sino-Japanese Rapprochement: A Relationship of Ambivalence. The 
China Quarterly. 57(57). 101–123. 
Huang, Zijin. (2002, March). Manshū Jihen zengo ni okeru Kokumin seifu no tai-Nichi seisaku 
(The Nationalist Government’s Japan Policy Before and After the Manchurian Incident). Higashi 
Ajia kindaishi 5.  
Hussain, Touqir. (2018, June 21). Why Pakistan Needs a Democratic Revolution. The Diplomat. 




Huth, Paul, & Russett, Bruce. (1993). General Deterrence Between Enduring Rivals: Testing 
Three Competing Models. The American Political Science Review, 87(1), 61-73. 
Ians. (2021, September 11th). Ahmad Shah Massoud's Prophetic Words: For Peace in 
Afghanistan, Pakistan Must be Kept Away. The Express Tribune.  
Ignatieff, Michael. (2015, September 6). This isn’t a ‘European Problem’. The New York Times. 
Ikenberry, G. John. (2008). The Rise of China and the Future of the West: Can the Liberal 
System Survive? Foreign Affairs, 87(1). 23-37. 
Imai, Takeo. (1964). Shina Jihen no Kaisō (Reminiscences on the China Incident). Misuzu 
Shobō. 
India, Pakistan report deadly violence along Kashmir border. (2020, November 13). Al Jazeera. 
Inoue, Toshikazu. (1994). Kiki no naka no kyōchō gaikō (Cooperative Diplomacy in Crisis) 
Yamakawa Shuppansha. 
Itoh, Mayumi. (2012). The Origin of the LT Trade Agreement. Pioneers of Sino Japanese 
Relations. Palgrave Macmillan. 
Jaffrelot, Christophe. (1999). The Hindu Nationalist Movement and Indian Politics: 1925 to the 
1990s: Strategies of Identity-Building, Implantation and Mobilisation. Penguin Books.  
Jameson, Sam. (1985, August 16). Nakasone’s Visit to Wartime Shrine Criticized. Los Angeles 
Times. 
Janowski, Tomasz, Kaneko, Kaori, Wee Sui-Lee, and Macfie, Nick. (2012, April 17). Tokyo 
governor seeks to buy islands disputed with China. Reuters. 
Jansen, Marius B. (2002). The Making of Modern Japan. Harvard University Press. 
Japan: The Elusiveness of Reform. (2012, December 15). The Guardian. 
Japan-China Public Opinion Survey 2019. (2019) The Genron NPO.  
Japanese Ministry of Foreign Affairs, (1965). ed., Nihon gaikō nenpyō narabini shuyō bunsho 
(Chronological Table and Important Documents of Japanese Diplomacy).1. Hara Shobō. 404–
416.  
Japan-U.S. Alliance Cannot be Maintained by Words ‘Trust Me”. (2010, February 10). Japan 
Economic Newswire. 
Jervis, Robert, Lebow, Richard Ned, & Stein, Janice Gross. (1985) Psychology and Deterrence. 
John Hopkins University Press. 





Joint Communique of the Government of Japan and the Government of the People's Republic of 
China. (1972, September 29).  
Kadioğlu, Ayşe. (1996). The Paradox of Turkish Nationalism and the Construction of Official 
Identity. Middle Eastern Studies, 32(2), 177-193. 
Kaifee, Sib. (2019, July 21). Trump-Khan Summit ‘Arranged through MBS’. Arab News. 
Kaiser, Hilmar. (2007). Armenian Property, Ottoman Law and Nationality Policies during the 
Armenian Genocide, 1915-1916. In, Farschid, Olaf, Kropp, Manfred, and Dähne, Stephan. Ed., 
The First World War as Remembered in the Countries of the Eastern Mediterranean. Orient-
Institut.  
Kanli, Yusuf. (2015, May 8). Seeking a Magician in Cyprus. Hurriyet. 
Kanli, Yusuf. (2016, January 22). Trilateral Meeting for Cyprus, Finally…. Hurriyet.  
Karagul, Ibrahim. (2011, June 21). They Must be Scared Witless! Yeni Safak. 
Karakus, Kadir, and Ozer, Sarp. (2015, January 30). Speculation Ended in Defeat. Anadolu.  
Karsavuran, Orhun Cem. (2019). Construction of New Turkey: Turkish Identity in Transition: 
From Kemalist Hyper-Modernism to Religious Conservatism. Peter Lang Publishing. 
Katō, Yōko. (2007). Manshū Jihen kara Nit-Chū Sensō e (From the Manchurian Incident to the 
Sino-Japanese War). Iwanami Shoten. 
Katsumi, Usui. (1972. Nihon to Chūgoku: Taishō jidai (Japan and China in the Taishō Era) 
Hara Shobō. 61–89. 
Kaufman, Alison Adcock. (2010) The “Century of Humiliation,” Then and Now:Chinese 
Perceptions of the International Order. Pacific Focus 25(1). 1-33. 
Keck Zachary. (2014, September 4). The CCP Didn’t Fight Imperial Japan; the KMT Did. The 
Diplomat. 
Keck, Margaret E. and Sikkink, Kathryn. (1998). Activists beyond Borders: Advocacy Networks 
in International Politics. Cornell University Press. 
Kelley, Lane; Shenkar, Oded. Eds. (1993). International Business in China. Psychology Press. 
Kemp, Geoffrey. (2010). The East Moves West: India, China, and Asia's Growing Presence in 
the Middle East. Brookings Institution Press.  
Key Jr. V.O. (1963) The Responsible Electorate: Rationality in Presidential voting, 1936-1960. 
Harvard University Press.  





Kieser, Hans-Lukas. (2010). Germany and the Armenian Genocide of 1915–17. In. Friedman, 
Jonathan C. (Ed.). The Routledge History of the Holocaust. Taylor and Francis. 
Kim, Hong N. (1975). Sino-Japanese Relations since the Rapprochement. Asian Survey. 15(7). 
559–573. 
Kimura Kan. (2007). Kōsō, Minpi (King Gojong and Queen Min). Minerva Shobō. 
Kingsley, Patrick. (2018, April 21). Tiny Islands Make for Big Tensions Between Greece and 
Turkey. The New York Times. 
Kingsley, Patrick. (2018, April 22). Incursions By Turkey Put Greece on Alert. The New York 
Times. 
Kitsantonis, Niki. (2018, May 21). 75-Year-Old Mayor is Attacked in Greece, and Nationalists 
Rejoice.  The New York Times.  
Kitson, Peter J. (2013) Forging Romantic China: Sino-British Cultural Exchange 1760-1840. 
Cambridge University Press. 
Kiyoshi, Kiyosawa. (1979). Ankoku nikki (Diary of Darkness). Hyōronsha. 
Kobayashi, Tatsuo and Shimada, Toshihiko, eds. (1964). Manshū Jihen (The Manchurian 
Incident), Gendaishi shiryō 7. Misuzu Shobō. 
Kollewe, Julia. (2018, August 17). Turkish Lira Weakens Aftr US Threatens More Sanctions. 
The Guardian. 
Komireddi, Kapil. (2019, August 6). Humiliating Kashmir is part of Modi’s plan to remake 
India. The Guardian. 
Konstandaras, Nikos. (2014, December 2). Is the Cyprus Issue Insoluble? The New York Times. 
Kornicki, Peter, Francis. (1998) The Book in Japan: A Cultural History from the Beginning to 
the Nineteenth Century. BRILL. 
Krainin, Colin, & Ramsay, Kristopher, W. (2021) Dyadic Conflict: Elites, Citizens, and War. 
Journal of Politics. 
Krebs, Ronald R. (2015). Tell me a Story: FDR, Narrative, and the Making of the Second World 
War. Security Studies, 24(1), 131-170.  
Kristof, Nicholas D. (1995, March 17). Unmasking Horror: A Special Report. Japan Confronting 
Gruesome War Atrocity. The New York Times. 
Kulke, Hermann, and Rothermund, Dietmar. (2004). A History of India. Psychology Press. 





Landler, Mark, and Hirschfeld Davis, Julie. (2017, November 6)a. Trump Tells Japan it can 
Protect Itself by Buying U.S. Arms. The New York Times. 
Landler, Mark, and Hirschfeld Davis, Julie. (2017, November 7)b. Trump Tells Japan it can 
Protect Itself by Buying U.S. Arms. The New York Times. 
Lawrence, Martin. (1924). Treaties of Peace, 1919–1923. Carnegie Endowment for International 
Peace 
Lebow, Richard, Ned. (1981) Between Peace and War: The Nature of International Crisis. John 
Hopkins University Press.  
Lee, Chong-sik. (1967). Counterinsurgency in Manchuria: the Japanese experience 1931-40. 
RAND Corporation, Memorandum RM-S0 1 2-ARPA. 
Lee, John. (2015, September 19). Tokyo to Take a Tougher Line with China. The New York 
Times.  
Lee, Taeku. (2002). Mobilizing Public Opinion: Black Insurgency and Racial Attitudes in the 
Civil Rights Era. The University of Chicago Press.  
Leidig, Evian. (2020). Hindutva as a Variant of Right-Wing Extremism. Patterns of Prejudice, 
54(3), 215-237. 
Leonhard, Robert. (2016). The China Relief Expedition: Joint Coalition Warfare in China, 
Summer 1900. Applied Physics Laboratory, Johns Hopkins University. 
Li, Xiaobing. (2012). China at War: An Encyclopedia. ABC-CLIO. 
Li, Xiaokun and Wang, Chenyan. (2012, September 17). UN to Get Shelf Submission. China 
Daily. 
Liu, Jiangdu. (n.d.) Kunyi zouqing chi mishang E’guo cu Ri huan Liao yuyi Xinjiang shu cheng 
wei xie pian (Gen eral Liu Kunyi proposed that the Emperor secretly make an offer to Russia to 
recover Liaodong from Japan in exchange for some cities in Xinjiang). 
Lüthi, Lorenz M. (2008) The Sino-Soviet Split: Cold War in the Communist World. Princeton 
University Press. 
Lyon, Peter. (2008). Conflict Between India and Pakistan: An Encyclopedia. ABC-CLIO, Inc. 
Ma Qian (Ed.)., (2012, March 16). China’s Patrol Fleet Patrols Diaoyu Islands. People’s Daily 
Online. 
MacFarquhar, Roderick. Fairbank, John K. Twitchett, Denis C. (1991). The Cambridge History 
of China. Cambridge University Press. 
Mahadevan, Prem. (2017, December). India and the Global Discourse on State-sponsored 




Margolis, Eric. (2004). War at the Top of the World: The Struggle for Afghanistan, Kashmir, and 
Tibet. Routledge. 
Marshall, Monty G., Cole, Benjamin R., Ramsey Marshall, Donna, Elzinga, Eliot, Elzinga-
Marshall, Gabrielle. (2020, ongoing). Polity V: Political Regime Characteristics and Transitions, 
1800-2018. Center for Systemic Peace.  
Masaharu, Katsuta. (2003) Seijika: Ōkubo Toshimichi (Ōkubo Toshimichi, the Politician). 
Kodansha Ltd. 
Masalski, Kathleen Woods. (2001, November). Examining the Japanese History Textbook 
Controversies. Stanford Program on International and Cross-Cultural Education. 
Masangkay, May. (2016, December 23). Students in Japan See Trump’s Rise Spurring Debate on 
Tricky Topics. Japan Economic Newswire. 
Masuda, Hiroshi. (1995). Ishibashi Tanzan Chūō Kōronsha. 
Masuda, Masayuki. (2003). Japan’s Changing ODA Policy Towards China. China Perspectives, 
358.  
Mathews, Jay. (1989, June 2). Chinese Army Moving Closer to Protesters: Finances, Leadership 
Split Student Ranks. The Washington Post. 
Mayhew, David R. (1974). Congress: The Electoral Connection. Yale University Press 
Mearsheimer, John J. (2001). The Tragedy of Great Power Politics. W.W. Norton & Company. 
Meisner, Maurice (1999) Mao’s China and After: A History of the People’s Republic. Free Press. 
Mertha, Andrew C. (2010) China’s Water Warriors: Citizen Action and Policy Change. Cornell 
University Press. 
Miles, James. (2009, June 2) Tiananmen Killings: Were the Media Right? BBC. 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan (MoFA). (1993). ed., Gaimushō shitsumu hōkoku: Tōa 
Kyoku (Report on Official Business of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan: Bureau of 
Asiatic Affairs), vol. 3 (1937 [1]) Kuresu Shuppan. 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Japan. (2016). Overview of Official Development Assistance (ODA) 
to China. 
Mitchell, Richard H. (1997). George Hicks. The Comfort Women: Japan's Brutal Regime of 
Enforced Prostitution in the Second World War, The American Historical Review, 102(2), 503 
Mitzen, Jennifer (2006) Ontological Security in World Politics: State Identity and the Security 
Dilemma. European Journal of International Relations, 12(3), 341-370. 
MoFA, ed., (1966). Nihon gaikō nenpyō narabi ni shuyō bunsho (Chronological Table and 
Important Documents of Japanese Diplomacy), vol. 2. (Tokyo: U.N. Association of Japan, 1955; 




Morgan, Jason. (2018, March 24) How Beijing Weaponizes ;Comfort Women’ as Propaganda 
Tool. Asia Times.  
Morley, J.W. (1983). Ed. The China Quagmire: Japan's Expansion on the Asian Continent, 
1933-41. Columbia University Press. 
Moteki, Hiromichi. (n.d.). China’s anti-Japanese Propaganda Warfare in the United States. 
Society for the Dissemination of Historical Fact. 
Mueller, John E. (1973). War, Presidents and Public Opinion. John Wiley & Sons. 
Murao, Akira. (2018, September 7). Ishiba Attacks Abe for Shifting Stance on Constitutional 
Revision. The Mainichi. 
N.A. (1891). Kōbun ruisan, vol. 9, Meiji 24. 
Nacos, Brigitte, L. (1990) The Press: Presidents and Crises. Columbia University Press. 
Nadeau, Paul. (2020, July 20) Japan Can’t Count on a Return to Normal in the U.S. Election. 
Tokyo Review. 
Nakajima, Gakusho. (2018) The Structure and Transformation of the Ming Tribute Trade 
System. In ed. Perez-Garcia, Manuel and De Sousa, Lucio, Global History and New Polycentric 
Approaches Europe, Asia and the Americas in a World Network System. Palgrave.  
Nakamura, Kita. (2018, December 18). Japan’s Plan to Pursue Aircraft Carrier Raises Question 
of Necessity. Japan Economic Newswire. 
Nanhai zibian nianpu. Zhongguoshi xuehui (Association of Chinese Historians). (1957)., ed. 
Wuxu bianfa, Vol. 4 Shanghai Renmin Chubanshe 
Narayanan, Raviprasad. (2010). The India-Pakistan Dyad: A Challenge to the Rest or to 
Themselves? Asian Perspective, 34(4), 165-190. 
Nathan, Andrew J. (2009, June 3) The Consequences of Tiananmen. Reset Dialogues on 
Civilization. 
Nathan, Andrew. (2002). On the Tiananmen Papers. Foreign Affairs. 80(1). 2–48. 
Naughton, Barry. (2007). The Chinese Economy: Transitions and Growth. MIT Press. 
Nawaz, Shuja (2008). Crossed Swords: Pakistan, Its Army, and the Wars Within. Oxford 
University Press. 
Nelson, Hank. (2008). The Consolation Unit: Comfort Women at Rabaul. The Journal of Pacific 
History 43(1), 1-21. 
Newman, William L. (1963). America Encounters Japan: From Perry to MacArthur. The Johns 
Hopkins University Press. 




Nish, Ian. (1990). An Overview of Relations between China and Japan, 1895-1945. The China 
Quarterly, 124. 601-623. 
Noor, Sanam. (2007). Pakistan-India Relations and Terrorism. Pakistan Horizon, 60(2), 65-84. 
Ogreten, Tunca. (2014, November 24.) If Rent-Seeking Stoppd, Unemployment will Double. 
Taraf. 
Ōsato, Hiroaki and Son, Ansuk, eds. (2002). Chūgokujin Nihon ryūgakushi kenkyū no gendankai 
(Current State of Research on the History of Chinese Study in Japan) Ochanomizu Shobō. 
Özkirimli, Umut, and Sofos, Spyros. (2008). Tormented by History: Nationalism in Greece and 
Turkey. Columbia University Press. 
Özoğlu, Hakan. (2011). From Caliphate to Secular State: Power Struggle in the Early Turkish 
Republic. Praeger Publishers. 
Pakistan Blames India, Afghanistan for Terror Attack on Chinese Engineers. (2021, August 12). 
Business Standard.  
Pakistan NSA Accuses India of Orchestrating Lahore Bomb Attack. (2021, July 5). Al Jazeera. 
Pak-wah Leung, Edwin. (2011). Prelude to the Diaoyutai Dispute: Chinese-Japanese 
Controversy Over the Liuqiu Islands as Seen from an International System-Change Perspective. 
In, Hao, Yufan, and Chou, Bill KP. Ed. China’s Policies on its Borderlands and the 
International Implications. World Scientific 
Parry, Richard Lloyd. (2007, February 25). Dissect Them Alive: Order Not to be Disobeyed. 
Times Online. 
Peloni, Aristoteleia. (2014, August 30). Turkish-Israeli Pressure over Anti-Racism Bill. Ta Nea. 
Peloni, Aristotelia. (2010, June 12). The Islamic Slide Worries Athens. Ta Nea. 
PM Tsipras: Greece on the Final Stretch Before Exiting Memoranda. (2018, April 4). ANA-MPA. 
Polakow-Suransky, Sasha. (2018, July 23). The Far-Right Doesn't Have to Win to Set the 
Legislative Agenda. The Guardian. 
Polmar, Norman, and Norris, Robert S. (2009). The U.S. Nuclear Arsenal: A History of Weapons 
and Delivery Systems since 1945. Naval Institute Press.  
Premier Pledges New Reforms Amid Mounting Wstern Criticism. (2014, May 4). Today’s 
Zaman. 
Pritchard, R. John, Zaide, Sonia M., and Watt, Donald Cameron. (1981). The Tokyo War Crimes 
Trial. Garland Pub. 
Pua, Derek, Dybbro, Danielle, and Rogers, Alistair. (2017). Unit 731: The Forgotten Asian 




Putnam, Robert D. (1988). Diplomacy and Domestic Politics: the Logic of Two-Level Games. 
International Organization 42(3), 427-460.  
Pye, Lucian W. (1990). Tiananmen and Chinese Political Culture: The Escalation of 
Confrontation from Moralizing to Revenge. Asian Survey. 30(4). 331–47. 
Qiao, Liang & Wang Xiangsui. (1999) Unrestricted Warfare. Beijing: PLA Literature and Arts 
Publishing House. 
Rabo, Annika. (2005). A Shop of One’s Own: Independence and Reputation among Traders in 
Aleppo. I. B. Tauris. 
Radnock, Robert W. (1998). Regional Geopolitics in a Globalising World: Kashmir in 
Geopolitical Perspective. Geopolitics, 3(2). 1-29. 
Rashiduzzaman, M. (March 1972). Leadership, Organization, Strategies and Tactics of the 
Bangla Desh Movement. Asian Survey. 12(3), 185-20 
Ratkiewicz, J., Conover, M.D., Meiss, M., Goncalves, B., Flammini, A., & Menczer, F. (2011). 
Detecting and Tracking Political Abuse in Social Media. Proceedings of the Fifth International 
AAI Conference on Weblogs and Social Media, 297-304.  
Reilly, James. (2012). Strong Society, Smart State: The Rise of Public Opinion in China’s Japan 
Policy. Columbia University Press. 
Reilly, James. (2013) A Wave to Worry About? Public Opinion, Foreign Policy and China’s 
Anti-Japan Protests. Journal of Contemporary China 23(86). 197-215. 
Richelson, Jeffrey T.; Evans, Michael L., eds. (1999, June 1). Tiananmen Square, 1989: The 
Declassified History — Document 13: Secretary of State's Morning Summary for June 4, 1989, 
China: Troops Open Fire. National Security Archive. 
Roberts, Jeffery J. (2003). The Origins of Conflict in Afghanistan. Greenwood Publishing Group. 
Rogin, Josh. (2017, December 10) China’s Foreign Influence Operations are Causing Alarm in 
Washington. The Washington Post. 
Rose, Caroline. (2005). Sino-Japanese relations: Facing the past, looking to the future? 
Routledge. 
Rousseau, David L. & Garcia-Retamero, Rocio. (2007). Identity, Power, and Threat Perception: 
A Cross-National Experimental Study. The Journal of Conflict Resolution, 51(5), 744-771. 
Ruff-O'Herne, Jan. (1994). Fifty years of silence. Editions Tom Thompson. 
Russett, Bruce & Oneal John. (2001). Triangulating Peace: Democracy, Interdependence, and 
International Organizations. W.W. Norton & Company. 
Russett, Bruce. (1990). Controlling the Sword: The Democratic Governance of National 




Saaler, Sven. (2005). Politics, Memory and Public Opinion: The History Textbook Controversy 
and Japanese Society. IUDICIUM Verlag GmbH. 
Saich, Tony. (2011) Governance and Politics of China. Palgrave Macmillan. 
Saito Seiji, (2001). Nichidoku chintao senso [The German-Japanese Qingdao War]. 
Yumanishobo. 
Sakai Tetsuya. (2007). Kindai Nihon no kokusai chitsujoron (Modern Japan’s View of the 
International Order). Iwanami Shoten. 
Sarkar, Kanishka. (2020, May 7). Imran Khan claims India could launch ‘false flag operation’ 
against Pakistan. Hindustan Times. 
Satoshi, Hirano. (2007). Dai-Shin teikoku to Chūka no konmei, (The Great Qing Empire and the 
Crisis in Sinocentrism). Kodansha Ltd. 
Schaller, Dominik J., and Zimmerer, Jürgen. (2008). Settlers, Imperialism, Geonocide: Seeing 
the Global without Ignoring the Local – Introduction. Journal of Genocide Rsearch, 10(2). 191-
199. 
Schelling, Thomas C. (1960) The Strategy of Conflict. Harvard University Press. 
Schelling, Thomas C. (1966) Arms and Influence. Yale University Press. 
Schelling, Thomas C. (1984) Choice and Consequence. Harvard University Press. 
Schimmelpenninck van der Oye, David. (2005) The Immediate Origins of the War. In Steinberg 
et al. The Russo-Japanese War in Global Perspective (History of Warfare). BRILL 
Schofield, Victoria. (2000). Kashmir in Conflict: India, Pakistan and the Unending War. 
I.B.Tauris. 
Senshi, Sōsho. (1975). (War History Series) 86. Asagumo Shimbunsha. 
Shah, Aqil. (2014). The Army and Democracy: Military Politics in Pakistan. Harvard University 
Press. 
Shim, Elizabeth. (2018, Jan 10). China Scolds Japan Over Issue of Comfort Women. United 
Press International. 
Shimbun, Sankei. (2018, January 25) History Wars: Chinese Propaganda Against Japan Gains 
Ground in Canada. Japan Forward. 
Shin, Kawashima. (2004). Chūgoku kindai gaikō no keisei (The Formation of Modern Chinese 
Diplomacy). University of Nagoya Press.  
Shin, Kawashima. (2006). Kankei kinmitsuka to tairitsu no genkei: Nis-Shin Sensōgo kara Nijū-
Ikkajō Yōkyū made (Prototype of Closer Ties and Conflict: from the Sino-Japanese War of 




Kokkyō o koeru rekishi ninshik i (Cross-Border Historical Recognition) University of Tokyo 
Press. 
Shin’ichi et. al. (2011). Japan-China Joint History Research Report. (n.p.) 
Shirk, Susan. (2007). China: Fragile Superpower. Oxford University Press. 
Shōji, Jun’ichirō. (1993). Nit-Chū Sensō no boppatsu to Konoe Fumimaro no taiō (The Outbreak 
of the Sino-Japanese War and Konoe Fumimaro’s Response). Shin bōei ronshū 15(3). 
Shultz, Kenneth A. (2001). Looking for Audience Costs. Journal of Conflict Resolution, 45(1), 
32-60. 
Sikkink, Kathryn. (2011). The Justice Cascade: How Human Rights Prosecutions Are Changing 
World Politics. W. W. Norton & Company. 
Silver, Laura, and Devlin, Kat. (2020, January 10). Around the World, More Se the U.S. 
Positively than China, but Little Confidence in Trump or Xi. Pew Research Center. 
Smith, Anthony D. (1996). Culture, Community, and Territory: The Politics of Ethnicity and 
Nationalism. International Affairs, 72(3), 445-458. 
Smoke, Ben. (2018, December 28). The Christmas Channel Crossings Show How Cruelly 
Britain Treats Refuges. The Guardian. 
Sneider, Daniel. (2013) Textbooks and Patriotic Education: Wartime Memory Formation in 
China and Japan. Asia-Pacific Review, 20(1), 35-54. 
Snow, Shawn. (2016, 19 September). Analysis: Why Kashmir Matters. The Diplomat. 
Snyder, Glen Herald, & Diesing, Paul. (1977) Conflict Among Nations: Bargaining, Decision 
Making, and System Structure in International Crises. Princeton University Press. 
Snyder, Jack & Borghard, Erica D. (2011). The Cost of Empty Threats: A Penny, Not a Pound. 
American Political Science Review, 105(3), 437-456. 
Soble, Jonathan. (2015, September 19). Foes of Abe’s Plans for Military Cite Iraq. The New York 
Times.  
Soucek, Svatopluk. (2015). Ottoman maritime wars, 1416-1700. The Isis Press. 
Starr, John Bryan. (2011) Understanding China: A Guide to China’s Economy, History, and 
Political Culture. Hill and Wang. 
Statcounter Global Stats Search Engine Market Share China. (2019, Dec 31). Statcounter. 
Statcounter Global Stats Search Engine Market Share Greece. (2019, Dec 31). Statcounter. 
Statcounter Global Stats Search Engine Market Share India. (2019, Dec 31). Statcounter. 




Statcounter Global Stats Search Engine Market Share Pakistan. (2019, Dec 31). Statcounter. 
Statcounter Global Stats Search Engine Market Share Turkey. (2019, Dec 31). Statcounter. 
Statement on the Confucius Institute at the University of Chicago. (2014, September 25). 
UChicago News. 
Stein, Burton; Arnold, David. (2010). A History of India. John Wiley and Sons. 
Steinberg, John W. (2008) Was the Russo-Japanese War World War Zero? The Russian Review. 
67(1). 1-7. 
Steiner, Thomas. (n.d.) https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:TratadoDeSevres1920.svg. 
Takahashi Hidenao. (1995). Nis-Shin Sensō e no michi (The Path to the Sino-Japanese War of 
1894–95). Tokyo Sōgensha. 
Takano, Yayori. (2010) Foreign Influence and the Transformation of Early Modern Japan. 
Emory Endeavors Journal. 
Takashi Okamoto. (2004). Zokkoku to jishu no aida: Kindai Shin-Kan kankei to Higashi Ajia no 
meiun (Between a Tributary and an Autonomous State: Modern Qing-Korea Relations and the 
Fate of East Asia. University of Nagoya Press. 
Takenaka , Kiyoshi, and Tait, Paul. (2012, September 5). Japan to Buy Disputed East China Sea 
Islands – Media. Reuters. 
Talbot, Ian, Singh, Gurharpal. (2009). The Partition of India. Cambridge University Press 
Tamura, Yoshio (1992). Demons from the East: Unit 731. In Cook, Haruko Taya; Cook, 
Theodore F. (eds.). Japan at War: An Oral History. The New Press. 
Tang, Qihua. (1998). Beijing zhengfu yu guoji lianmeng 1919–1928. Dongda tushu gongsi. 
Tannenwald, Nina. (1999). The Nuclear Taboo: The United States and the Normative Basis of 
Nuclear Non-Use. International Organization 53(3), 433-468. 
Tarrow, Sidney. (1988). National Politics and Collective Action: Recent Theory and Research in 
Western Europe and the United States. Annual Review of Sociology, 14. 421-440. 
Tastekin, Fehim. (2013, June 10). Gezi Foreign Front. Radikal.  
Teradaira, Tadasuke. (1970). Rokōkyō jiken: Nihon no higeki (The Marco Polo Bridge Incident: 
Japan’s Tragedy) Yomiuri Shimbunsha. 
To End “Yahoo! Category” “Ended Role”. (2017, June 29). ITMedia.  
Tobe, Ryochi. (2011). The Manchurian Incident to the Second Sino-Japanese War. In, Shin’ichi, 
et. al. Ed.  Japan-China Joint History Research Report. (n.p.) 
Tobe, Ryōichi. (1991). Pīsu fīrā: Shina Jihen Wahei Kōsaku no Gunzō (Peace Feelers: The 




Tokitō, Hideto. (1983, December). Inukai Tsuyoshi to Manshū jihen (InukaiTsuyoshi and the 
Manchurian Incident). Seiji-keizaishi gaku 209.  
Tomz, Michael. (2007). Domestic Audience Costs in International Relations: An Experimental 
Approach. International Organization, 61(4), 821-840. 
Tōyama Shigeki. (1951). “Nis-Shin Sensō to Fukuzawa Yukichi” (Fukuzawa Yukichi and the 
Sino-Japanese War of 1894–95). Fukuzawa kenkyū.   
Traynor, Ian. (2015, October 15). Big Decisions Unlikely at Migration Summit as EU Leaders 
Aim to Avoid Rows; Every Area of Policy Being Discussed is Hotly Contested and the 
Likelihood is High that the Actions Following the Summit will Fail to Match the Rhetoric. The 
Guardian. 
Treaty of Peace and Friendship between Japan and the People's Republic of China. (1978).  
Tremblay, Reeta, and Bonner, Michelle D. (2019, October 28). In India, Modi’s Nationalism 
Quashes Dissent with Help from the Media. The Conversation.  
Trump Calls for Change in Security Pact with Japan but no Scrapping. (2019, June 29). Japan 
Economic Newswire. 
Trumpener, Ulrich. (1968). Germany and the Ottoman Empire, 1914-1918. Princeton University 
Press.  
Tsebelis, George. (1990). Nested Games: Rational Choice in Comparative Politics. University of 
California Press. 
Turkey Exerting “Brutal Pressure” to Influence Bulgarian Election – Paper. (2017, March 13). 24 
Chasa.  
Turkey: Social Media Highlights. (2018, December). BBC-Twitter. 
Turkey: Social Media Highlights. (2019, June 3). BBC-Turkish Social Media. 
U.S. and European Union Arms Sales Since the 1989 Embargoes. (1998, April 28). United States 
General Accounting Office.  
U.S. Mission to China (2020, March) 2019 Country Reports on Human Rights Practices: China. 
U.S. Embassy and Consulates in China.  
Uchida, Naotaka. (2006). Kahoku jihen no kenkyū (Studies in the North China Incident) Kyūko 
Shoin. 
Uchiyama Yū. (2010) Koizumi and Japanese Politics: Reform Strategies and Leadership Style. 
Routledge. 
UN General Assembly Resolution 2758. (1971). Restoration of the Lawful Rights of the People's 




Üngör, Uğur Ümit. (2011). The Making of Modern Turkey: Nation and State in Eastern Anatolia, 
1913–1950. Oxford: Oxford University Press.  
United States Office of War Information Psychological Warfare Team, Attached to U.S. Army 
Forces India-Burma Theater. (1944) Japanese Prisoner of War Interrogation Report 49. 
Unquenchable thirst. (2011, November 19). The Economist. 
Usui, Katsumi. (1998). Nit-Chū gaikōshi kenkyū (Studies in the Diplomatic History of Japan-
China Relations). Yoshikawa Kōbunkan. 
Verma, Virendra Sahai (2006). "Sino-Indian Border Dispute At Aksai Chin – A Middle Path For 
Resolution" (PDF). Journal of Development Alternatives and Area Studies. 25 (3) 
Viewpoint: Has India pushed Kashmir to a point of no return? (2020, August 13). BBC. 
Walker, Christopher J. (1980). Armenia: The Survival of a Nation. St. Martin's Press. 
Wallace, Jeremy L. & Chen Weiss, Jessica. (2015) The Political Geography of Nationalist 
Protest in China: Cities and the 2012 Anti-Japanese Protests. The China Quarterly, 222, 403-
429. 
Walt, Stephen M. (1985) Alliance Formation and the Balance of World Power. International 
Security 9(4), 3-43. 
Walt, Stephen M. (1987). The Origin of Alliance. Cornell University Press.  
Walt, Stephen M. (1988) Testing Theories of Alliance Formation: The Case of Southwest Asia. 
International Organization, 42(2), 275-316. 
Waltz, Kenneth N. (1979) Theory of International Politics. Addison-Wesley Publishing 
Company. 
Wang Yunsheng. (1987). Nit-Chū gaikō 60-nenshi (Sixty Years of Japanese-Sino Diplomacy), 
Trans. and Ed. Hatano Ken’ichi and Nagano Isao (Kensetsusha, Ryuukeishosha Publish. 
Wang, Dong. (2005) The Quarrelling Brothers: New Chinese Archives and a Reappraisal of the 
Sino-Soviet Split, 1959–1962. Cold War International History Project Working Paper Series. 
Wang, Qian. (2012, September 17). China Steps Up Vigilance at Sea. People’s Daily Online. 
Wang, Zheng. (2008). National Humiliation, History Education, and the Politics of Historical 
Memory: Patriotic Education Campaign in China. International Studies Quarterly, 52(4). 783-
806. 
War over water. (2002, June 3). The Guardian. 
Waraich, Omar. (2018, July 27). Pakistan’s Populist Triumph. The Atlantic. 
Ward, Thomas J. and Lay, William D. (2019, March 8) Statue Politics vs. East Asian Security: 




Weber, Max (1958) The Three Types of Legitimate Rule. Berkley Publications in Society and 
Institutions, 4(1), 1-11. 
Wee, Sui-Lee, and Maxim Duncan. (2012, September 15). Anti-Japan Protests Erupt in China 
Over Islands Row. Reuters. 
Weeks, Jessica L. (2008). Autocratic Audience Costs: Regime Type and Signaling Resolve. 
International Organization, 62(1), 35-64. 
Weeks, Jessica L.P. (2014). Dictators at War and Peace. Cornell University Press. 
Westad, Odd Arne. (2003). Decisive Encounters: The Chinese Civil War, 1946–1950. Stanford 
University Press 
White, J.B. (1984). When Words Lose Their meaning: Constitutions and Reconstitutions of 
Language, Character, and Community. University of Chicago Press. 
White, Theodore, H. (1968). China: The Roots of Madness, a Documentary. W.W. Norton. 
Wikileaks: Rahul Gandhi Feared Hindu Extremist Threat. (2010). BBC. 
Wilkinson Endymion Porter. (2000) Chinese History: A Manual. Harvard University Asia 
Center. 
Wilson, M. Brett. (2009). The First Translations of the Qur'an in Modern Turkey (1924–1938). 
International Journal of Middle East Studies, 41(3), 419–435. 
Wilson, Robert Arden. (1957) Geneis of the Meiji Government in Japan, 1868-1871. University 
of California Press. 
Withington, Thomas. (2001). The Early Anti-Taliban Team. Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, 
57(6), 13-15. 
Wong, Chun Han. (2015, December 29). China Shows Skepticism on Japan’s ‘Comfort Women’ 
Apology. Th Wall Street Journal. 
Wong, Mathew Y.H. (2018). Selectorate Theory in Hybrid Regimes: Comparing Hong Kong and 
Singapore. Government and Opposition, 53(4), 707-734 
Woodhouse, Christopher Montague. (1968). Modern Greece: A Short History. Faber and Faber. 
Wu, Renhua (April 23, 2010). 六四北京戒严部队的数量和番号 (Number of Beijing martial 
law units on June 4]. Boxun blog. Wu Renhua June 4 Anthology. 
Wu, Renhua. (2009). 六四事件中的戒严部队 (Military Units Enforcing Martial Law During 
the June 4 Incident). 真相出版社 (Truth Press). 
Wu, Renhua. (2011, June 4). 89天安门事件大事记：6月 4日 星期日 (1989 Tiananmen 
Events: Sunday, June 4). Boxun blog. Wu Renhua June 4 Anthology. 




Yao Chun and Ma Qian (Ed.)., (2012, July 10). Diaoyu Issue Needs More than Diplomacy. 
People’s Daily Online. 
Yasamee, Feroz. (1995). Nationality in the Modern Balkans: The Case of the Macedonians. In 
Balkans: A Mirror of the New International Order. Eren. 
Yasui, Sankichi. (1993). Rokōkyō Jiken (The Marco Polo Bridge Incident). Shuppan. 
Yasukuni Jinja. Retrieved from https://www.yasukuni.or.jp/english/ 
Ye, Zhaoyan Ye, Berry, Michael. (2003). Nanjing 1937: A Love Story. Columbia University 
Press 
Yetkin, Murat. (2014, August 25). Why did Erdoğan’s Middle East Policy Miss Goals? Hurriyet. 
Yilmaz, Ihsan. (2013, October 2). The New Democratization Package. Today’s Zaman. 
Yinac, Barcin. (2015, February 5). Turkish-Greek Relations Under Syriza. Hurriyet. 
Yinanc, Barcin. (2017, January 10). The Ball is in Ankara and Athens’ Court on Cyprus. 
Hurriyet. 
Yo, Sasaki. (2000). Shinmatsu Chūgoku ni okeru Nihonkan to Seiyōkan (Views of Japan and the 
West in the Late Qing Dynasty). University of Tokyo Press. 
Yoda, Yoshiie. (1996). The Foundations of Japan's Modernization: a comparison with China's 
Path towards Modernization. Brill. 
Yoshiaki, Yoshimi. (2000) Comfort Women: Sexual Slavery in the Japanese Military During 
World War II. Columbia University Press. 
Yoshino, Sakuzō. (1995) Yoshino Sakuzō senshū (A Selected Anthology of Writings by Yoshino 
Sakuzō), Vol. 9. Iwanami Shoten. 
Yurttagul, Ali. (2015, March 22). Where is Greece Heading? Today’s Zaman. 
Yurttagul, Ali. (2015, May 4). A Deafening Silence on the EU Front. Today’s Zaman. 
Zagoria, Donald S. (1986). The USSR and Asia in 1985: The First Year of Gorbachev. Asian 
Survey 36. 15-29. 
Zakowski, Karol. (2012). Reaction to Popular Pressure or a Political Tool? Different 
Interpretations of China’s Policy Regarding Koizumi’s Visit to the Yasukuni Shrine. Journal of 
Contemporary Eastern Asia 11(2), 47-60. 
Zaller, John R. (1992). The Nature and Origins of Mass Opinion. Cambridge University Press. 
Zhang, Liang. (2001). Nathan, Andrew; Link, Perry (eds.). The Tiananmen Papers: The Chinese 
Leadership's Decision to Use Force, in Their Own Words. Public Affairs 
Zhao, Dingxin. (2001). The Power of Tiananmen: State-Society Relations and the 1989 Beijing 




Zhao, Suisheng. (1998). A State-Led Nationalism: The Patriotic Education Campaign in Post-
Tiananmen China. Communist and Post-Communist Studies, 31(3). 287-302. 
Zhao, Suisheng. (2004). A Nation-State by Construction: Dynamics of Modern Chinese 
Nationalism. Stanford University Press. 
Zhao, Ziyang. (2009). Bao Pu; Renee Chiang; Adi Ignatius (eds.). Prisoner of the State: The 
Secret Journal of Premier Zhao Ziyang. Simon & Schuster. 
Zhu Rui and Yao Chun (Ed.)., (2012, September 8). China Should Strike Back Over Sale: 
Experts. People’s Daily Online. 
Zürcher, Erik J. (1984). The Unionist Factor: The Role of the Committee of Union and Progress 
in the Turkish National Movement. BRILL. 
 
